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Abstract 
The use of Social Networking has exploded, with millions of people using 
various web- and mobile-based services around the world. This increase in social 
networking use has led to user anxiety related to privacy and the exposure of 
personal information.  Large-scale sharing in virtual spaces means that researchers, 
designers and developers now need to re-consider the issues and challenges of 
maintaining privacy when using social networking services.  
 Some research has begun to focus on this area of privacy; however, it is 
limited in its application and scope. What is now required is a new design paradigm 
that provides all the expected functionality of social networking services, while at the 
same time preserving and maintaining all the elements of user privacy expectations. 
This current research has developed a Social Networking privacy framework 
and privacy model. It has also designed a three level architecture of Business, Data, 
and Technology, which is based on The Open Group Architecture 
Framework (TOGAF®). This framework and architecture provides a novel platform 
for investigating privacy in Social Networks (SNs) for both desktop and mobile 
devices. This approach mitigates many current SN privacy issues, and leads to a 
more controlled form of privacy assessment. Ultimately, more privacy will 
encourage more connections between people across SN services.  
In summary, this research has established a new privacy framework, privacy 
model, and privacy architecture to create more transparent and accountable privacy 
for social networking users. 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of this research by providing background 
information, explaining the research problem and questions, and outlining the 
research objectives and significance. It also presents the research scope and 
limitations, and the structure of this report. 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The practice of social networking has exploded, with millions of users across 
many and various web-based services. Social Networks (SNs) have become an 
important part of user social identity. People use their personal information to create 
a social profile, and then devote substantial time and energy to maintaining and 
manipulating their online persona in the SN. SNs have thus transformed the web into 
a new medium for social communities to share personal data such as contacts, 
pictures, activities, and other Personally Identifiable Information (PII). 
The initial intent of SNs was to facilitate this connection and sharing. Now, 
however, with the benefit of hindsight, SN users and specialists are looking at the 
privacy impact of such large-scale sharing; for example, 90% of 5627 respondents in 
22 countries ranked privacy issues as ‘troubling’, and also expressed anxiety about 
information privacy (KPMG International Cooperative, 2010). 
Of even greater concern is the emerging trend for users to continue social 
networking while physically moving from place to place, by using hand-held mobile 
communication devices. People who use one of the popular social networking sites 
(such as Facebook) on their mobile devices, are twice as active on the site as non-
mobile users (Facebook Inc., 2011b). This is of further privacy concern as mobile SN 
enables the real time spread of information, which can lead to immediate privacy 
breaches. This mobility, however, also leads to new challenges and opportunities for 
social networking services to enable more connections among people, and to exploit 
the fact that they are in close proximity. Making these connections, however, must be 
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based on strong relationships through symmetric or asymmetric scenarios. The 
challenge then is to achieve this, while still preserving and respecting each user’s 
privacy preference. Therefore, it is critical to provide privacy protection mechanisms 
for users’ personal information in mobile SNs, as well as in traditional web-based 
services.  
Privacy is an important component of a person’s freedom and plays a key role 
in protecting fundamental human rights. It is becoming increasingly difficult to 
ignore the fact that, without appropriate levels of privacy, a person’s freedom can be 
diminished. Failing to protect private, personal information affects everyone: friends, 
family, co-workers, relatives and many others. Every person has the right to share, 
disclose, access, rectify, delete, and block their own personal information unless 
legitimate legal reasons prevent this from occurring (European Commission, 2010).  
However, privacy is not simply the hiding of information; it is also the legitimate 
control over one’s own personal information. Without an individual’s explicit 
consent, nobody has the right to access another’s personal information unless there 
are laws permitting access to that information; for example, tax authorities may have 
access to income information from employers. This is particularly pertinent for SNs. 
Significantly, furthermore, any person has the ultimate right and freedom to exit the 
digital world. 
Users and consumers are beginning to express concerns about privacy in 
various ‘privacy invasive’ areas including: SNs (Cavoukian, 2009); cloud computing 
(Zeng & Cavoukian, 2010); health records (Cavoukian & Spencer, 2010); geo-
location services (Cavoukian, 2010b); video surveillance cameras (Cavoukian, 
2009); biometrics (Cavoukian & Stoianov, 2007); radio-frequency identifiers 
(RFIDs) (Cavoukian, 2009); mash-up applications (Cavoukian, 2009); network 
tracing and monitoring (Cavoukian, 2009); and whole body imaging (Cavoukian, 
2009). User and consumer anxiety arises after experiencing incidents that threaten 
their freedom. Technology experts (Skinner, 2010), researchers and industrialists are 
also expressing concerns about privacy invasion; indeed, they are concerned that 
privacy may not exist by the year 2020 (Cavoukian, 2010a).  
There is a fundamental conflict between SN objectives and privacy protection. 
By definition, SNs promote sharing through SN functionalities; this sharing is the 
very purpose of their existence. Privacy is not considered evil; indeed, in some 
 Chapter 1: Introduction 3 
circumstances, any necessary protection may itself be considered evil by some SN 
users. The question is, therefore, how SN users can be empowered to define their 
own (flexible and changeable) privacy preferences, and how they might be assured 
that protection is suitably implemented to deliver these preferences through SN 
functionalities. The primary objective is, therefore, to understand and manage user 
privacy requirements and protection as a mechanism for delivering reliably managed 
privacy policies through SN functionalities. 
Privacy can be conceptualized from a variety of discipline perspectives such as 
Social Sciences, Law, Architecture, Urban Design, Health Sciences and Computer 
and Information Science. However, the three main dimensions through which to 
describe and analyse privacy (Patil & Kobsa, 2009) are the legal, social and technical 
dimensions. The legal dimension focuses on laws, contracts and policies to protect 
individual privacy, whereas the social dimension concentrates on managing privacy 
according to individual and collective everyday social relationships and the 
boundaries between private and public life. The technical dimension aims to protect 
privacy through technical specifications by controlling (automatically and/or 
manually) data and information. As a result of legal breaches, civil and/or criminal 
penalties can occur, whereas social breaches can cause potential embarrassment or 
social breakdown in a relationship. Technical breaches can be a source of identity 
theft, unauthorized access, and illegal use of information (Patil & Kobsa, 2009). This 
technical dimension aligns with the privacy focus of this study; this research focused 
on this dimension to examine SN user privacy requirements. 
Typically, it is difficult to justify investment in privacy functionality unless it is 
motivated by a serious incident. An organization might, for example, use a ‘privacy 
policy’ to protect itself from negative outcomes, but may fail to plan for appropriate 
information systems privacy support due to inadequate risk analysis and limited 
Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs). Overall, then, these organizations fail to 
consider the value of their consumers’ personal information. External pressure to 
share personal information with ‘privacy-friendly’ third parties can also lead to 
various privacy-related issues.  
The privacy problem is complex: users want privacy but they seldom know 
‘how to specify’ and ‘what to seek’ for their own privacy (Shapiro, 2009). Embedded 
privacy-enhancing technology (PET) at the design level can be the solution for 
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ensuring privacy from the beginning of a system’s development. PET is a coherent 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) system that protects privacy by 
eliminating or reducing unnecessary disclosure, collection, retention, sharing, or 
trading of personal data without losing the functionality of information systems. 
While Langheinrich (2001) describes the following six principles to ensure privacy 
during the system design process as: ‘notice’, ‘choice and consent’, ‘proximity and 
locality’, ‘anonymity and pseudonymity’, ‘security’ and ‘access and recourse’, 
identifying that ‘something’ needs to be done, since private information may be 
stored forever in public places. 
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The current literature confirms that there are millions of users of social 
networking and, of course, there are significant numbers of sites linked to these 
users.  It is also likely that many of these users come with sensitive information. The 
aim of this research, therefore, was to improve future privacy by protecting such user 
information, and to thus foster more confident user engagement with SNs. 
Specifically, the objectives of this research were to: 
o Investigate the privacy requirements of SN users 
o Investigate the principles required to protect user privacy in SNs 
o Investigate the effectiveness of the privacy principles employed by the 
SN providers and convert these principles into a usable framework 
o Design SN  architecture based on the privacy framework 
1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
SNs have become the virtual public space for users’ private information. This 
trend is increasing by people using their hand-held devices to continue their SN 
access while they are mobile; some even suggest that being a part of SNs is positive 
for their mental health as long as they are able to protect their privacy1. The SN user 
loses this privacy, however, as soon as their information is published in virtual public 
places without appropriate protection. Clearly, protecting privacy is a paramount 
challenge for SNs. Figure 2 illustrates a person’s three primary types of information: 
private, protected and public 2 3 4. 
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Private information 
By definition, ‘private information’ can only be released: by the subject of the 
information to those who have a legitimate need-to-know reason; to outside entities 
with the subject’s permission; and/or to others, as allowed by law. Such information 
may include, for example: a social security number, a medical record number, a 
health plan number, account numbers, personal profile information, home or e-mail 
address, consumer purchase history, and physical characteristics.  
In theory, therefore, private information is owned, maintained and shared by 
the subject who has the legitimate right to share this information with others such as 
friends, family, and colleagues. A person may, however, consider the private 
information as shielded and may deliberately make it unavailable to others.  A person 
can specify their own privacy preference rules and disclose private information to 
others; however, sharing personal information, in any way, may eventually lead to 
major privacy issues in unforeseen circumstances.  
Protected information 
By definition, ‘protected information’ is information which, if disclosed, may 
affect the person directly in various contexts. Such information may include: legal 
investigations conducted by the government; information related to offences; 
criminal convictions; classified information; online activities; geo-locations; 
information revealing racial or ethnic origin; political opinions; religious or 
philosophical beliefs; trade-union memberships; information concerning medical or 
health conditions; sexual preferences; and genetic information. Disclosure of 
protected information is a significant issue that may affect a person even without any 
direct intervention.   
Public Information  
By definition, ‘public information’ is information which is available to anyone 
who requests it, and which can be released without express permission. Such 
information may include: names; work experiences; financial data on publicly 
sponsored projects; employment or educational verification; and public profiles. This 
information can also be ‘public’ in certain ‘personal’ online circumstances; for 
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example, a personal website can be ‘public’. Nevertheless, public information needs 
to be verifiable, and its provider accountable. 
 
Figure 1: Various entities in Social Networks 
 
Figure 2: Various types of information 
People may have their privacy compromised when engaging in social 
networking as it involves a significant amount of sharing of private, protected and 
public information (Refer Figure 1). It is likely that the owner of the private 
information (such as the sharing of one’s activities and pictures with friends, family 
and trusted colleagues) has the legitimate authority to share that information with 
others and/or to allow them to access it. They may wish to alter their private 
information, to protect it by using various protection mechanisms, or may choose to 
make it public information. However, an individual should be the ultimate owner of 
this information and must be capable of controlling it.   
SN members may protect certain information, such as related views and 
opinion or geo-location activities. Only particular clusters of people who have a 
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relationship with the subject of the information and/or who are deliberately selected 
by that person, can access the protected information. The disclosure of protected 
information – even to friends, family, colleagues or the SN provider – can 
significantly affect the subject of that information; it should, therefore, be carefully 
shielded. 
Another privacy issue arises when SNs cater to various internal and external 
organizational activities and, in so doing, may deliberately make personal 
information publicly visible. They may republish private information to the outside 
world, and can even harvest the collective wisdom of personal information from 
various sources and deliberately make it public without the consent of the owners of 
that information. It is, therefore, important to know who the authoritative sources of 
information are, and who is accountable for its publication. 
SN services deal with various data types, and SN user data can be classified for 
the user, for others, or from inference (Hart & Johnson, 2010). Categorizing SN data 
types and data entities (Schneier, 2010) is essential in order to specify user rights and 
privacy in SN services; this categorisation – into service, disclosed, behavioural, 
incidental, entrusted, and derived data – is illustrated in Figure 3 ( Refer Table 33 
For SN data types in tabular format).  
 
Figure 3: SN data types 
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Service data 
‘Service data’ is the data a user provides to a SN in order to use its services, 
and can include:  ‘basic profile information’; a ‘legal name’, ‘credit card 
information’ or ‘authentication information’. 
Disclosed data 
‘Disclosed data’ is the data a user provides on their own page, and can include: 
‘photographs’, ‘albums’, ‘messages’, ‘links’, or ‘comments’.  
Entrusted data 
‘Entrusted data’ is the data a user posts on other people’s pages. While it is 
similar to disclosed data, the user has no control over it. Included in the ‘Entrusted 
data’ category are: ‘Comments on friend's albums’; ‘comments on friend's notes 
(including tagged notes)’; ‘comments on friend's photos (and tagged photos)’; 
‘comments on friend's status updates that the participant was tagged in’; ‘comments 
on friend's videos (and tagged videos)’; ‘comments on friend's wall’; and ‘event 
RSVPs and public group memberships’ (Madejski, Johnson, & Bellovin, 2011).  
Incidental data 
‘Incidental data’ is the data other people post about the user. It is similar to 
disclosed data; however, in this case, the user has no control over the data and has 
not created it. Included in this category are: ‘Comments on friend's status updates 
that the participant was tagged in’; ‘comments on participants’ albums’; ‘comments 
on participants’ links’; ‘comments on participants’ notes and tagged notes’; 
‘comments on participants’ videos’; ‘comments on participants’ wall’; ‘comments on 
status updates’; ‘comments on the participants’ photos and tagged photos’; and 
‘status updates a participant was tagged in’ (Madejski et al., 2011).  
Behavioural data 
‘Behavioural data’ is data collected by SN services and includes: ‘games users 
play’; ‘news articles users access’; ‘topics users write about’; ‘user activities’ or ‘any 
activities in which a user engages’; and ‘what users say about political leanings’ 
(Schneier, 2010). 
Derived data 
 Chapter 1: Introduction 9 
‘Derived data’ is derived from all other data including: ‘mesh up data’ and 
‘location-based applications’. 
While SN service providers offer various services and functions – such as 
‘edit’, ‘share’, ‘export’, ‘delete’ various types of SN data and information– it is often 
not clear what rights SN users really have (Schneier, 2010). For example, users may 
wish: to delete their various types of information such as ‘private information’, or 
control ‘information sharing’ as their privacy requirements; to control access to some 
types of information but disclose other types of information; or to share information 
with one particular stakeholder, while restricting it to others. SN users may wish to 
share their information with individual stakeholders or share among a particular 
group. However, in the current paradigm, social networking sites have become a 
centralized system based platform that does not allow full control over individual 
information or practice of that control. This research focused, therefore, on 
protecting user privacy from various SN stakeholders. 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1.4.1 Summary of research questions  
The key research question was: How can user privacy be protected within 
Social Networks (SNs)? This key question was divided into the following sub-
questions: 
i) What are the privacy requirements of SN users? 
ii) What are the principles required to protect user privacy in SNs? 
iii) How effective are the privacy principles employed by the SN 
providers? How can these be integrated into a usable framework? 
iv) How does the privacy framework inform SN architecture? 
1.4.2  Formulation of research questions  
Key research question: How can user privacy be protected within Social Networks?  
The use of social networking has exploded, with millions of people using 
various web-based services around the world. This increase in SN use has led to user 
anxiety related to their privacy and the exposure of personal information.  Such 
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large-scale sharing in virtual spaces means that researchers, designers and developers 
now need to re-consider the issues and challenges of maintaining privacy in SN 
services.  Some research has begun to focus on this area of privacy; however, it is 
limited in its application and scope. What is required is a new design paradigm that 
provides all the expected functionality of SNs, while at the same time preserves and 
maintains all the elements of user privacy expectations. 
To ensure that privacy is a feature of SNs, it needs to: be a fundamental 
element that is considered and embedded in the initial design stages of the SN 
development process; exist by default within a system; and be considered throughout 
the system’s lifecycle. Controlling access to information from the design stage will 
eliminate the need for retrospectively dealing with privacy breaches after they have 
already caused significant personal embarrassment and/or damage. 
Research sub-questions  
i) What are the privacy requirements of SN users? 
There is a significant amount of private information (such as details of private 
activities and pictures) posted on SNs. This user information is generally shared with 
various entities such as friends, family, members of the public, and other trusted 
parties. SN members may also participate in various protected SN activities such as 
the sharing of related views and opinion or geo-location activities, and can disclose 
information through: i) identity disclosure; ii) link disclosure; and iii) attribute 
disclosure (Wu, Ying, Liu, & Chen, 2010). ‘Identity disclosure’ reveals the identity 
of an individual, whereas ‘link disclosure’ protects information shared by two 
individuals. ‘Attribute disclosure’ denotes protected information such as age, gender 
or income shared by two individuals. Such disclosure, even to friends or family, can 
significantly affect a person. However, privacy is not a matter of SNs simply hiding 
information, but of identifying specific user privacy requirements to ensure SN 
accountability.  
ii) What are the principles required to protect user privacy in SNs? 
It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the fact that SN user privacy is 
under threat, with nearly 8 out of 10 global consumers (79%) being concerned about 
their privacy (KPMG International Cooperative, 2010). SN service providers can use 
various policies to protect user information, such as: Langheinrich’s six principles 
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(2001), as outlined above; ‘Privacy by Design (PbD)’ (Cavoukian, 2009); or ‘Privacy 
by Redesign’ (PbRD)5 principles for directly adopting PET (explained above) at the 
system design level. One question that needs to be asked, however, is whether the 
principles currently employed by the SN providers are effective. The systematic 
study reported here identifies how these principles operate in SNs to ensure user 
privacy. 
iii. How effective are the privacy principles employed by the SN providers? 
How can these be integrated into a usable framework? 
SN users want privacy but seldom know ‘how to specify’ their needs or ‘what 
to seek’ in this regard (Shapiro, 2009). Embedding PET at the design level can 
ensure privacy from the beginning of a system’s development. Langheinrich’s six 
principles (2001), as outlined above can ensure privacy during the system design 
process. The Common Criteria (CC) (Blarkom, Borking, & Olk, 2003; Denning, 
1999) can also be applied to evaluate the privacy compliance and security properties 
of ICT products and systems. These  CC can be applied to reach a wider audience in 
Social Networks; however, Blarkom et al. (2003) identify the need to avoid having to 
apply the CC framework in privacy audits; rather, they suggest that privacy 
obligations and standards should be addressed and fulfilled within system design 
processes. Blarkom et al. (2003) also encourage the use of 11 Fair Information 
Practices, and 9 principles of the Privacy Audit Framework.  
‘Privacy by Design (PbD)’ (Cavoukian, 2009) is a concept that uses seven 
principles to protect PII; however, there are neither mechanisms nor processes for 
applying these principles across SNs within a Privacy Framework which could 
protect user information. In addition, to date, very little earlier work has focused on 
the effectiveness of these privacy protecting principles in SN contexts, or on 
integrating these principles into SN design. Furthermore, system development costs 
increase substantially in the later stages of system development; thus, it is essential to 
incorporate privacy considerations in the initial design phase to ensure their inclusion 
in the development process. 
iv. How does the privacy framework inform SN architecture? 
Privacy preservation should not be partially applied, but should ensure end-to-
end protection for a SN within an integrated architecture where collaborative 
 12 Chapter 1: Introduction  
technologies are used to protect user information; however, limited research has been 
conducted in this area. More specifically, collaborative integrated architecture for 
SNs, and the problem of the adaptation of collaborative technologies in SNs have not 
been widely investigated. It is critical, therefore, to determine the appropriate privacy 
preserving architecture to protect SN user information.  
Storing information is a significant challenge in SNs, particularly in terms of 
time link: information that was once public can be transformed to private information 
at a later stage, or private information can later be considered public information. In 
the current SN paradigm, the service provider has the opportunity to search, view or 
access user information at any stage. While this is in line with the service provider’s 
policy to which users have agreed, the service provider can revise their privacy 
policy and disclose personal information to a third party at any time. 
User information should not be perpetually stored and accessed by the service 
provider. Stored information can be stolen or hacked, or a user account can be 
deactivated or reactivated at any later stage. It is likely that users would always wish 
for full ownership and control of their information so that they could turn off access 
at any time; however, in the current SN paradigm, the owner of the information – 
service provider or user – remains unclear.  
In the current SN paradigm, users store their information in the public storage 
in SNs and access their information by using various access mechanisms in the 
virtual space owned by the service provider. A variety of methods is available to 
store the information; however, these are limited in their application. An improved 
system architecture for the storage of user information is now necessary; ideally, the 
SN provider would provide public storage for private user information, but would be 
unable to view or access this information without the person’s explicit permission.  
There are five different system architectures (C. Chow & Mokbel, 2009) for 
storing information in SNs: client-server (centralized architecture); third party; 
distributed (requiring fixed communication architecture, that is, a base station); peer-
to-peer architecture (not requiring fixed communication architecture); and wireless 
sensor networks (sensor nodes provide aggregate information). Prior research has 
shown that these system architectures have various unsolved issues, such as 
information reliability and backup; user accounts can be stolen, hacked, deactivated 
or later reactivated. This current investigation, therefore, assesses: the consequences 
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of various unusual activities on user accounts; various types of attacks on user 
information (such as identity theft or de-anonymization); and information storing 
mechanism for SNs. 
1.5 RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE 
The aim of this research is to improve privacy in SNs, where privacy has 
become a significant contemporary issue (KPMG International Cooperative, 2010) 
due to the extensive sharing and exchange of personal information. This personal 
information becomes the asset of SNs; it attracts the attention of  entrepreneurs and 
interested organizations6, and has become part of the business benefits of some 
online service providers7.  
An individual is the legitimate owner of their personal information and has the 
sole legitimate right to share it. Inappropriate SN use (such as connecting doubtful 
contacts) can lead to serious consequences.8 Analysts and researchers indicate that 
SN users are becoming more aware of privacy issues, and their concerns could lead 
to their failure to use SNs in the future. For this reason, analysts and researchers are 
investigating a more comprehensive linking model for connecting the real and virtual 
world in SNs, while preserving the multiple aspects of privacy. This research 
contributes to this vision. 
There is a variety of approaches that protect personal information; however, 
these are limited in their application. It is now necessary to protect personal 
information at the design level to ensure privacy by default, as well as to ensure 
ownership of personal information in SNs. Such an approach – privacy by design –
addresses the issue of protecting personal information, and leads to a more accurate 
form of measurement of future privacy protection. 
Although previous research shows that there are various types of system 
architectures available for SNs, a number of questions, with respect to incorporating 
privacy functionality into system architecture, remain. Analysts, researchers, and 
relevant organizations predict that the convergence of mobile technologies and 
collaborative integrated architecture could be a possible solution 9. To date, however, 
there has been limited investigation of privacy-enhanced system architecture to 
address the privacy issue.  
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1.6 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This research investigates SN user privacy requirements. As each user may 
have different privacy requirements, several steps were conducted to determine these 
various requirements. Several steps and a survey were then constructed to validate 
this determination. 
The research investigated leading privacy protecting principles and compiled 
state-of-the-art Privacy by Design (PbD) principles to ensure the consideration of SN 
user privacy from the initial design level of SN development. These principles were 
then converted into a privacy framework to facilitate their incorporation into the 
design level of SN development. This research also investigated the effectiveness of 
these privacy principles, as employed by SNs.   
A novel integrated architecture which provides the mechanisms to ensure 
visibility, transparency and accountability with respect to information privacy in SNs 
was also designed, tested and verified based on the privacy principles.  
Specifically, the research:  
o Determines the privacy requirements of SN users 
o Represents these privacy requirements in design principles required to 
deliver these SN requirements  
o Evaluates the effectiveness of these principles, as employed by the SN 
providers 
o Represents these principles in a practically useful privacy framework 
and 
o Designs SN architecture based on the privacy framework. 
These outcomes will enable more effective privacy protection; in turn, it is 
expected that the promise of more effective privacy protection will attract more SN 
users. 
The major limitation of the research is that it does not examine the legal 
aspects of social networking, such as cyber laws and regulations that aim to preserve 
user privacy in SN. Additionally, large scale global testing, for example, on 
Facebook (Facebook Inc., 2011a) or LinkedIn (LinkedIn Corporation, 2011) is not 
undertaken. 
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1.7 SUMMARY AND STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT 
This thesis is organised into six sections. The first section presents an overview 
of state-of-the-art privacy in SNs, and clarifies the privacy requirements of SN users. 
A survey to verify these requirements is then included in the second section. The 
third section illustrates privacy by design principles that are required by SN 
providers to protect user privacy. The following section includes a SN privacy 
framework, which integrates the privacy principles and demonstrates the three levels 
of the System Architecture: Business, Data and Technology Architecture based on 
The Open Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF®) (The Open Group, 2013). 
This section also illustrates the privacy model for protecting SN user information. 
The final section includes the conclusion and discussion arising from this research.  
The significant and distinguishing features of this research are: i) its 
enhancement of the understanding of privacy protection principles in various 
privacy-invasive areas, including SNs; and ii) its focus on ways in which these 
principles can be engaged to protect privacy in SNs.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter provides an overview of the current literature pertaining to 
privacy in Social Networks (SNs). Hodge (2006) aptly points out that SNs are 
designed as public spaces for the private individual; however, since individuals use 
these public spaces to disseminate their personal information, the networks become 
the source of complex privacy issues. This chapter focuses on these SN privacy 
issues as documented by analysts, researchers, and users. In so doing, it determines 
the issues that need to be addressed in this area. 
The chapter organizes the material into seven major components: i) various 
definitions of SN and privacy; ii) reasons for justifiable concern about SNs and 
studies of location-based privacy; iii) various privacy protecting principles iv) 
representative results of privacy protection mechanisms in SNs; v) studies of privacy 
protecting architectures; vi) studies of architecture models; and vii) representative 
results of enterprise architecture methodologies.   
While the chapter does not address every type of SN privacy issue, it does 
provide a summary of the most recent studies in the area, and briefly discusses their 
major contributions and limitations. One of the main objectives of the chapter is to 
encourage the incorporation of privacy considerations at the initial system design 
level where privacy functionality is most easily implemented and ensured. 
2.1 DEFINITIONS 
2.1.1 Social Network 
A Social Network  is a website or network of connections and relationships. In 
general, it is defined as ‘a network of interactions of relationships’ (C. C. Aggarwal, 
2011), while its most classic definition is ‘the interactions of humans’ (C. C. 
Aggarwal, 2011) in a platform. Some of the most recent and leading SNs are 
Facebook10 , LinkedIn11, Twitter12, or content-sharing networks such as YouTube13  
and Flickr14. In these (and other) SNs, a person seeks to discover like-minded or 
compatible people with interests or experiences similar to theirs (Chatterjee, 2011). 
 18 Chapter 2: Literature Review  
Most recent SNs combine elements of various types of information, such as music, 
photos, videos, blogs, links, and third party applications. 
2.1.2 Privacy 
There is no rigid definition of privacy (B. Krishnamurthy, 2010); indeed, in various 
research areas (for example, research into databases, data mining, networks, security, 
and Social Science), the term ‘privacy’, with reference to SNs, has quite different 
meanings (Figure 4 represents multiple representations of privacy in SN contexts). 
Generally speaking, however, ‘privacy’ can be defined as ‘personal control over 
personal content’, and a person’s failure to control this content can constitute a 
privacy breach.  
The most effectively articulated and supported theories of privacy are provided by 
Westin (1967)  and Altman (1975) .Westin defines privacy as the way in which 
people protect themselves by temporarily limiting others’ access to them , while 
Altman similarly describes it as ‘the selective control of access to the self’. Privacy is 
also defined as a ‘tension between opening and closing a personal boundary to 
others’ (Child & Petronio, 2011; S. S. Petronio, 2002). The most useful privacy 
theory for understanding interpersonal computer-mediated communication, such as 
blogging and social networking, however, is Communication Privacy Management 
(CPM) theory (Stephen T. Margulis, 2011).  
Privacy can be seen as a companion to access-control for SN users who are linked to 
other people (Islam & Iannella, 2012). A user can allow access to personal content 
through the use of various access control mechanisms; in the same way, this access 
can be revoked at the user’s discretion. The personal content that uniquely identifies 
and links to a person in some specific way – for example, names, date and place of 
birth, mother’s maiden name, social security numbers or biometric records – is 
known as ‘Personal Identifiable Information’ (PII)  (B. Krishnamurthy, 2010). 
Privacy is a critical factor in managing PII, and a person can usually detect the 
violation of privacy when others directly or indirectly abuse their personal 
information. PII is managed in SNs using traditional concepts such as access control, 
and new concepts such as ‘friends of friends’. However, PII privacy control is not 
comprehensively supported across SNs and, eventually,  standardisation and 
incorporation in all networks will be required.  
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Figure 4: What is privacy? 
Privacy positions 
Westin  (2003) empirically derived three privacy positions that the public hold: 
a high-privacy position, a balanced-privacy position, and a limited-privacy position. 
These three privacy positions can be used to describe the privacy attitudes of Social 
Media users (Stephen T. Margulis, 2011). This section presents the general and most 
significant characteristics of, and data related to, each position.  
High-privacy position 
As the name suggests, the group who hold this position are extremely 
concerned about their privacy and place a high value on it. They reject claims for the 
use of personal information for business or government purposes; for example, 
access to HIV test results, medical-records, ID Cards, and Biometric Identifiers 
(Etzioni, 1999). This group demands their personal consent before personal 
information15 is shared. Like Cranor et al’s ‘privacy fundamentalists’ (Cranor, 
Reagle, & Ackerman, 2000), they seek to protect their privacy through 
comprehensive legal rules, enforcement, and intervention. They have a great distrust 
of organisations, and favour an ‘opt-in’ approach to the sharing of their personal 
information so as to retain individual control of it.  
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Balanced-privacy position 
The balanced-privacy position makes a claim for strong privacy, while at the 
same time balancing business and consumer interests; for example, widespread HIV 
testing may violate personal privacy, but may also be necessary for the protection of 
others (Etzioni, 1999). In the balanced-privacy view, people seek a careful balance 
between privacy (that is, individual rights) and the common good (that is, social 
responsibility); if possible, however, privacy rights should not be violated in pursuit 
of the common good.  
The balanced-privacy position also seeks tailored legal rules to protect 
individual privacy and to prevent privacy abuses. It also favours organizational 
policy initiatives which promote individual choice in matters of privacy, access and 
security to ensure Fair Information Practice (FIP) (S.T. Margulis, 2003). An example 
of individual choice is the individual’s ability to ‘opt-in’ and ‘opt-out’ of information 
sharing according to the sensitivity of the information being considered (A. F. 
Westin, 2003).  
Limited-privacy position 
The limited-privacy position values business efficiency and societal protection 
more than individual privacy. The group holding this position is generally trustful of 
organizations (A. F. Westin, 2003), promotes openness and transparency, and 
considers most regulatory privacy-protecting interventions as unnecessary and costly. 
In certain scenarios, this position is reasonable given that it might be impossible to 
guarantee privacy in a society that now widely uses privacy-invasive surveillance 
technology (Brin, 1998). Indeed, an open and transparent personal policy could assist 
in addressing and preventing problems through a united effort. Additionally, a 
greater emphasis on personal accountability could create a generally more 
transparent and ‘free’ society where ‘free-speech’ and self-disclosure are valued. As 
Singleton (1998) point out, human beings already enjoy the freedom to converse and 
trade information about one another in most contexts.  
It is an intriguing phenomenon that SN users can be inconsistent in their privacy 
concerns and their self-disclosure behaviours. They variously tend to unwarily disclose 
too much personal information (Zhang & Luo, 2012), not be concerned, or be 
marginally concerned about providing information in SNs. In this research, the user 
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group who are  not concerned or marginally concerned form the ‘limited-privacy’ 
position group.  
 
Figure 5: Privacy positions 
Privacy stages 
The privacy friendliness of a system can be represented by privacy stages 
(Spiekermann & Cranor, 2009), and is inversely related to the degree of 
identifiability of user data (Pfitzmann & Hansen, 2010). The more identifiable 
personal information there is in a system, the less control there is over that 
information and the greater the chance of privacy issues.  
If user data includes ‘unique identifiers’ and PII – such as credit card 
information or a social security number – or if a stable IP address is linked to the 
data, the information is not privacy-friendly and belongs to ‘Privacy Stage 0’. In such 
cases, privacy can be protected only through policy that provides ‘notice’ and 
‘choice’ for the user. Notice and Choice are components of Fair Information Practice 
Principles (FIPPs) (US Federal Trade Commission, 2000). Notice involves telling 
users: what information is going to be collected; how it will be collected (for 
example, directly or indirectly); how it will be used; how Choice, Access and 
Security will be provided; and whether the collected information is disclosed to other 
entities. Choice involves users choosing how their PII is used beyond the purpose for 
which it was provided.  
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‘Privacy Stage 1’ data have no unique identifiers but have common attributes 
such as email addresses or contact information which is linkable to user data through 
reasonable effort (Spiekermann & Cranor, 2009).  At this stage,  data can be stored 
and protected under unique pseudonyms and passwords, and provides notice and 
choice to users. 
Data with no unique identifiers and no common attributes, and which is not 
linkable to user data with reasonable effort belongs to ‘Privacy Stage 2’. This stage 
can use random identifiers, and pseudonymous data and contact information are 
separated from profile and transaction logs. Data of long-term personal 
characteristics can be collected, and deletion of data occurs at regular intervals. 
Through transactional pattern matching, Stage 2 data can be linked with specific 
individuals; for example, mobile operators may be able to identify a customer even if 
that customer is using an unidentified prepaid mobile. Data collected from/about an 
individual should be limited by long-term personal characteristics granularity 
(Spiekermann & Cranor, 2009), and l-diversity principle (Machanavajjhala, Kifer, 
Gehrke, & Venkitasubramaniam, 2007) can be used to protect this data. 
Anonymous and unlinkable data belong to ‘Privacy Stage 3’. Here, there is no 
collection of contact details or of long-term personal characteristics. Data with k-
anonymity with a larger value of k can arise in this stage; however, privacy issues 
can occur as a result of long-term collection. To resolve privacy issues in this stage, 
collected profiles need to be deleted regularly, and the data anonymized with a 
combination of l-diversity large values of l, and k-anonymity with large values of k 
(Spiekermann & Cranor, 2009). 
Table 1: Privacy stages and approach to privacy protection (adapted from (Spiekermann & Cranor, 
2009) 
Privacy 
stages 
Identifiability and 
linkability 
Privacy protection 
approach 
Data characteristics 
0 Identified and 
linked 
Notice 
Choice 
Unique identifier 
Combination of contact and profile 
information 
1 Pseudonymous Unique pseudonyms and No unique identifiers 
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and linkable with 
reasonable and 
automatable 
effort 
passwords 
Notice  
Choice 
Common attributes 
Separation of contact information 
from profile and transaction log 
2 Pseudonymous 
and not linkable 
with reasonable 
effort 
Collected data 
minimization to long-
term personal 
characteristics  
granularity  
Use of l-diversity 
principle 
No unique identifiers 
No common attributes 
Separation of contact information 
from profile and transaction log 
Collection of long-term personal 
characteristics on a low granularity 
level 
Deletion of profile details at regular 
intervals 
3 Anonymous and 
unlinkable 
Regular deletion of 
collected profiles 
Data anonymization  
with a combination of l-
diversity large values of l 
and k-anonymity with  
large value of k  
No collection of contact information 
No collection of long-term personal 
characteristics 
k-anonymity with large value of k 
Privacy research domain 
Gürses (2010) identifies three privacy research paradigms: i) ‘Privacy as 
confidentiality’ which facilitates the  concealment of information; ii) ‘Privacy as 
control’ which ensures user determination of how their information is or isn’t used; 
and iii) ‘Privacy as practice’ which highlights identity construction. 
Privacy as confidentiality 
‘Privacy as confidentiality’ research addresses the need to guarantee that SN 
surveillance information is not collected and, if it is collected, that it be processed in 
anonymous form. The confidentiality goal also guarantees that only authorized 
persons can view user information. Privacy as confidentiality can be measured by the 
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inclusion (or omission) of system properties such as unlinkability, undetectability, 
unobservability, and communication content confidentiality (Gürses, 2010).  
Privacy as control 
The ‘privacy as control’ goal ensures confidentiality through the SN user 
controlling the authorization of  audiences for their data/information. Privacy as 
control  also addresses the need for SN user information to be collected according to 
data protection principles. 
Privacy as practice 
‘Privacy as practice’ guarantees that the user receives information about who in 
the network can view their information. Practice goals address the transparency and 
feedback demands of the various SN stakeholders. SN users will receive feedback 
with respect to their current privacy settings – such as the ‘Facebook View as’ 
feature (Facebook Inc., 2011a) – and a transparent view of the collection, processing 
and distribution of their provided information. Feedback on the individual and 
collective concealment and/or revelation of information is typical of privacy as 
practice solutions (Gürses, 2010). 
 
Figure 6: Privacy research paradigm 
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2.2 SOCIAL NETWORKS AND PRIVACY 
2.2.1 Why should we care about Social Networks?  
Hundreds of SNs have millions of users, an enormous number of information 
sources, and ever-increasing data about people, businesses, and organization (K. Liu, 
Miklau, Pei, & Terzi, 2010). The SN structures are themselves also key information 
sources; for example, they hold information about linked communities. 
 
Figure 7: Launch years of major SNs (Adapted from (Ellison, 2007) 
The largest social networking site, Facebook, has more than 700 million 
users16. Another dominating site, Twitter, has over 175 million registered users17, 
while LinkedIn has over 100 million users. According to recent statistics18, Facebook 
has more than 30 billion pieces of content, including web links, news stories, blog 
posts, notes, and photo albums. Users spend over 700 billion minutes per month in 
activity on the site. Another large SN, MySpace, has more than 110 million active 
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monthly users around the globe, and 100 billion rows of data19. These statistics 
indicate that SNs are immense sources of information and opportunity.  
2.2.2 User information and privacy in Social Networks 
There is a significant amount of private information (such as pictures and 
details of private activities) registered in SNs. User information is generally shared 
with various stakeholders (refer Figure 1), and the owner of private information has 
the legitimate authority to allow access to, to share, to alter, and to control that 
information.  
Privacy breaches in SNs can be grouped into three categories: i) identity 
disclosure, ii) link disclosure, and iii) attribute disclosure (Wu et al., 2010). ‘Identity 
disclosure’ relates to individual identity; ‘link disclosure’ relates to protected 
information shared between individuals; and ‘attribute disclosure’ relates to the 
disclosure of protected information – such as age, gender or income – which reveals 
a relationship between individuals.  
SN members may participate in various protected activities, such as related 
views and opinion or geo-location activities. Protected information can only be 
accessed by particular clusters who have a close relationship with the owner of the 
information, and who are deliberately selected by the owner. Disclosure of that 
particular protected information, even to friends or family, can significantly affect 
the person; it needs, therefore, to be guarded with extra care. 
Both SNs themselves and external entities can use SNs to contribute to their 
own internal and external organizational activities and purposes. Various external 
entities may deliberately publicise personal information on SNs; SNs may republish 
private information to the outside world; and SNs can harvest and deliberately 
publicise collective personal data. However, a person may not wish to make their 
personal information publicly available without giving their consent; hence, it is 
important to consider who the authoritative sources of this information are, and who 
is accountable for its publication. 
2.2.3 Behind privacy in Social Networks 
At the beginning of the social networking era, people were keen to make 
contact with friends and families and quickly adapted to the Social Network 
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innovation. However, the rapid growth of SNs became a significant problem for 
privacy, with SN members regularly adding and sharing PII. Unflattering photos, 
scandalous text messages, voice messages, and recorded phone calls are all stored  
permanently and filter through to SN members (Magnuson, 2011). Volumes of 
officially uploaded information becomes just as permanent; for example, the US 
Library of Congress recently announced that it will permanently store the entire 
archive of public Twitter posts since 2006 (Rosen, 2010). Such action, in the future, 
could be considered to be a breach of the privacy of millions of Twitter users. 
SNs need a privacy policy to avoid such future privacy breaches. While they 
may initially promise privacy, SNs are able to amend their privacy policies at any 
time without the explicit consent of users (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2011). 
Furthermore, research shows that privacy policies tend to intensify privacy concerns, 
rather than engender privacy (Pollach, 2007), and that reading privacy policies can 
involve a significant effort (Kelley, Bresee, Cranor, & Reeder, 2009) as most are 
both lengthy and difficult to understand. One way to combat this situation is to 
redesign policy content, language and format, and to simplify symbol-based grids 
with mixed controls and represent them in a graphical tabular format (Kelley et al., 
2009). However, redesigning the policies might not solve the situation completely 
since the user has to agree with ‘all or nothing approach’ with the traditional privacy 
policies to operate in the site, and is not able to negotiate these policies (Ran & 
Justin, 2007). Another concern is that SN providers do not necessarily guarantee the 
privacy and security of their members; for example, as of 22 June 2011, Facebook’s 
privacy policy20 states that: 
We cannot control the actions of other users with whom you share your information. 
We cannot guarantee that only authorized persons will view your information. We 
cannot ensure that information you share on Facebook will not become publicly 
available. We are not responsible for third party circumvention of any privacy 
settings or security measures on Facebook. 
Privacy has become a significant contemporary issue (KPMG International 
Cooperative, 2010) in SNs due to the massive sharing and exchange of personal 
information. According to KPMG International (KPMG International Cooperative, 
2010), approximately 8 out of 10 global consumers (79%) are concerned about  
unauthorized access to PII. This rising concern is also a catalyst for a focus on 
privacy, and researchers continue to examine the question of which information 
people generally wish to share and which needs to remain private. 
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In opposition to this privacy push and focus, however, Mark Zuckerberg21 (one 
of Facebook’s renowned founders) has expressed a preference for a move towards 
publicity and transparency rather than privacy (Rosen, 2010). Facebook has also 
announced that elements of user profiles that had previously been private – including 
user friends, relationship status, and family relations – are to be made public and 
accessible to other users. Facebook has also developed the Open Graph Protocol 
which allows a user to integrate personal information in real world web pages into 
their social graph; as a result, ‘all Open Graph-enabled web pages will show up in a 
search when a user likes them’22.  
A person’s online reputation, if inappropriate in any way, can be harmful to 
their professional career. HR professionals can reject candidates based on their 
online material (such as photos, videos, personal blogs, and SN pages) to avoid 
possible negative future impacts on their organization’s reputation. According to a 
recent survey (Cross-Tab, 2010), 70% of US recruiters reject candidates based on 
information found online. However, this rejection can be misguided for three 
reasons: i) the possible presence of inaccurate, irrelevant, or false online information; 
ii) a lack of accountability and disclosure by an individual; and iii) the possible 
irrelevance of an individual’s online social life (Davis, 2006). Accumulated online 
information can also be used against exposing crime and misconduct; for example, 
the Vancouver 2011 Riot Criminal List was prepared on the basis of Facebook 
updates and photos of the incidents on various social media sites23. 
Personal information and contacts also attract the attention of entrepreneurs 
and interested organizations24, and have become business assets for some online 
services25. However, the individual is the legitimate owner of his or her personal 
information and should have the right to conceal or share this information. In the 
current SN paradigm, however, a person owns a public space, utilizes the public 
space, and deposits and shares their personal information through the public space. In 
this paradigm, also, service providers can make use of users’ personal information 
for their own trade purposes26.  
Inappropriate usage, such as connecting doubtful contacts, can lead to various 
serious consequences27.  Analysts and researchers indicate that user awareness of 
such SN privacy leaks can result in a decline in users, and are investigating a more 
comprehensive SN connection or linking model for the real and virtual worlds which 
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will preserve multiple aspects of privacy. At the same time, according to a global 
survey (KPMG International Cooperative, 2010), nearly six out of ten (58%) 
respondents would be willing to allow their personal information to be tracked and 
shared if this resulted in lower SN service costs. Hence, privacy protection 
mechanisms should not necessarily aim to hide or minimize information disclosure 
or to camouflage online activities.  
2.2.4 Location-based privacy 
 An emerging trend is for social networking users to continue networking while 
mobile, by utilizing hand-held devices; for example, people who use Facebook on 
their mobile devices are twice as active on Facebook as non-mobile users28. GPS-
enabled cellular phones and the new Near-me Area Network (NAN)  (Wong, 2010), 
for example, now enable more people to be engaged in Location Based Services 
(LBS) or location-based social networking. In a recent survey commissioned by 
Microsoft and conducted by Cross-tab (2011), 94% of respondents considered that 
LBS were valuable, 41% considered that they were very valuable, and 53% 
considered them to be somewhat valuable. Four out of  ten respondents  used LBS at 
least once per week, and 18% of these engaged in social networking while doing so. 
Respondents used services such as Google Latitude29, Facebook-places, 
Foursquare30, Loopt31, Yowza, Brightkite32, Gowalla, and Zhing  to interact in real 
time. 
Privacy on mobile devices is not as simple to ensure as privacy on desktop 
devices where the user has the luxury of configuring their privacy using the available 
desktop tools. Setting up privacy preference rules on the move is significantly 
different. Real time information spread throughout mobile SNs can result in 
immediate privacy breaches; this has lead both to new challenges and opportunities 
for social networking services, and to new concerns for users.  
There are two types of LBS: i) location-tracking (allowing the tracking of other 
parties); and ii) position-aware tracking (where a device is aware of its own 
location). Privacy concerns are, of course, greater for location-tracking LBS than for 
position-aware LBS (Barkhuus & Dey, 2003), and the latter can be accepted and 
appreciated as a beneficial aspect of LBS. Furthermore, when using LBS, answers to 
questions such as Who is requesting the information? , Why do they want to know 
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the participant’s location? and What level of detail do they need?’ are required when 
sharing locations and other user details (Consolvo et al., 2005). There might also be 
additional dependent factors (such as cross-cultural considerations) when sharing 
location data. 
Feedback makes an important contribution to improving user comfort levels 
when using online social networking (Janice Y. Tsai et al., 2009). Built-in feedback 
mechanism such as Who, Where, When and How questions with respect to the 
accessing, collecting and sharing of user data in LBS (Harrison & Dey, 2009) might 
be useful in this regard. This feedback could lead to a decrease in the need for 
privacy preference settings in LBS.  
In LBS, explicit authorization has several disadvantages, such as the effort 
required for its management and its potential to create social difficulties. Treu et al. 
(2007) introduce the concept of implicit authorization where an inquirer is 
automatically granted access to the one’s own private and sensitive information using 
a black box based system. Upon request, and after validation, the black box deposits 
and discloses private and sensitive information according to predefined rules. 
However, while this approach has been theoretically and computationally nalysed, it 
has not yet been validated under real world conditions. 
Benisch et al. (2009) note that most LBS users have relatively complex privacy 
preferences, and might use privacy mechanism with higher levels of expressiveness. 
They also demonstrate the configuration of privacy and sharing technology 
according to black list, location-based, time-based and location-and-time-based 
mechanisms. They found that the ‘black list’ mechanism was too simple to capture 
users’ complex privacy preferences compared to the ‘location-and-time-based 
preference’ which could be more efficient. However, Benisch et al.’s (2009) 
exploratory study tracked 30 subjects for one week and all were students from one 
university. A cross-disciplinary survey could provide different results (Fung, Wang, 
Chen, & Yu, 2010).  
According to a recent survey commissioned by Microsoft and conducted by 
Cross-tab (2011), 52% of respondents expressed strong concern about sharing their 
location with other people, 87% expressed strong concern about sharing their 
location with organizations they have not specified, and 84% expressed strong 
concern about sharing their location without consent. Tsai, Kelley, Cranor, & Sadeh 
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(2009) believe that SN users might consider location sharing services less useful due 
to a lack of suitable privacy features. They also recommend that location share 
developers set up privacy controls to assist in addressing these user privacy concerns.  
Concern is higher for sharing location with organizations than for sharing with 
other people, and could drive the user away from LBS. Hence, the challenge is to 
preserve and respect user privacy preferences without increasing the user burden. 
This could be achieved through approaches such as those based on Inductive Logic 
Programming (ILP) (Bandara, Russo, & Lupu, 2007) where privacy policies are 
fixed throughout LBS use, and decisions are either automatically made, or manually 
recorded by the user. More complex privacy management policies and non-
observable predictive learning can also be considered as means of protecting LBS 
user privacy.  
2.2.5 Privacy in mobile SN services 
A number of recently implemented mobile SN services have raised user 
concerns about their privacy implications and a significant number of researchers are 
focusing on these privacy issues. One of their challenges is to standardize privacy 
functionalities, as none of  these systems are identical (Counts & Fisher, 2008). 
Mobile SN services can be divided into three types: i) the original mobile SN 
services which do not emanate from web-based communities or mobile portal 
websites; ii) those which evolve from mobile portal websites; and iii) those which 
migrate from web-based communities (Haobin, Lingyan, Zewei, & Ning, 2008). 
Haobin et al. (2008) claim that privacy in the original mobile SN service is superior 
to the privacy afforded by other types of services. This is because the original mobile 
SN service is built in accordance with a mobile platform and holds the specific 
services of that platform; therefore, future research on privacy should consider the 
original mobile SN service method. 
Guanling & Rahman (2008) identify that feedback, accessibility, and control of 
information construction are inadequate in existing applications. They also claim that 
personal information exposed in multiple entities and mash-ups between various 
networking sites may lead to privacy breaches. Some examples of mobile SN 
services/applications are: ‘Bluetracker’ (Young, Foth, & Matthes, 2007); 
‘SmokeScreen’ (Cox, Dalton, & Marupadi, 2007); ‘Jaiku’ (Vihavainen, Oulasvirta, 
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& Sarvas, 2009); ‘Micro-blog’ (Gaonkar, Li, Choudhury, Cox, & Schmidt, 2008); 
‘PeopleFinder’ (Sadeh et al., 2009); and ‘MobiSNA’ (Gou et al., 2009). Most of 
these mobile SN services/applications have limited privacy features. There are, 
however, some exceptions; for example, ‘PeopleFinder’ enables mobile devices to 
selectively share locations with friends, family and colleagues, and engages 
visualizations, sophisticated dialogues and explanations to protect privacy. 
‘SmokeScreen’ ensures privacy by using a ‘trusted’ broker.   
Mobile SN applications which integrate social networking without fully 
acknowledging the importance of the ‘user profile’ may raise significant privacy 
issues (Lugano, 2008). Of far greater concern, however, is the fact that SN 
application service providers can tamper with user information and make private and 
sensitive customer information available for trade.  
Mobile SN services are deployed as tools for sharing, browsing and querying 
personal information on a large-scale. These activities raise critical privacy issues, 
and foster the demand for ensuring privacy in mobile social networking applications. 
However, according to a recent review, only 66% of the 89 location-based sharing 
applications, SNs, and Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) currently have 
privacy policies to evaluate their privacy controls (Janice Y.  Tsai, Kelley, Cranor, & 
Sadeh, 2010). Hence, it is essential to continue the quest to ensure privacy in mobile 
SN services. 
2.3 PRIVACY PROTECTING PRINCIPLES 
There are various principles available for protecting privacy. These principles 
are Fair Information Principles (FIPs), OECD (Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development) Principles, CSA Model Code Principles, Information 
Privacy Principles (IPPs), National Privacy principles (NPPs), Nine Architectural 
Principles, and Privacy by Design (PbD) principles. This section reviews these 
various principles. 
FIPs (Refer to 2.3.1) are included in the national level but do not includes in 
the  federal level, and no safeguards exist to ensure that these principles are 
implemented (Diamond, Goldstein, Lansky, & Verhulst, 2008). Another major 
weakness is that the principles allow agencies to use private sector data without any 
appropriate protections from law. OECD Principles (Refer to 2.3.2) are confined to 
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the European Union directive to protect personal data33; however, those principles 
are strengthened, particularly in ‘Consent’ and ‘Accountability’, in the CSA Model 
Code Principles (Refer to 2.3.3). The Nine Architectural Principles (Refer to 2.3.4) 
are designed especially to protect privacy in a networked environment (Diamond et 
al., 2008). IPPs (Refer to 2.3.5) manage personal information for government 
agencies, whereas the NPPs (Refer to 2.3.6) regulate the private sector. 
2.3.1 Fair Information Principles (FIPs) 
FIPs were introduced as the result of a review by a non-profit consumer group, 
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse34. 
iii. Collection limitation 
There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose very existence 
is secret. 
iv. Disclosure 
There must be a way for an individual to identify what information about him 
is in a record and how it is used. 
v. Secondary usage 
There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him that 
was obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes 
without his consent. 
vi. Record correction 
There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of 
identifiable information about him. 
vii. Security 
Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of 
identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended use, 
and must take precautions to prevent misuse of the data. 
2.3.2 OECD Principles 
The OECD states eight principles35 for protecting privacy. 
Principle 1: Collection Limitation 
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There should be limits to the collection of personal data, any such data should 
be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or 
consent of the data subject. 
Principle 2: Data quality 
Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to be used 
and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete and 
kept up-to-date. 
Principle 3: Purpose specification 
The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified not later 
than at the time of data collection and their subsequent use limited to the fulfilment 
of those purposes, or other purposes which are not incompatible with the original 
purposes and which are specified whenever they are changed. 
Principle 4: Use limitation 
Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or otherwise used for 
purposes other than those specified in accordance with ‘Principle 3’, except: a) with 
the consent of the data subject, or b) by the authority of law. 
Principle 5: Security safeguards 
Personal data should be protected by reasonable security safeguards against 
such risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, use, and modification or 
disclosure of data. 
Principle 6: Openness 
There should be a general policy of openness about developments, practices 
and policies with respect to personal data. The means of establishing the existence 
and nature of personal data, the main purposes of their use, and the identity of the 
usual residence of the data controller should be readily available. 
Principle 7: Individual participation 
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Individuals should have the right: a) to obtain from a data controller, or 
otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the data controller has data relating to 
them; b) to have data relating to them communicated to them, within a reasonable 
time (at a charge, if any, that is not excessive; in a reasonable manner; and in a form 
that is readily intelligible); c) to be given reasons why a) and b) is denied if requested 
(and to be able to challenge such denial); and d) to challenge data relating to them 
and, if the challenge is successful, to have the data erased, rectified, completed or 
amended. 
Principle 8: Accountability 
A data controller should be accountable for complying with measures which 
give effect to the principles stated above. 
2.3.3 CSA Model Code Principles 
Ten interrelated principles36 form the basis of the CSA Model Code for the 
Protection of Personal Information. 
Principle 1: Accountability 
An organization is responsible for personal information under its control, and 
shall designate an individual or individuals to be accountable for the organization's 
compliance with the following principles. 
Principle 2: Identifying Purposes 
The purposes for which personal information is collected shall be identified by 
the organization at or before the time the information is collected. 
Principle 3: Consent 
The knowledge and consent of the individual are required for the collection, use, or 
disclosure of personal information, except where inappropriate. 
Principle 4: Limiting Collection 
The collection of personal information shall be limited to that which is 
necessary for the purposes identified by the organization. Information shall be 
collected by fair and lawful means. 
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Principle 5: Limiting Use, Disclosure, and Retention 
Personal information shall not be used or disclosed for purposes other than those for 
which it was collected, except with the consent of the individual or as required by 
law. Personal information shall be retained only as long as necessary for the 
fulfilment of those purposes. 
Principle 6: Accuracy 
Personal information shall be as accurate, complete, and up-to-date as is 
necessary for the purposes for which it is to be used. 
Principle 7: Safeguards 
Personal information shall be protected by security safeguards appropriate to 
the sensitivity of the information. 
Principle 8: Openness 
An organization shall make readily available to individuals specific 
information about its policies and practices relating to the management of personal 
information. 
Principle 9: Individual Access 
Upon request, an individual shall be informed of the existence, use, and 
disclosure of his or her personal information and shall be given access to that 
information. An individual shall be able to challenge the accuracy and completeness 
of the information and have it amended as appropriate. 
Principle 10: Challenging Compliance 
An individual shall be able to address a challenge concerning compliance with 
the above principles to the designated individual or individuals accountable for the 
organization's compliance. 
2.3.4  Nine Architectural Principles 
Nine core principles are contructed based on Fair Information Practices 
principles (Diamond et al., 2008) (Refer 2.3.1 for details).  
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Principle 1: Openness and Transparency 
There should be a broad and universal practice of openness and transparency in 
the way data is handled. 
Principle 2: Purpose Specification and Minimization 
Purpose specification requires that data must be used only for the originally-
stated reason, or, in rare cases, for other purposes with specific legal sanction. This 
principle also specifies that strict minimization requirements can prevent 
unauthorized reuses of data. 
Principle 3: Collection Limitation 
The collection of personal information should be obtained by lawful and fair 
means and with the knowledge and consent of individuals. 
Principle 4: Use Limitation 
A minimization requirement would strictly limit instances where data collected 
for one purpose could be reused in another context. 
Principle 5: Individual Participation and Control 
An individual has a vital stake in, and thus needs to be a participant in 
determining how his or her information is used. 
Principle 6: Data Integrity and Quality 
A mechanism is required to address data corruption violation and to establish 
accountability among those who maintain records.  
Principle 7: Security Safeguards and Controls 
Reasonable security safeguards against loss, unauthorised access, destruction, 
use modification, or disclosure of personal information are required. 
Principle 8: Accountability and Oversight 
An essential mechanism is required to identify privacy violations and to enable 
remedial action to be taken. 
Principle 9: Remedies 
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This principle is closely related to Principle 8, with the exception that it 
probably entails greater participation by the state in the form of legal sanctions. 
2.3.5 Information Privacy Principles (IPPs) 
Eleven IPPs37 regulate how Australian and ACT government agencies manage 
personal information. They include how and when personal information can be 
collected, used, disclosed, stored, corrected and accessed so as to provide security.  
Principle 1: Manner and purpose of collection 
The information collected must be necessary for an agency’s work, and 
collected fairly and lawfully. 
Principle 2: Collecting information directly from individuals 
An organization must take steps to tell individuals why they are collecting 
personal information, what laws give them the authority to do so, and to whom they 
usually disclose it. This is often done through what is known as an ‘IPP 2 notice’. 
Principle 3: Collecting information generally 
An agency must take steps to ensure the personal information it collects is 
relevant, up-to-date, complete and not collected in an unreasonably intrusive way. 
Principle 4: Storage and security 
Personal information must be stored securely to prevent its loss or misuse. 
Principle 5: Access to records  
Agencies need to take steps to record the type of personal information that they 
hold, and to give individuals access to their personal information. 
Principle 6: Alteration of records 
A record-keeper who has possession or control of a record is authorised to 
refuse to provide the individual with access to that record under the applicable 
provisions of any law of the Commonwealth that provide for access to that record. 
Principle 7: Record-keeper to check accuracy 
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A record-keeper who has possession or control of a record must check the 
accuracy of personal information before use. 
Principle 8: Information use only for relevant purposes 
A record-keeper who has possession or control of a record can only use the 
information for a specific purpose. It can only be used for another purpose in special 
circumstances; for example, with the individual's consent, or for a health and safety 
or law enforcement reason. 
Principle 9: Limits on use of personal information 
A record-keeper who has possession or control of a record that contains 
personal information shall not use the information except for a purpose for which the 
information is relevant. 
Principle 10: Disclosure 
This principle mandates when an agency can disclose personal information to 
someone else; for example, to another agency. This can only occur in special 
circumstances; for example, with the individual's consent, or for health and safety 
and law enforcement reasons. 
2.3.6 National Privacy principles (NPPs) 
Ten NPPs38 regulate how private sector organizations manage personal 
information in Australia. They include how and when personal information can be 
collected, used, disclosed, securely managed, corrected and accessed, in order to 
provide security. 
Principle 1: Collection 
The collection principle states what an organisation should do when collecting 
personal information, including: what it can collect; principles covering collecting 
from third parties; and, generally, what it should tell individuals about the collection. 
Principle 2: Use and disclosure 
This principle outlines how organisations can use and disclose individuals’ 
personal information. If certain conditions are met, an organisation does not always 
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need an individual's consent to use and disclose personal information (There are 
specific rules, for example, with respect to direct marketing). 
Principle 3: Information quality 
An organisation must take steps to ensure the personal information it holds is 
accurate and up-to-date. 
Principle 4: Security 
An organization must take steps to ensure the personal information is kept 
secure from unauthorised use or access. 
Principle 5: Openness 
An organisation must have a policy on how it manages personal information, 
and make it available to anyone who asks for it. 
Principle 6: Access and correction 
Individuals have a general right of access to their personal information, and the 
right to have that information corrected if it is inaccurate, incomplete or out-of-date. 
Principle 7: Identifiers 
This principle generally prevents an organisation from adopting and using an 
Australian Government identifier (for example, an individual’s Medicare numbers). 
Principle 8: Anonymity 
Where possible, organisations must give individuals the opportunity to do 
business with them without having to identify themselves. 
Principle 9: Trans-border data flows 
This principle outlines how organisations should protect personal information 
that they transfer outside Australia. 
Principle 10: Sensitive information 
Higher standards apply to the handling of sensitive information such as health 
details, racial or ethnic background, or criminal records. 
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2.3.7 Privacy by Design (PbD) principles 
The term ‘Privacy by Design’ (PbD) was conceived by Dr. Ann Cavoukian in 
the early 1990s (Cavoukian, 2009). Cavoukian has gradually distilled PbD principles 
into seven key principles. To date, however, these principles remain at the conceptual 
stage. Generally, to comply with the PbD concept and to ensure privacy, a system 
has to be systematic, predictable and repeatable (Cavoukian, 2009).  
Principle 1: Proactive not Reactive; Preventative not Remedial 
Privacy protection comes before-the-fact, not after.  This principle dictates that 
information privacy will be considered and ensured before problems arise. 
Principle 2: Privacy as the Default 
Privacy as the Default ensures that no action is required on the part of the 
individual to protect their privacy; it is built into the system by default, and 
information use and collection is determined by a respect for individual privacy. 
Principle 3: Privacy Embedded into Design 
Privacy can be integral to a system, without diminishing its functionality. This 
principle underpinning the mechanism is how to implement the system policies to 
ensure user privacy. 
Principle 4: Full Functionality: Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum 
It is possible to have both such as privacy vs. Security. The principle 
underpinning the methodology is how to create full functionality while protecting 
individual privacy. 
Principle 5: End-to-End Security: Full Lifecycle Protection 
PbD ensures cradle-to-grave, lifecycle management of information. The 
principle underpinning the assessment is how to secure information along with 
privacy. 
Principle 6: Visibility and Transparency: Keep it open 
Trust but verify. The principle underpinning the investigation is how the 
accountable organization will be open and honest with individual privacy. 
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Principle 7: Respect for User Privacy  
Keep the system user-centric. The principle underpinning the investigation is 
how to share, disclose or access, rectify, delete, and block information that is 
consistent with respect to individual privacy. 
2.4 PRIVACY PROTECTION MECHANISMS 
2.4.1 Individual user perspectives 
SN users have ultimate ownership of their personal data and can take control to 
ensure its privacy. Users may share private information with friends and (often) 
strangers. In so doing, however, major concerns can include being identified by 
malicious adversaries, and having sensitive relationships revealed (K. Liu et al., 
2010). SN users can, however, manage their personal and private information via a 
well-informed approach, such as access control for other SN users, or advanced 
mechanisms such as privacy by Friends-of-a-friend prediction. Setting up such 
privacy protection mechanisms, however, requires significant effort and may lead SN 
users to accept the default setting; this eventually results in a loss of privacy and loss 
of control over one’s personal information. 
Privacy by access control 
Privacy can be seen as a companion to access control for linked members on 
SNs. Currently, users are required to make a substantial effort in, and devote 
significant time to, setting up access controls for other individuals in order to protect 
themselves from privacy breaches.  
There are several ways in which users can implement access control: i) They may be 
technically adept enough to understand the privacy settings of the SN; ii) They might 
be able to employ a Mobile Access Control List (MACL), a privacy control 
mechanism which considers ‘user attitude’, ‘user communication history’ and ‘social 
aspect’ (G Lugano & P Saariluoma, 2009); iii) They might ensure privacy by using a 
SN privacy wizard template (Fang & LeFevre, 2010), which iteratively captures a 
limited number of user inputs to assign privacy ‘labels’ to selected friends and infers 
a user privacy preference; iv) They can utilize ‘Privacy Butler’, an automated service 
which monitors privacy policies and filters unwanted activities of connected friends  
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(Wishart, Corapi, Madhavapeddy, & Sloman, 2010); and v) They can avail 
themselves of the advantages of the capabilities of both the Semantic Web and 
mobile ad-hoc networks to ensure privacy based on a simple number as the trust 
mechanism, such as the ‘BlueTrust’ system (Marupadi & Coetzee, 2008); however, 
trust is more complex and, while regularly available in the Bluetooth range, the 
system may not provide symmetric or asymmetric trust.  
Privacy by friends-of-a-friend prediction 
Privacy can be achieved through new concepts such as ‘friends-of-friends’, 
which are based on symmetric or asymmetric scenarios. Privacy by friends-of-a 
friend prediction has drawn the attention of social researchers who hold that 
everybody on the planet is connected by ‘six degree relationships’: your friends 
belong to a ‘one degree relationship’; friends of your friends belong to a ‘two degree 
relationship’; and so on (Cai, Wang, Gong, Chen, & Ma, 2009). The user can apply 
varying levels of control to the publishing and sharing of information or resources 
according to the friend-of-a-friend relationship theory. 
 ‘Serendipity’, for example, is one of the initial Bluetooth-based systems which 
demonstrates the friendship initiation system (Eagle & Pentland, 2005); however, it 
does not utilize WiFi, and is not extendable to Multihop mesh networking similar to 
‘WhoZThat’. ‘WhoZThat’ ties mobile smart phones to multiple SNs and initiates 
friendships by sharing social networking ID (Beach et al., 2008) extended to a 
context-aware component, such as Music Jukebox; however, linking to SN 
information may cause future privacy breaches. 
Friendships can be hidden but can be revealed by using secure hashing 
identifiers, and friends-of-a-friend can be matched through hashed key to disclose 
unilateral friendships. This hidden friendship matching technique avoids privacy-
depleting consequences (Sören Preibusch, 2008). Raban et al. (2009) describe 
mechanisms for exploring relationship between strangers, and recommends a 
‘restrictive profile’ for mobile devices. Their investigation incorporates two 
established theoretical approaches – Uncertainty Reduction Theory (URT) and 
Predicted Outcome Value Theory (POV) – to develop an efficient introduction 
mechanism between users based on synchronous progressive disclosure of personal 
information.  
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Link prediction algorithms to anonymize a dynamic SN is one of the privacy 
preserving techniques (Smriti Bhagat, 2010). Bhagat proposes clustering methods, 
that consequently, provides guaranteed anonymity against adversaries with limited 
background knowledge; however, the personal information which SN users provide 
could be misused and tampered with. The Connection Linking Mechanism is also a 
SN focus area. New connections are always essential elements of a SN; however, it 
is crucial to choose valid connections. 
2.4.2 Web service federated or distributed perspective 
Privacy can be assured through new concepts of web services federation or 
distribution. The federation or distributed approach can be composed and compared 
as various approaches such as 39: i) Commodity webhosting; ii ) Non-free software; 
iii) Federation of Servers; iv) Peer-to-peer (P2P) and Distributed Hashtable (DHT); 
v) Social desktop applications; vi) In-browser profile and certificates; and vii) 
Distributed Node Architecture.  
Commodity webhosting 
In the Commodity webhosting40 approach, web services are often deployed on 
virtual machines or commodity webhosting. Some examples of this type of service 
are StatusNet41, Diaspora42 and The Appleseed Project43.  However, encryption, 
security and privacy are not safe on virtual machines, and the federation on these 
machines and servers cannot handle as much traffic as applications using optimized 
protocols rather than HTTP. 
Non-free software 
Non-free software44 based services hide user data and only allow its sharing 
based on attribute-based encryption; examples are iSocial45 and Persona (Baden, 
Bender, Spring, Bhattacharjee, & Starin, 2009). However, privacy should not intend 
to simply hide user data as, although hidden, it will remain in the system and can still 
become the cause of future privacy incidents. 
Federation of Servers 
Server federation46 approaches use existing server infrastructure and traditional 
Internet architecture; some examples are OneSocialWeb47, XMPP48 and Google 
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Wave49. However, these approaches construct services using a certain degree of 
unencrypted trust in the servers. 
Peer-to-peer (P2P) /Distributed Hashtable (DHT) 
The Peer-to-peer (P2P) and Distributed Hashtable (DHT)50 approach can be 
considered as one of the best privacy approaches, as it provides for any social 
interaction to be end-to-end or group encrypted; some examples of this approach are 
SNsare PeerSoN51, Safebook52, Friend2Friend53 and Opera Unite54. Some fine-tuned 
technologies improve their services by concealing the identities of those involved in 
a communication. However, availability of services is still doubtful since the services 
need a special strategy for message delivery when a source goes ‘offline’ with a 
redundancy between servers, DHT, and/or group communication. 
Social desktop applications 
Social desktop application55 approaches allow end to end encryption for people 
and groups without engaging a web browser, and provide richer interactions beyond 
traditional social networks. Examples of this type of application are Nepomuk for 
KDE56 and Social Desktop for KDE57. While these applications provide computer 
desktop experience integration, they could be the source of possible privacy issues 
similar to client-server approach.  
In-browser profile and certificates 
The In-browser profile and certificates58 approach stores secure user profile 
locally in the browser and authenticates it at any website; external websites are not 
able to breach it using FOAF+SSL protocol. An example in this category is Lorea59. 
In this approach, FOAF+SSL securely includes a link to a profile request by the web 
browser, and can be hosted on commodity web hosting. However, this approach 
includes a layer of complexity without solving the privacy issues; this is because 
creating a forum and micro blogging requires some sort of hosting, and group 
encryption is not possible in this approach. The user also needs to surf websites to 
receive profiles and information updates and there is no real-time notification stream; 
these are other drawbacks of this approach.  
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Distributed Node Architecture 
Distributed Node Architecture60 separates an end user’s social node into five 
components  – ‘core’, ‘UI’, ‘core transports’, ‘datastore modules’, and ‘UI 
transports’ – and defines a framework for their interaction; Distnode61 is an example 
of this category. This approach facilitates end-to-end encryption for people and 
groups, and the use of transport protocols such as HTTP, XMPP, or PSYC for 
relaying data between nodes. The approach also allows users to access the same 
account using various client programs such as Web Browser, Dedicated App and 
MeMenu. This approach is impressive but there is the possibility of over-design.  
2.4.3 Enterprise perspective 
Privacy preservation should not be partial but should ensure end-to-end 
preservation for SNs. Enterprises and service providers are accountable for the 
complete protection of the privacy of all SN users. Ensuring privacy at the system 
design level by using PbD or other technologies can be the future privacy protection 
solution for SN users. 
Privacy by innovative architecture 
Researchers have designed various innovative SN architectures to protect 
privacy in SNs; for example, Matryoshka structure  (Cutillo, Molva, & Strufe, 2010) 
and Contrail (Studi et al., 2010) provide an innovative and complete solution to 
preserve privacy, data integrity, data availability and data lookup. Peer to peer 
architecture is used in the Matryoshka structure, and cloud-based peer-to-peer 
architecture is used in Contrail. However, the feasibility of the peer-to-peer SN 
architecture in terms of availability of data and responsiveness of the system is still 
an open question; additionally, no existing large-scale SN has been considered for 
Contrail. One of the specific limitations of the Contrail system is that the pre-trusted 
assumption between two users implies synchronous mutual trust; however, trust can 
be asynchronous. Another limitation of Contrail is that it assumes that the cloud is 
reliable and will not lose any data; however, cloud privacy is another issue for future 
research.  
Other solutions, such as ‘De-identification’ by removing or modifying PII 
(such as social security numbers, driver's license numbers or financial accounts) and 
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‘re-identification’ whenever individual and sensitive information is needed 
(Narayanan & Shmatikov, 2010) can be part of the system architecture. Additionally, 
differential privacy can ensure effective privacy protection in the architecture; 
however, Narayanan & Shmatikov’s (2010) findings might have been much more 
convincing if the they had considered data accessibility in the proposed process.  
Privacy by Design 
The term ‘Privacy by Design’ (PbD) (Cavoukian, 2009) was conceived by Dr. 
Ann Cavoukian in early 1990. Gradually, she has distilled PbD into seven key 
principles; however, these principles remain at the conceptual stage. To comply with 
the PbD concept and to ensure privacy, a system needs to be systematic, predictable 
and repeatable (2009). Figure 8 shows the PbD principles. 
 
Figure 8: PbD principles (2009) 
2.5 PRIVACY PROTECTING ARCHITECTURES 
There are five different system architectures (C. Chow & Mokbel, 2009) for 
storing information in Social Networks. These are: client-server architecture 
(centralized architecture); third party architecture (similar to cloud-based 
architecture); distributed architecture (requiring fixed communication architecture, 
that is, a base station); peer-to-peer or ubiquitous architecture (not requiring a fixed 
communication architecture); and wireless sensor networks (where sensor nodes 
provide aggregate information). While prior research has shown that all these system 
architectures have various pros and cons, a number of issues such as information 
privacy and reliability remain unsolved.  
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2.5.1 Client-server architecture 
Client-server architecture is also known as ‘centralized architecture’ and uses a 
central repository to store data about their users and their connection (Bortoli, 
Bouquet, & Palpanas, 2009). The SN service providers facilitate a set of services 
such as finding other people, sharing pictures/videos, and exchanging professional 
and personal information. Some renowned SN services such as Facebook, MySpace 
and LinkedIn are developed based on this architecture. Existing work in this 
architecture can be divided into: i) Access control mechanism; ii) Virtual and 
individual client/server approach; and iii) User-centric approach.  
With the access control mechanism, users may specify that certain of their 
profile items are accessible only by ‘friends’, ‘friends of friends’, or certain members 
in the friend list by using an access control list (Giuseppe Lugano & Pertti 
Saariluoma, 2009), multilevel access control list (Park, Hong, Park, Zhan, & Lee, 
2010), degree of relationship (Cai et al., 2009), or hidden friendship matching (Sören 
Preibusch, 2008). The users may iteratively capture their privacy preferences by 
using ‘Privacy Wizard’ (Fang & LeFevre, 2010) or may use an automated service 
such as ‘Privacy Butler’ (Wishart et al., 2010). However, in this approach, SN users 
are required to make a substantial effort and devote time to setting up access control 
for others so as to achieve partial privacy and protection from future privacy 
breaches.  
Virtual and individual client/servers (Cáceres, Cox, Lim, Shakimov, & 
Varshavsky, 2009) or personal databases – such as ‘MyLifeBits’ (Park et al., 2010), 
and ‘Phonebookmark’ (Ekler & Lukovszki, 2010) – can be used to store user data or 
identity (Beach, Gartrell, & Han, 2009) in an individual server, rather than uploading 
the data to a centralized server. Such a server might resolve privacy issues – such as 
direct anonymity issues, indirect or K-anonymity issues, eavesdropping, spoofing, 
replay, or wormhole attacks – and allows for the use of a location-based system 
without disclosing user identity. However, one limitation is that the system uses of 
centralized server, which may highlight user future privacy issues. 
 In the user-centric approach, the user can manually or automatically set up 
their trustable mechanisms (VENETA: (Von Arb, Bader, Kuhn, & Wattenhofer, 
2008)), or use a combined ontology for both class membership and family 
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relationships (Smart architecture: (Noll, Chowdhury, Kalman, & Gomez, 2007)). The 
user can also use a time capsule with timed and revocable decryptability to use SN 
services with anonymity and less trust in an external authority (Camenisch, Groß, & 
Heydt-Benjamin, 2009). However, this approach may not ensure overall service 
privacy, but may partially do so through a friend list or the selective sharing of 
information with service providers, or with friends, family and colleagues 
(‘PeopleFinder’: (Sadeh et al., 2009)).  
2.5.2 Distributed architecture 
SN services are decentralized and distributed across various providers in 
distributed architecture. The SN facilitates services through widgets, plug-ins or add-
ons to implement functionality on user websites. This architecture is also known as 
federated SN architecture. Existing work in this architecture can be divided into39: i) 
The Commodity webhosting approach; ii) the Federation of Servers approach; iii) 
Social desktop applications; iv) the In-browser profile and certificates approach; and 
v) Distributed Node Architecture.  
In the Commodity webhosting approach, the service is deployable on 
commodity webhosting; some examples of this type of service are StatusNet41, 
Diaspora42 and The Appleseed Project43.  However, commodity webhosting can be 
often deployed on virtual machine farms, which might not be safe in terms of 
privacy. Existing server infrastructure can also be used; some examples are 
OneSocialWeb47, XMPP48, and Google Wave49. However, this approach requires a 
certain degree of trust in servers.  
Social desktop applications allow end-to-end encryption for users and groups 
without browser, and provide much richer interactions beyond traditional social 
networks; examples of these types of applications are Nepomuk for KDE56 and 
Social Desktop for KDE57. However, as is the case in the client/server approach, it is 
possible to engage in unsafe activities in this type of application.  
The In-browser profile and certificates approach provides authentication using 
locally stored secure profiles in browser; it is based on FOAF+SSL protocol, and 
websites cannot falsify certificates. Lorea59 have already implemented this protocol. 
However, in this approach, a layer of complexity is added without solving the 
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privacy issues, as creating a forum/micro-blogging still requires some kind of 
hosting, and the provision of group encryption is not possible. 
Distributed Node Architecture separates an end user and allows end-to-end 
encryption for people, groups and other entities; Distnode61 is an example of this 
type of architecture. However, there is the possibility of over-design in this approach.  
2.5.3 Third party architecture 
Third party architecture uses third party storage; this is also known as 
‘anonymizer’ and is placed between users and service provider as a middle layer. 
This layer must satisfy  user privacy requirements (C. Chow & Mokbel, 2009) while 
storing information. In this architecture, user information can be transformed into 
blurred, cloaked, hidden, or encrypted information and stored in: i) a trusted third 
party or broker (for example, SmokeScreen: (Cox et al., 2007); or ii) an untrusted 
third party (Puttaswamy & Zhao, 2010). This transformed information will be 
unblurred, uncloaked, made visible or decrypted in client devices for further use.  
2.5.4 Peer-to-peer or ubiquitous architecture  
In Peer-to-peer or ubiquitous architecture, a user of a mobile or hand-held 
device can establish social networking by identifying another user who is both close 
by and using another mobile device (Chatterjee, 2009). This architecture generally 
uses overlay or logical networks62.  There is no fixed communication infrastructure 
or centralized/distributed servers; mobile users directly communicate to each other 
through the multi-hop routing Peer-to-peer (P2P)/Distributed Hash table (DHT) 39 
approach. The users can engage in SN services such as sharing information, pictures, 
or locations. This approach might be one of the best for ensuring privacy as it allows 
any social interaction to be end-to-end or group encrypted. However, the P2P 
approach requires a special strategy for message delivery when a source server, DHT 
and/or group communication goes ‘offline’. Some examples of this type of approach 
are: SNsare PeerSoN51, Safebook52, Friend2Friend53, and Opera Unite54.  
2.5.5 Wireless sensor network architecture 
Wireless sensor network architecture is based on wireless sensor data. Existing 
work in this type of SN takes two main directions: i) dividing the system into 
hierarchical levels on physical units, for example, sub-rooms, rooms, floors, smart 
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buildings or between cars; or ii) providing an in-network information anonymization 
algorithm, regardless of the system’s physical structure (C. Chow & Mokbel, 2009).  
In this architecture, SNs can be used as ‘storage infrastructures’ for sensor 
information (Breslin et al., 2009).  Users can also avail themselves of both the 
capabilities of the Semantic Web and mobile ad-hoc networks to ensure privacy 
based on a simple number as the trust mechanism – such as the ‘BlueTrust’ system 
(Marupadi & Coetzee, 2008) –  or the friendship initiation system , Serendipity, 
which is one of the initial Bluetooth-based systems (Eagle & Pentland, 2005). 
However, trust is more complex, and its regular occurrence in the Bluetooth range is 
not enough to create symmetric or asymmetric trust. Users can also initiate friendship 
by sharing their social networking ID, WhoZThat ((Beach et al., 2008), extended to a 
context-aware component such as Music Jukebox. However, this linkage to SN 
information may raise future privacy breaches. 
MyLifeBits is a personal database-based system which is based on converging 
and collaborative computing (Park et al., 2010). ‘Smart architecture’ enables SN user 
privacy based on the identity of the user, using a combined ontology for both class 
membership and family relationships (Noll et al., 2007). ‘Novel architecture’ is an 
accountable privacy-supporting service  which uses Time Capsule (Camenisch et al., 
2009) . These architectures partially or completely address privacy issues using their 
own built-in systems. However, they too have limitations; for example, MyLifeBits 
was not verified in a real life environment or smart architecture, and overall user 
privacy was partially substantiated through an access control mechanism for a SN’s 
friend list, but was not confirmed overall. 
2.5.6 Open source architectures 
Users are becoming more aware of privacy issues and are demanding further 
controls to protect their personal information. They now have the need and desire to 
connect with each other through privacy-aware, personally controlled, open source 
SNs which can replace the centralized SNs which have thus far failed to protect their 
privacy. Such a SN (Diaspora63), for example, raised more than $20 000 from 700 
backers in a matter of weeks64. Some further examples of open source and free SNs 
are: Distributed Friends and Relations Network65, GNU Social66, Lorea67, 
NoseRub68, StatusNet69, and The Mine! Project70.   
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End-to-end privacy protection should be integrated into the design stage of SN 
service development. Although many designers incorporate privacy protection 
techniques for a particular component of their SN, the literature reveals that for 
optimum safety, they need to be embedded at the design stage. Open source 
architecture could be one of the architectures to achieve this. 
2.6 ARCHITECTURE MODELS 
The purpose of this section is to define the business architecture models and 
various privacy models, in order to scope the SN to which the privacy architecture is 
applicable. The various privacy models available to protect user information between 
connected stakeholders are the Access Control Model (Refer Figure 9), Minimal 
Information Sharing (Refer Figure 10), and the Third Party Model (Refer Figure 11). 
2.6.1 Access Control model 
The Access Control Model is used to ensure privacy by setting up access 
control for the SN stakeholders. Figure 9 shows this model where users can control 
access for service providers and stakeholders through a service provider.  
 
Figure 9: Access Control Model 
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However, access control is inherently inadequate to address privacy on the 
Internet. The access control paradigm can be described as Discretionary Access 
Control, as the ‘Need-to-know’ access model, or as Role-Based Access Control 
(Fong, Anwar, & Zhao, 2009). With this model, stakeholders have little control over 
how their data is used and accessed (Kagal & Abelson, 2010). 
2.6.2 Minimal Information Sharing Model 
The Minimal Information Sharing Model (Refer Figure 10) performs 
cryptographic techniques such as join and intersection operations, or secures 
information. However, the computational cost and the inability to facilitate other 
queries make this paradigm unsuitable for real time applications (C. Y. Chow, 2010).  
Other solutions, such as ‘de-identification’ by removing or modifying PII (that 
is, social security numbers, driver license numbers or financial accounts) and ‘re-
identification’ whenever individual and sensitive information is  needed (Narayanan 
& Shmatikov, 2010), can be part of the system architecture. While differential 
privacy can ensure good privacy protection in the architecture, it is inadequate with 
respect to data accessibility.  
 
Figure 10: Minimal Information Sharing Model 
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2.6.3 Third Party Model 
The Third Party Model engages a third party (refer Figure 11) to protect SN 
user information. This model is further divided into the Untrustworthy Third Party 
and Trustworthy Third Party Models. The Untrustworthy Third Party Model engages 
an untrusted third party, which executes queries by collecting secure information 
from multiple data sources (C. Y. Chow, 2010). However, the computational cost 
and the emphasis on processing and securing information from multiple data sources 
make this paradigm unsuitable for real time applications. The Trusty Third Party 
Model engages a third party trusted by users and acts as a middle layer between the 
database server and users, to process information (C. Y. Chow, 2010). This paradigm 
is already engaged in various location-based services.  
 
Figure 11: Third Party Model 
A trusted third party could be engaged to protect SN user information; 
however, there are both strong supporters and strong opponents of both the minimal 
information sharing model, which uses cryptographic techniques to share minimum 
information (Agrawal, Evfimievski, & Srikant, 2003), and trusted third party models, 
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which use a third party server to protect user privacy (G. Aggarwal et al., 2004; 
Jefferies, Mitchell, & Walker, 1996) .  
The computational cost and inability to facilitate the performance of every 
cryptographic technique query makes the minimal information sharing paradigm 
unsuitable for real time applications (C. Y. Chow, 2010). On the other hand, the 
Trusted Third Party Model is already used by existing location privacy techniques 
(Bamba, Liu, Pesti, & Wang, 2008; Beresford & Stajano, 2003; C.-Y. Chow & 
Mokbel, 2007; C.-Y. Chow, Mokbel, & Liu, 2006; Gedik & Liu, 2008; Gruteser & 
Grunwald, 2003; Kalnis, Ghinita, Mouratidis, & Papadias, 2007; Mokbel, Chow, & 
Aref, 2006; Peng, Wang, Ku, Xu, & Hamilton, 2008; Xu & Cai, 2007, 2008). It is 
commercially engaged in ensuring online user privacy in: Paypal (PayPal, 1999-
2003) for buying and selling products; Anonymizer (Anonymizer Inc., 2013) for 
anonymous surfing; and in Wi-Fi protection. However, the third party must be 
completely and highly trusted for the storage and sharing of information (Agrawal et 
al., 2003). 
2.7 ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE METHODOLOGIES 
There are a number of enterprise architecture methodologies available. 
However, as many as 90% of these have focussed on four methodologies: i) The 
Zachman Framework for Enterprise Architectures; ii) The Open Group Architectural 
Framework (TOGAF); iii) The Federal Enterprise Architecture; and iv) The Gartner 
Methodology (Sessions, 2007).  
2.7.1 The Zachman Framework 
The Zachman Framework is self-described as a ‘framework’; however, 
Sessions (2007) defined this framework as ‘a taxonomy’ since it organizes 
architectural artefacts such as design documents, specifications, and models as 
taxonomy. The Zachman Framework™71 is typically depicted as six functional foci 
(data, function, network, people, time, and motivation) from the perspective of six 
major players of an organization (planners, owners, designers, builders, 
subcontractors, and enterprises); these are represented in a 6 x 6 ‘matrix’, with the 
Communication Interrogatives as Columns and the Reification Transformations as 
Rows (Sessions, 2007).  
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2.7.2 The Open Group Architectural Framework (TOGAF) 
The Open Group Architectural Framework (TOGAF) (The Open Group, 2013) 
is also known as a ‘framework’; however, Sessions (2007) defines the framework as 
‘a process’ since the Architecture Development Method (ADM) is used as a process 
for creating an Enterprise Architecture. TOGAF has a detailed method and set of 
supporting resources for developing an Enterprise Architecture (Refer to Chapter 6: 
for more details about TOGAF). 
2.7.3 The Federal Enterprise Architecture (FEA) 
The Federal Enterprise Architecture can be viewed as either an implemented 
enterprise architecture, or as a proscriptive methodology for creating an enterprise 
architecture (Sessions, 2007). FEA72 provides principles and standards within and 
between agencies and external stakeholders across the Federal Government to 
develop business, information, and technology architectures.  
2.7.4 The Gartner Methodology 
A well-known and leading organization, Gartner Inc.73 has developed the 
Gartner Methodology and many well-qualified specialist communities which 
encourage collaboration and best practice in technology research. Sessions (2007) 
describes the Gartner Methodology as ‘an enterprise architectural practice’,  as 
explored  in Gartner Enterprise Architecture Process: Evolution 2005 (Bittler & 
Kreizmann, 2005). 
2.7.5 Comparison of enterprise architecture methodologies 
Sessions (2007) suggests a much more systematic approach to identify which 
architecture methodology is appropriate for an enterprise, and to distinctly 
differentiate between various enterprise architecture methodologies so as to establish 
criteria and ratings for each methodology. Sessions evaluated the methodologies 
based on 12 criteria and a ranking of 1-4 for each criterion. If a criterion does ‘a very 
poor job’ in that area, then the methodology scores ‘1’; it scores ‘2’ for ‘an 
inadequate job’, ‘3’ for ‘an acceptable job’, and ‘4’ for ‘a very good job’. Table 2 
(adapted from (Sessions, 2007)  shows these criteria and ratings for enterprise 
architecture methodologies. Sessions recommends working through the criteria and 
determining the appropriate architecture methodology, as each has its strengths and 
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weaknesses, and none is complete; for example, TOGAF has scored ‘4- a very good 
job’ for ‘process completeness’.  
Table 2: Criteria and ratings for enterprise architecture methodologies (adapted from Sessions(2007) 
 Ratings 
Criteria Zachman TOGAF FEA Gartner 
Taxonomy completeness 4 2 2 1 
Process completeness 1 4 2 3 
Reference-model guidance 1 3 4 1 
Practice guidance 1 2 2 4 
Maturity model 1 1 3 2 
Business focus 1 2 1 4 
Governance guidance 1 2 3 3 
Partitioning guidance 1 2 4 3 
Prescriptive catalogue 1 2 4 2 
Vendor neutrality  2 4 3 1 
Information availability 2 4 2 1 
Time to value 1 3 1 4 
2.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presents the current state-of-the-art in addressing privacy issues in 
Social Networks. It is apparent that analysts, researchers and SN users are expressing 
their concerns about these issues, and are engaging in attempts to mitigate these 
concerns. To date, however, privacy in SNs has not been adequately addressed and 
the issue requires further investigation. It is apparent that it is important to consider 
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technical, non-technical, legislative, judicial, and ethical issues with respect to 
protecting and sharing user information in SNs. 
A SN’s user privacy preferences are extensive and diverse. It is a definitive 
conclusion that SN users appreciate control over their information and customization 
of their privacy preferences. Nevertheless, most SN services have limited options for 
customizing privacy preferences. A SN’s existing privacy preference may at first 
seem attractive to a user, and they may be interested in customizing their preference; 
however, individual privacy preference customization is a burden for users, and this 
can eventually force them to abandon SN services.  
‘Who’ can be connected and ‘How’ they can be connected or linked in SNs are 
further key questions. Researchers and analysts are devising and reviewing various 
connection mechanisms, such as graph theory or the friend-of-a-friend-based systems 
to facilitate privacy protection; however, these mechanisms are limited by the use of 
a different mathematical theory, rather than the intersection of user relationships.  
Canonical policies and access control mechanisms can be incorporated as a 
quick and temporary solution for these applications. A set of social norms – such as 
‘home self’, ‘work self,’ ‘family self’, ‘high school self’ – or the appendage of an 
expiry date for SN data may provide individuals with temporary solutions (Rosen, 
2010). Reputation74 defender, which protects one’s online reputation, is another 
quick solution. However, as a permanent solution, privacy needs to be incorporated 
into the system architecture.  
To alleviate user burden and to ensure their full ownership of private 
information, the latest design paradigm, Privacy by Design (PbD), can be adapted 
into SNs. Embedding privacy directly into the design and operation of a system can 
ensure the protection of privacy from the outset (Cavoukian & Prosch, 2011). In fact, 
incorporating privacy at the design stage can ensure  SN users’ autonomy by default. 
This will reduce the burden on users and encourage an increase in social networking. 
The contemporary web service federated/distributed approach and perspective 
for incorporating PbD to protect user privacy is recommended for SN services. This 
approach has established specific mechanisms for individuals, business, developers, 
government and academia75.  
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Individual users can decide where to store their data, which tools and features 
they use for their services, which provider they prefer, and can specify the 
technology which is used to store their data in their own individual storage. In this 
way, they can accomplish jurisdiction and rights over their own data76.  
Business also benefits from using federated services as they can depend on 
open technology, choose where to store data, have jurisdiction over their own data, 
and ensure robustness for their business77. Business can also benefit from the use of 
Vendor Relationship Management (VRM) which empowers individuals to manage 
their relationships with businesses. 
 Federated social web technologies are also beneficial for academics, students 
and teachers78. Universities can benefit from the integration of non-commercial 
software and services, so as to gain freedom from commercial organizations and to 
provide public domain journals. Students and faculty can connect and collaborate 
with their peers worldwide to advance their web and data science.  
Although extensive research has been carried out on the web service 
federated/distributed approach, there are still challenges that are not adequately 
covered by this approach. Section 2.4.2 explains and compares some of these 
challenges. The key limitation of the web service federated/distributed approach is 
that providers may need to develop completely new services to achieve 
interoperability from the outset.  
Interoperability between these federated services, which is inadequately 
addressed by the services, can be conquered by various privacy languages. There are 
also many privacy languages available for representing policies in a human-readable 
and machine-readable format, such as: Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P); A 
P3P Preference Exchange Language (APPEL); Customer Profile Exchange 
(CPExchange); Privacy Rights Markup Language (PRML); XML Access Control 
Language (XACL); Platform for Enterprise Privacy Practices (E-P3P); Security 
Assertion Markup Language (SAML); Rei; eXtensible Access Control Markup 
Language (XACML); Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL); X-Path 
Based Preference Language (XPref); Declarative Privacy Authorization Language 
(DPAL); Geographic Location Privacy (Geopriv) (Kumaraguru, Cranor, Lobo, & 
Calo, 2007); and ODRL (Iannella, 2002). However, while these privacy languages 
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are useful for interoperability between new or existing SNs, it is necessary to address 
the privacy issues for these SN services.   
Facebook currently has approximately one billion users, Twitter has 
approximately 500 million, Linkedin has approximately 110 million, and MySpace 
has 50 million users79. These SN services and enterprises have existing systems and 
relatively mature business practices; replacing such systems and practices outright is 
rarely on the agenda of a PbD approach (Cavoukian & Prosch, 2011). Enterprise 
perspective approaches could, therefore, provide a solution to the SN user privacy 
issue by incorporating PbD functionality. However, it is necessary to rethink, 
redesign, and revive these enterprise systems so as to ensure the highest standard of 
privacy protection. 
Section 2.7.5 includes a comparison of enterprise-architecture methodologies, 
and lists a set of criteria for selecting appropriate architecture methodologies. All the 
studies reviewed so far, however, suffer from the fact that none is complete. Prior 
studies have noted the importance of selection of the TOGAF as the architecture 
methodology for SN services. This research recommends the TOGAF to develop the 
SN privacy framework for three reasons. Firstly, TOGAF (The Open Group, 2013) 
scores the three criteria of process completeness, vendor neutrality, and information 
availability as necessary to promote sharing and disclosure for SN users  
(Spiekermann & Cranor, 2009; Tan, Qin, Kim, & Hsu, 2012; Wallbridge, 2009). 
Secondly, the TOGAF enables frameworks to be tailor-made. Lastly, TOGAF offers 
‘Boundaryless Information Flow’ and open systems implementation (The Open 
Group, 2013).  
This chapter also assists researchers and analysts in the industry to gain an 
enhanced understanding of the privacy issues in SNs. Privacy is a basic issue for SNs 
as users will terminate their usage if they feel unsafe in the SN environment. 
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A research methodology consists of a combination of processes, methods, and 
tools (Nunamaker Jr & Chen, 1991). A research process involves understanding the 
research subject matter and the significant research questions, and applying the 
research methodology to address these research questions. Research methodology 
refers to the approach used for finding the best possible data to address the research 
questions. Tools are used to implement the research methodology. This chapter 
focuses on the research methodology and strategies used in this research.   
To date, various research methods have been developed and employed in the 
field of Information Systems, including experiments, surveys, case studies, theorem 
proof, forecasting, simulation, reviews, action research, and role/game playing 
(Choudrie & Dwivedi, 2005). Yin  (2009) categorizes these research strategies in 
terms of the ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘where’, ‘how’, and ‘why’ research questions they 
address (refer Table 3 below).  
Table 3: Various research strategies (Adapted from Yin, (2009)) 
Strategy  Form of Research Question 
Experiment How? Why? 
Survey Who? What? Where? How many? How much? 
Archival analysis Who? What? Where? How many? How much? 
History How? Why? 
Case Study How? Why? 
Most of the questions posed in Section 1.4 are ‘who’ questions; therefore, an 
integration of the case study and survey approaches was considered appropriate for 
this research. Findings from Choudrie and Dwivedi (2005) suggest that the case 
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study method is the most widely used when investigating topics such as adoption 
issues at the organisational level, and that the survey method is predominantly used 
for investigating topics such as user adoption of, and uses of, technology. In another 
major study, Gable (1994) proposes that a mix of research methods can be useful to 
meet the needs of discovery and verification; for example, qualitative case study 
method and quantitative survey method can be combined in a single project. In 
addition to the integration of case study and survey methods, this research also 
considered to review and synthesize SN user privacy requirements using Thematic 
analysis since a case study typically uncover what is actually there, and the existing 
or missing features which users may be aware of.  SN user privacy requirements may 
be uncovered in a typical case study; however, many privacy requirements are not 
addressed at all by typical social networking sites and cannot be uncovered from a 
study of existing systems. Therefore, as the major aims of this research are 
exploration, confirmation verification, this research integrates case study, thematic 
analysis and survey methods (Refer to Figure 12). 
The research strategy was initially formulated to identify the research gaps and 
to subsequently establish the research questions. A review of the literature 
substantiated the research gaps, and a case study protocol was then developed to 
conduct multiple case studies; these case studies identified important variables, and 
patterns, which, in turn, lead to the development of a conceptual SN privacy 
framework and architecture.  
The next steps involved the review and synthesize SN user privacy 
requirements using Thematic analysis and verifications of these requirements. This 
step also involves the design of the pre-pilot assessment, pilot survey and survey 
instrument design and the conduct of the survey. All survey data was analysed using 
IBM SPSS Statistics 21 and IBM SPSS Amos 21. This analysis was one of the bases 
for the formulation of the SN privacy framework and architecture. TOGAF (The 
Open Group, 2013) was used to develop the SN privacy framework and architecture. 
Figure 12 (below) illustrates the various research methods and their output. The 
findings from this research were finally incorporated into this doctoral thesis.  
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Figure 12: Research methods and output 
Table 4 below illustrates the overall relationship between the research 
questions, the research sub questions, the unit and main method of analysis, the 
research methods, and the study objectives. 
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Table 4: Research methodology 
Research 
Questions 
Research Sub-questions Unit of analysis Main Method of 
Analysis 
Research 
Methods 
Study 
Objectives 
Depended 
variables 
Deliverables 
How can 
user privacy 
be protected 
within 
Social 
Networks? 
 
What are the privacy 
requirements of SN users? 
What is privacy in a 
SN context? 
Description 
Exploratory Factor 
Analysis (EFA) 
Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) 
Thematic 
Analysis 
Survey 
Exploration 
Confirmation 
Description 
Explanation 
Privacy in a SN 
context 
SN user privacy 
requirements  
and architecture for 
Social Network 
What are the principles 
required to protect user 
privacy in SNs? 
 
What principles exist 
for protecting SN user 
privacy? 
What principles are 
employed by the SN 
providers? 
Exploration 
Description 
Descriptive 
analysis 
Exploration 
Confirmation 
Description 
Privacy protecting 
principles 
 
Privacy protecting 
principles for 
protecting SN user 
privacy 
How effective are the 
privacy principles employed 
by the SN providers? How 
can these be integrated into a 
How effective are these 
principles? 
Description 
Comparing privacy 
protecting principles 
Descriptive 
analysis 
Case Study 
Exploration 
Confirmation 
Description 
Privacy protecting 
principles  
Effective Privacy 
protecting 
principles for 
protecting SN user 
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usable framework? Exploration TOGAF privacy 
Privacy protecting 
framework 
How does the privacy 
framework inform SN 
architecture? 
 
TOGAF 
What is the information 
storing mechanism to 
protect user 
information privacy in 
the architecture? 
What type of 
information can be 
stored while still 
preserving privacy in 
the architecture? 
Description TOGAF 
 
Exploration 
Description 
 
SN user privacy 
requirements  
 
Effective Privacy 
protecting 
principles for 
protecting SN 
user privacy  
 
SN privacy 
architecture 
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3.1 RESEARCH PLAN 
The research was conducted in five phases, with a number of internal iterations 
(Refer to Figure 13 for the research plan and Figure 14 legend used in the research 
plan). 
3.1.1 Phase 1: Project initiation 
The first phase of the research – the Project Initiation Phase – focused 
primarily on the project initiation process and assisted in developing a knowledge 
base in the social networking area. Activities included the literature review, the 
research problem identification, and preparation of the research plan. The expected 
deliverables from this phase were the Stage 2 doctoral document and the doctoral 
Confirmation report. 
3.1.2 Phase 2: SN users’ privacy requirements 
The second phase focused on compiling SN user privacy requirements, and 
validating these requirements by conducting a survey. The survey data then assisted 
in the development of a usable privacy framework and architecture. 
3.1.3 Phase 3: SN Privacy protecting principles 
Phase 3 focused on the design section of the research. Two case studies were 
undertaken in this phase. In the first study, various privacy protecting principles were 
compared, and effective principles for SN privacy were proposed. In the second 
study, privacy protecting principles were incorporated in the SN and compiled into a 
usable framework. 
3.1.4 Phase 4: Achieving a privacy protecting framework 
Phase 4 focused on achieving a privacy-protecting framework based on the 
principles from Phase 2.  
3.1.5 Phase 5: Synthesis and overall research evaluation 
Phase 5 was the synthesis and review phase for the overall research project. 
and focused on synthesising all solutions in a privacy framework and architecture for 
SNs. Freely available TOGAF (The Open Group, 2013) was used for the ‘step by 
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step’ development of this framework and architecture, which were then empirically 
validated. (Refer to all the case study results and survey data.) 
 
Figure 13: Phased research plan 
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Figure 14: Legend used in the research plan 
3.2 THE CASE STUDY DESIGN 
The case study design included three exploratory case studies, each with 
different objectives. 
3.2.1 The case study objectives 
The multiple case study approach was designed to: 
o Investigate the effectiveness of the privacy principles employed by the 
SN service providers 
o Investigate the principles required to protect user privacy in SNs (and 
to then compile these principles into a usable framework) 
3.2.2 The case study design overview 
Each case study in this research addressed an exploratory, descriptive or 
explanatory objective. Dependent variables as various privacy protecting principles 
were identified from the literature (Refer to 2.3 various privacy protecting principles) 
and used during each case study phase. Table 5 (below) maps the organization of the 
analysis, study objectives, variables, and method of analysis for this research. 
Table 5: Characteristics of the case studies 
Case Study Unit of analysis Study Objectives Dependent 
variables 
Main Method 
of Analysis 
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Case Study 1- 2 Privacy principles 
employed by the SN 
providers 
Principles/guidelines 
required to protect user 
privacy in Social 
Networks 
Exploration/Description Privacy 
principles 
Description 
Deliverables from each case study were incorporated into a conceptual model, 
which assisted in the development of a hypothesised model. These hypothesised and 
conceptual models then assisted in the development of the operational instrument 
design; this, in turn, lead to the design of the survey instrument. 
3.3 THE SURVEY DESIGN  
The survey method focused on qualitative and quantitative analysis, which 
involved online questions. This research investigated a subset sample of large 
numbers of research population from various renowned and popular SN sites80 such 
as Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn SN sites81. These sites have large numbers of 
estimated monthly visitors – 750 000 000, 250 000 000, and 110 000 
000 respectively. This research investigated SN general users as targeted samples 
who did not need to be expert in SN. The sample population was investigated for 
capturing diverse SN user privacy requirements. The collected data was analysed 
through statistical methods such as factor analysis. Traditionally, survey research 
serves as verification rather than discovery (Gable, 1994). In this research, a survey 
was conducted and designed through the ‘Survey Instrument’ step (Refer Chapter 4 
for details of the survey design). All the survey deliverables were validated through 
privacy models. 
3.4 EVALUATION METHODS 
By definition, a research study has a clearly defined beginning and end, with 
identifiable phases in between. Accordingly, this research had a clearly defined 
beginning (Phase 1) and end (Phase 5), and a detailed research plan (the ‘in 
between’, as given in Section 3.1). This research also had specific expected outcomes 
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which reflected its stated objectives (as outlined in Section 1.2). The research 
evaluation methods were based on these objectives. 
This research included the thematic investigation of ‘user privacy 
requirements’ in order to understand the role of user information in Social Networks. 
This investigation asked ‘how’ and ‘why’ a SN user seeks privacy. The answers to 
these questions provided an enhanced understanding of how to build better privacy 
functionality into SNs. The research included a survey of general SN users as a 
verification of their privacy requirements.  
The research presented seven leading principles of privacy protection, and 
determined which principles are most useful in ensuring SN privacy protection. It 
also evaluated how these principles need to be built into the way information is 
controlled, collected, accessed, and used. The case study method was used to 
evaluate how the best of the currently available instruments could meet SN user 
privacy requirements.  
This research also developed a SN privacy framework and architecture. Since 
any computer system design framework is tremendously complex, this research used 
the TOGAF, based on a comparison of the top four Enterprise Architecture 
Methodologies (Refer 2.7.5). An architecture was developed by mapping SN user 
privacy requirements with the privacy protecting principles as its core. The three 
types of architecture were developed from the TOGAF (for example, Business versus 
Data, versus Technology Architecture). The framework and architecture were 
developed using a verified TOGAF.  
The outcome of this research is a privacy model which is more comprehensive 
than existing models. The validity of this model was empirically established by 
mapping SN user privacy requirements (Refer 4.4),  privacy positions (Refer 2.1.2), 
and SN data types (Refer 1.3). In this way, the model investigates and validates the 
privacy requirements of general SN users by using the three privacy positions that 
the public holds as implicit. The model also involves the Communication Privacy 
Management Theory, and axioms reflecting the management of private (S. Petronio, 
2013) and public information. 
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Chapter 4: SN user privacy requirements 
This chapter investigates SN user privacy requirements. SN user information is 
accessed by other users in real-life contexts, and this can generate privacy breaches. 
Privacy has become a significant contemporary issue (Islam & Iannella, 2012) in 
SNs due to the massive sharing and exchange of personal information such as 
pictures and online activities. Inappropriate usage, such as connecting contacts 
without confirming identity, may lead to serious scenarios82 and privacy breaches83. 
Analysts and researchers confirm that SN users have become more aware of privacy 
breaches and that this could affect their future SN engagement84.  
Privacy is an important freedom and plays a key role in protecting fundamental 
human rights; however, ‘There is no widely accepted theory of what privacy is and 
what role it plays in our society’85. Nor is there a rigid definition of privacy  (Islam & 
Iannella, 2012), especially within the context of SNs. Furthermore, investigating 
millions of SN users’ privacy requirements is a mammoth task. Facebook, for 
example, has 700 million users86 and holds and shares more than 30 billion pieces of 
content (including web links, news stories, blog posts, notes, and photo albums) each 
month. These complex factors cause users to experience confusion between 
disclosure and privacy issues on SNs. ‘Privacy’ does not mean simply hiding 
information; it is the legitimate control over one’s own personal information. When a 
person fails to control personal identifiable information (PII), this can cause privacy 
breaches (Islam & Iannella, 2012); a user can probably detect these breaches when 
others directly or indirectly abuse their PII through SN functionalities. 
A variety of methods may be suitable in exploring SN user privacy 
requirements; each has its advantages and drawbacks. Findings from Yin (2009) 
suggest that case study method is the most widely used to investigate contemporary 
phenomena within certain real-life contexts where the investigator has little control 
over the events. A case study typically uncovers what is actually there, and the 
existing or missing features which users may be aware of.  SN user privacy 
requirements may be uncovered in a case study; however, many privacy 
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requirements are not addressed at all by typical social networking sites and cannot be 
uncovered from a study of existing systems.   
Similarly, users are largely oblivious to the risks and have even less idea about 
what SN functionality may be able to assist them; therefore, a case study of 
‘innocent’ users is not sufficient.  While there is a need to investigate user knowledge 
and explicit user concerns, there is also a need to explore user requirements. For 
example, essential SN functionalities which allow a user to simply explore and 
comprehend their exposure are needed.  There should also be functionalities that 
allow SN users to explore vulnerabilities that may require a deeper understanding of 
the system.  In short, users should be able to easily see what actions they can take to 
protect their privacy. 
This chapter is organised into five sections, the first of which clarifies the 
research model for the investigation. The second section reviews and synthesizes SN 
user privacy requirements, using thematic analysis. The following section explores 
the validation of SN user privacy requirements. The fourth section provides the 
research results, and the final section summarizes the chapter. 
4.1 RESEARCH MODEL FOR EXPLORING SN USER PRIVACY 
REQUIREMENTS 
Figure 15 below illustrates the research model for exploring SN user privacy 
requirements.  
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Figure 15: Research model for exploring SN user privacy requirements 
This research used thematic analysis to review and synthesize SN user privacy 
requirements in a systematic way. Thematic analysis is a flexible approach to 
analysing data in primary qualitative research. It searches for, identifies, and reports 
themes or patterns (Braun & Clarke, 2006), and clarifies the meaning of data by 
moving back and forth between all data to identify themes or patterns. Thematic 
analysis is independent of theory and epistemology, and can be applied across a 
range of investigation. It is useful in privacy research because of this theoretical 
freedom.  
This research was developed by conducting a thematic analysis of scholarly 
articles related to user privacy in SNs, and grouping the findings into primary and 
secondary user privacy requirements. These privacy requirements were then 
validated through several steps, including pre-pilot assessment, and pilot and final 
surveys. Finally, the validated SN user privacy requirements were used to develop 
the SN privacy architecture and privacy framework.  
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4.2 REVIEW AND SYNTHESIZE SN USER PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS 
This research organized privacy issues, which have been inductively and 
deductively derived from the literature review, as themes.  This thematic method, 
then, is the analytical framework which addresses SN user privacy issues. These 
issues are eventually engaged as a bridge between SN functionalities and SN user 
privacy requirements.  
This research adapted the thematic analysis method to include its 6 stages, as 
described by Braun and Clarke (2006) and detailed below. These stages are used to 
gather all relevant articles, based on keywords and search queries. A similar research 
pattern was also applied by Gürses (2010) to determine community privacy issues in 
online news and blogospheres.  
Stage 1: Familiarization with the data, and gathering the data 
This stage set up a query of scholarly article search engines and bibliographic 
databases, such as Google Scholar87 and Scirus88, with related search terms. Both 
databases have ‘export citation’ features to various bibliography managers. Scholarly 
articles were included in, or excluded from this query according to specific criteria. 
They needed to: 
o Be written in English 
o Discuss technical topics 
o Explicitly refer to SN users’ general privacy concerns 
o Discuss SN privacy issues, breaches, concerns, and privacy violations 
in general  
o Focus on SN user privacy requirements in general 
Excluded articles are those that discuss: 
o Legal topics 
o Social topics 
o Solutions for innovative SN architecture 
o Solutions for innovative SN frameworks solutions 
The queries ran in English, and the search results were restricted to articles 
written in English. Articles which discuss legal or social topics were eliminated, 
while articles discussing technical topics were included as this research focuses on 
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technical dimensions. The articles discussing solutions for innovative SN 
architecture and SN frameworks were eliminated since this research is concerned 
with the discussion of general issues relating to SN user privacy, rather than with 
innovative solutions. The research focuses on the privacy issues related to the 
innovative architectures and frameworks. Articles which explicitly discuss general 
SN privacy breaches, privacy violations and privacy requirements, were included for 
further analysis. These articles were included according to their technical 
dimensions, which assisted the exploration of SN user privacy requirements. 
‘And’ operator was used to search the articles with a combination of ‘social 
network’, ‘users’, ‘privacy’, ‘concerns’, ‘requirements’, ‘paradox’ and ‘breaches’, so 
as to limit the number of search results. Search queries and the number of return and 
downloaded items (after deleting duplicates) are illustrated in Table 6 below. 
Table 6: Search queries and number of return and downloaded items after deleting duplicates  
# Search queries Number of 
return items 
Number of 
downloaded items 
1 ‘social network’ and ‘user privacy concerns’ 210 190 
2 ‘social network’ and ‘user privacy requirements’ 29 28 
3 ‘social network’ and users and ‘privacy paradox’ 353 338 
4 ‘social network’ and users and ‘privacy breaches’ 441 431 
    Total 987 
Zotero89, a free and open source reference management tool, was used to 
gather, organize, and analyse sources. Zotero is a useful research tool for managing 
bibliographic data and related research materials. 
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Figure 16: Stored articles in the Zotero research tool 
All  relevant articles collected were gathered into a data corpus as raw data. 
The data corpus was then checked for duplicates, and invalid or irrelevant content 
and, eventually, the relevant data was located. The latter then became the ‘data set’. 
From the data set, initial codes were identified for further analysis. This coding 
allowed this research to organize the data into meaningful groups and themes (Figure 
17 provides a detailed flow diagram). For each article, meta-tags were added; these 
included publication details, such as publication type, author/s, where published, 
volume, issue, pages, date, URL, when accessed, library catalogue and date. Each 
article was coded using the thematic organizing tags. 
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Include on 
discussion on SN 
users privacy 
concern in general 
Exclude on 
innovative SN 
architecture
Exclude on 
innovative SN 
framework
Include on 
discussion on SN 
privacy breaches, 
privacy violations in 
general 
Exclude on 
language
Include on 
technical topic
Exclude on 
Social topic
Exclude on 
legal topic
Total imports
1467 items
Duplicates removed
668 items
Screen on title and abstract
987 items
Include based on 
title & abstract
135 items
Screen on title and abstract
135 items
Include based on 
title & abstract
48 items
Retrieve full report
48 items
Screen on full report
48 Items
Include based full 
report
31 Items
Studies for data 
extraction
31 Items
Include on 
discussion on SN 
users privacy in 
general 
Include on SN users 
privacy issues in 
general
Include on SN users 
privacy concerns in 
general
Include on SN users 
privacy requirements 
in general
In file
48 Items
Not available
0 Items
 
Figure 17: Review flow diagram 
Stage 2: Theoretical foundations and generation of initial codes 
In the previous stage – the reviewing and synthesizing of SN user privacy 
requirements – a series of studies which included the theoretical background to their 
authors’ investigation of individuals’ privacy concerns were identified. These studies 
assisted with the generation of initial codes.  
 78 Chapter 4: SN user privacy requirements 
Smith et al. (1996), for example, used a reflective framework  to measure 
organizational privacy concerns in four dimensions: the collection of an extensive 
amount of personal data; unauthorized secondary uses of personal information; 
improper access to personal data; and errors or inaccuracy in personal information. 
Smith et al. (1996)  also found that users might not like unsolicited communications 
and automatic data transfer. Brown and Muchira (2004) consider Smith et al.’s 
(1996) five contextual issues (as listed above) to examine consumers’ privacy 
concerns. Malhotra et al. (2004) conceptualize inter-user information privacy issues 
as: collections of personal information; users’ control over collected information; and 
awareness of users’ privacy practice. Spiekermann and Cranor (2009) emphasise  
exposure, unwanted inflow of data, and unauthorized execution, as well as the 
individual issues described by Smith et al. (1996). 
There are also various dimensional or factorial models available for 
representing privacy issues. For example, ‘Model 1’ – a one-dimensional (one factor) 
model – is a plausible model underlying data structure (Culnan, 1993); this model 
can assess the level of concern about an issue using an option survey such as, ‘How 
concerned are you about threats to your privacy in America today?’ (Stewart & 
Segars, 2002). ‘Model 2’ is a two-dimensional (two-factor) model where privacy 
issues can be measured as both ‘information collection’ and ‘maintance of that 
information’ (Smith et al., 1996). ‘Model 3’ is three-dimensional (three-factor), 
where privacy issues can be reflected into ‘information collection’, ‘information 
management’ (which includes errors and unauthorised access), and ‘secondary use’ 
(1996). 
The thematic analysis method included a step to generate initial codes. The 
theoretical foundations and various models (detailed above) assisted us to: i) generate 
initial codes in the reviewing and synthesizing of SN user privacy requirements 
(describes in this section); and ii) to validate SN user privacy requirements (as 
described in Section 4.3 below). This step was used for systematic coding across the 
entire data set to trace its interesting features (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  
Stage 3: Searching for themes 
This stage consisted of collating codes into potential themes by inductively and 
deductively gathering all the data relevant to each theme (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Each theme can be a combination of various codes. Themes are also assigned to 
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other themes, which become sub-themes. Tags for each theme were individually 
added to each scholarly article. In the next step, these tags were clustered and 
grouped under each theme. Each of the themes contained multiple tagged items.   
Stage 4: Reviewing themes 
This stage consisted of checking the themes data corpus and entire data set, to 
generate a thematic map of the analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  The themes which 
were reviewed and generated through mapping were systematically tagged in 
previous stage. Some themes were grouped as sub-themes under suitable themes. 
Themes were reviewed deductively and inductively to generate modified themes. 
Stage 5: Defining and naming themes 
This stage included analysis to refine each theme, and assisted in generating clear 
definitions and names for each theme. Each theme focused on specific types of 
privacy issues. Eventually, these themes were considered as the key themes related to 
privacy issues, as illustrated in Table 7 below. 
Stage 6: Analysis 
This stage included a scholarly discussion of the analysis. Each theme was 
labelled a ‘privacy requirement’ of SN users, and there are 10 of these 
themes/requirements (See Table 7 below). These requirements are validated in 
Section 4.3. 
Table 7: Privacy requirements with privacy issues 
# Privacy 
dimensions 
Description Privacy issues Privacy requirements Major 
literature 
references 
1 Accountability 
and 
Transparency 
Privacy issues 
created due to 
accountability, 
visibility or 
transparency 
in SN user 
information 
Users are added to 
various groups or 
networks without 
user concern. 
Users may want to 
exercise more control 
over their addition to 
various groups or 
networks (Privacy 
Rights Clearinghouse, 
2011). 
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(Wallbridge, 
2009) 
Users may be ignored 
or become lost in the 
maze of complicated 
privacy policies that 
the SN actually 
states. 
Users may want 
simplified and user-
friendly privacy 
policies.  
(Tan et al., 
2012) 
SN provider states 
that it is users’ 
responsibility when 
they add an 
application, while the 
TPA privacy policy is 
governed by the SN 
policies. 
SN users may expect a 
SN provider’s 
constructive assistance 
when they add a Third 
Party Application. 
(Tan et al., 
2012) 
Users might know 
nothing about how 
they are targeted by 
advertisers, and do 
not have a transparent 
view of their 
information uses.  
Users may want to 
know how they are 
targeted by advertisers 
and may want a 
transparent view of 
their information uses 
(Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse, 2011). 
 
 
2 Collection and 
storage 
Privacy issues 
created due to 
unlimited, 
inappropriate 
and extensive 
amounts of 
personal 
information 
collection and 
storage in SN 
(Brown & 
Muchira, 
2004; 
Malhotra et 
Users might not 
understand the 
privacy and data use 
policy, such as how 
their personal 
information during 
and subsequent to 
registration will be 
used.  
Users may want to 
understand the privacy 
and data use policy, 
such as how their 
personal information 
during and subsequent 
to registration will be 
used (American Civil 
Liberties Union, 2010). 
(Tan et al., 
2012) ) 
 
User information, 
activities, identity 
and interests may be 
collected and stored 
indefinitely. 
Users might not want 
their information, 
activities, identity and 
interests to be collected 
and stored indefinitely 
(Smith et 
al., 1996) 
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al., 2004; 
Smith et al., 
1996) 
(American Civil 
Liberties Union, 2010). 
The SN service 
provider can collect, 
analyse or delete any 
or all the profiles and 
activities of its users. 
SN users might assume 
that the provider is not 
able to collect, analyse 
or delete any or all the 
profiles and activities 
of its users. 
(Spiekerm
ann & 
Cranor, 
2009; Tan 
et al., 
2012; 
Wallbridge
, 2009) 
 3 Combining 
Data 
Privacy issues 
created due to 
a combination 
of personal 
data with other 
information; 
this provides 
more com-
prehensive 
user profile 
information 
(Smith et al., 
1996) 
SN information can 
be used to identify 
the physical location 
of a person. 
SN users may expect 
that their information 
will not be used to 
identify physical 
location. 
(Smith et 
al., 1996) 
Advertising can 
create problems by 
using SN user 
locations without 
notification. 
Advertising should not 
create problems by 
using SN user locations 
without notification. 
(J. Tsai, 
Kelley, 
Cranor, & 
Sadeh, 
2012) 
Mobile SN users may 
not want to 
participate in 
dynamic interaction 
facilitated by their 
presence and 
location.  
Mobile SN users may 
not want to participate 
in dynamic interaction 
facilitated by their 
presence and location. 
(Balachand
er 
Krishnamu
rthy & 
Wills, 
2010) 
4 Deletion Privacy issues 
created due to 
inappropriate 
data deletion 
in SN 
(Wallbridge, 
2009) 
Users might not be 
able to permanently 
delete their accounts. 
Users may want to be 
able to permanently 
delete their accounts. 
(Spiekerm
ann & 
Cranor, 
2009; 
Wallbridge
, 2009) 
Users might not be 
able to permanently 
Users may want to be 
able to permanently 
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delete their digital 
contributions. 
delete their digital 
contributions (Privacy 
Rights Clearinghouse, 
2011). 
Users might 
experience issues 
with the retention of 
deleted information. 
Users may want to 
know the SN retention 
policies regarding 
deleted information 
(Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse, 2011). 
 
Users might 
experience SN 
retention of their 
deleted information 
for a couple of years 
or indefinitely. 
Users may not want the 
SN provider to retain 
their deleted 
information for a 
couple of years or 
indefinitely (Privacy 
Rights Clearinghouse, 
2011) . 
 
Users are unable to 
delete data such as 
friend requests, posts, 
status update, 
messages, and pokes 
on a per item basis. 
Users may want to 
delete data such as 
friend requests, posts, 
status update, 
messages, and pokes 
on a per item basis 
(American Civil 
Liberties Union, 2010). 
 
Users might 
experience a 
complicated data 
deletion process. 
Users may want a 
simplified, user-
friendly data deletion 
process. 
(Balachand
er 
Krishnamu
rthy & 
Wills, 
2010) 
5 Error Privacy issues 
created due to 
accidental or 
deliberate 
SNs might retain ad-
click data 
indefinitely; this 
might be 
SN users may not want 
their SN ad-click data 
kept indefinitely. 
(American 
Civil 
Liberties 
Union, 
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error in SN 
information 
(Malhotra et 
al., 2004; 
Smith et al., 
1996) 
unacceptable.  2010) 
 
Users’ full name and 
contact details might 
be mandatory 
provided information 
in SNs; this makes 
users easily traceable. 
Users may want 
functionalities which 
allow them to 
optionally provide their 
full name and contact 
details in SNs. 
(Taraszow, 
Aristodem
ou, Shitta, 
Laouris, & 
Arsoy, 
2010) 
Users may be 
unaware that their 
profile may be 
publicly available by 
default as a result of 
privacy policy 
changes. 
Users may not want 
their profile publicly 
available by default. 
(Taraszow 
et al., 
2010) 
SN users may allow 
their information 
easily viewable by a 
third party; this can 
create privacy issues. 
SNs may want their 
information is not 
easily viewable by a 
third party since this 
can create privacy 
instances. 
(Taraszow 
et al., 
2010) 
6 Improper or 
unauthorized 
access 
Privacy issues 
created due to 
unauthorized 
and 
inappropriate 
access to view 
or work with 
the data 
(Malhotra et 
al., 2004; 
Smith et al., 
1996) 
Users may be unable 
to avoid unwanted 
accessibility to 
information (or to 
ascertain if 
information has been 
accessed) because 
contacts may have 
copied and reposted 
information, thus 
bypassing privacy 
settings. 
Users may want to 
avoid unwanted 
accessibility to 
information (or to 
ascertain if information 
has been accessed) 
because contacts may 
have copied and 
reposted their 
information, thus 
bypassing privacy 
settings. 
 
(Guo, 
2010; 
Privacy 
Rights 
Clearingho
use, 2011) 
Users receive 
unwanted 
Users may not want to 
receive unwanted 
(Bhatnagar
, Herath, 
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communication from 
restricted or 
unwanted contacts 
inside or outside the 
networks. 
communication from 
restricted or unwanted 
contacts inside or 
outside the networks. 
Sharman, 
Rao, & 
Upadhyaya
, 2009; 
Guo, 2010; 
Taraszow 
et al., 
2010) 
User location 
information can be 
disclosed and used 
for tracking; 
ramifications could 
range from annoying, 
to embarrassing, to 
downright dangerous. 
Users may not want 
their location 
information to be 
disclosed and used for 
tracking. 
(Canales & 
Licon, 
2011; J. 
Tsai et al., 
2012) 
Third parties can gain 
access to user 
information through 
deceitful conductor or 
other users, without 
infringing ‘by 
default’ privacy 
settings which were 
pre-set by the SN 
providers but not 
customized by the 
users. 
Users may not want 
third parties to gain 
unauthorized access to 
their information 
through deceitful 
conduct or other users 
without infringing ‘by 
default’ privacy 
settings. 
(Taraszow 
et al., 
2010) 
Internal or external 
parties can stalk SN 
users. 
Users may not want to 
be stalked by internal 
or external parties. 
(Deleon, 
2010; 
Taraszow 
et al., 
2010) 
Third party 
application providers 
may not specify the 
Users may want third 
party application 
providers to specify the 
(Canales & 
Licon, 
2011; 
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extent of  user 
information gathered 
through the 
application, which 
may harvest 
information from 
their network without 
their knowledge. 
extent of the gathering 
and harvesting of their 
information from their 
network through the 
application. 
Rizk, 
Gürses, & 
Günther, 
2010; 
Taraszow 
et al., 
2010) 
Identity issues such 
as false names, 
impersonation, or 
identity theft can be 
caused by profiling 
and data mining. 
Users may not want 
identity issues such as 
false names, 
impersonation, or 
identity theft to result 
from profiling and data 
mining. 
(Canales & 
Licon, 
2011) 
Users may experience 
unlimited use of 
information by other 
parties such as 
marketers, and HR 
and government 
agencies. 
Users may not want the 
unlimited use of 
information by other 
parties such as 
marketers, HR or 
government agencies. 
(Taraszow 
et al., 
2010) 
7 Poor or 
reduced 
judgement 
Privacy issues 
created due to 
poor or 
reduced 
judgement 
based on 
incorrect or 
partial 
personal data 
in SNs 
(Smith et al., 
1996) 
Other users can 
influence content on 
or related to a profile, 
such as relational 
information. 
 
 
 
Users may want other 
users to influence the 
content on or related to 
their profile, such as 
relational information. 
(Taraszow 
et al., 
2010) 
8 Unauthorized 
secondary use 
Privacy issues 
created due to 
Uploaded digital 
contributions might 
Users may not want 
their uploaded digital 
(Ahern et 
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(internal & 
external) 
unauthorized 
and 
inappropriate 
secondary use 
of the SN data 
by the Service 
Provider and 
third parties or 
other external 
parties 
(Brown & 
Muchira, 
2004; 
Malhotra et 
al., 2004; 
Smith et al., 
1996; 
Spiekermann 
& Cranor, 
2009) 
be disclosed and/or 
unexpectedly abused 
by a group of 
contacts and 
criminals. 
contributions to be 
disclosed and/or 
unexpectedly abused 
by a group of contacts 
and criminals. 
al., 2007) 
Users experience the 
SN provider sharing 
information with 
external parties such 
as criminals, 
commercial websites, 
marketers, HR or 
government agencies. 
Users may not want the 
SN provider to share 
information with 
external parties such as 
criminals, commercial 
websites, marketing, 
and HR or government 
agencies. 
(Ahern et 
al., 2007) 
 
The service provider 
may grant license for 
further use of user 
information and 
content by their 
Terms of Use. 
Users may not want the 
service provider to 
grant license for further 
use of user information 
and content by their 
Terms of Use. 
(Canales & 
Licon, 
2011; Rizk 
et al., 
2010) 
Users may experience 
their publicly 
available information 
being collected and 
misused by external 
parties such as 
marketers, HR or 
government agencies. 
Users may not want 
their publicly available 
information to be 
collected and misused 
by external parties such 
as marketers, HR or 
government agencies. 
(American 
Civil 
Liberties 
Union, 
2010; 
Pekárek & 
Pötzsch, 
2009) 
User information can 
be exposed through a 
chain of FOAF 
(Friend of a friend). 
Users may not want 
their information to be 
exposed through a 
chain of FOAF (Friend 
of a friend). 
(Bhatnagar 
et al., 
2009) 
9 Undesirable or 
excessive 
exposure 
Privacy issues 
created due to 
undesirable or 
excessive 
User information can 
be shown 
unexpectedly to 
someone (for 
Users may not want 
their information to be 
shown unexpectedly to 
someone (for example, 
(Ahern et 
al., 2007; 
Privacy 
Rights 
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exposure by 
other SN users 
(Spiekermann 
& Cranor, 
2009) 
example, a stranger, 
parents, relatives, a 
teacher, a boss, an 
‘ex’); this can cause 
inconvenience for the 
users. 
a stranger, parents, 
relatives, a teacher, 
boss, an ‘ex’); this may 
cause inconvenience 
for the users. 
Clearingho
use, 2011) 
Unwanted or 
unforeseeable user 
information and 
uploaded content can 
be publicly disclosed. 
Users may not want 
their unwanted or 
unforeseeable 
information and 
uploaded content to be 
publicly disclosed. 
(Gürses, 
2010) 
Users might 
experience other 
users tagging them in 
offensive photos, 
posts and real life 
activities, which may 
present them in an 
unflattering manner. 
Users may not want 
other users to be able to 
tag them in offensive 
photos, post and real 
life activities, which 
may present them in an 
unflattering manner. 
(Ahern et 
al., 2007) 
The location 
granularity associated 
with photos can 
create privacy and 
location disclosure 
issues. 
Users may not want 
their location 
granularity to be 
associated with photos, 
which can create 
privacy and location 
disclosure issues. 
(Ahern et 
al., 2007) 
Users’ private 
information, such as 
location information, 
can be revealed 
through the real time 
publishing of 
uploaded pictures. 
Users may not want 
private information, 
such as location 
information, to be 
revealed through the 
real time publishing of 
uploaded pictures. 
(Ahern et 
al., 2007) 
10 Unwanted 
execution or 
Privacy issues 
created due to 
Trusted contacts can 
be involved in 
Users may expect that 
trusted contacts will 
(Ahern et 
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inflow of data unauthorized 
execution in 
personal 
devices or 
operation by 
spyware, 
which trigger 
unauthorized 
collection of 
personal data 
(Spiekermann 
& Cranor, 
2009) 
unsolicited privacy 
breaches and issues. 
not be involved in 
unsolicited privacy 
breaches and issues. 
al., 2007) 
Privacy issues may 
arise through 
interaction between 
mobile  and 
traditional SNs. 
Users may not want 
privacy concerns to 
arise through 
interaction between 
mobile and traditional 
SNs. 
(Ahern et 
al., 2007) 
User information can 
be leaked through 
direct attacking 
techniques. 
Users may not want 
their information to be 
leaked through direct 
attacking techniques. 
(Guo, 
2010) 
4.3 VALIDATING SN USER PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS 
Understanding user privacy concerns/issues is important to the investigation of 
SN user privacy requirements. The methodology used in this study is premised on 
the ideas of past studies which have captured SN user privacy requirements. Through 
the thematic analysis of key words in previous studies of privacy issues in online 
social networks, user privacy issues in SNs have been captured; these issues have 
then been used to inductively develop primary ‘Privacy requirements’ and a user 
privacy framework, using a bottom-up approach. This approach assumes that the 
previous work accurately captures the sets of needs users may have. However, 
analysing existing research might not be the best way to obtain all responses to the 
question. In order to determine user privacy needs, it is critical to talk to SN users 
directly in order to understand what they want.  
Due to a lack of validated measurement instruments to determine SN user 
privacy requirements, following the initial assessment by the expert judges, this 
research employed focus group and survey research methods to validate user privacy 
requirements. Focus groups are a popular method of exploratory, qualitative research 
for understanding consumer impressions, and for structuring information (Krasnova, 
Günther, Spiekermann, & Koroleva, 2009). Focus groups are generally small 
population samples, and data collection is relatively quick and easy. They are used 
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for brainstorming ideas from (typically) four to ten respondents (David L. Morgan & 
Spanish, 1984); they are useful for ongoing discussion, and generate empirically 
testable hypotheses (Churchill & Iacobucci, 2009). Respondents’ interactions in a 
group produce the data in this type of research, and the reliance on the researcher’s 
focus and the group’s interaction increase the reliability of the collected information 
(David L. Morgan & Spanish, 1984). 
The survey method is a research method for gathering information from a 
sample of individuals (Scheuren & Association, 2004), and is a form of quantitative 
research. The numbers of respondents in surveys are generally larger, and these 
larger numbers help to validate findings. The survey method is considered to be an 
efficient way to collect information about a larger group of people, and can easily be 
tailored exactly to the phenomena under study (Collie & Rine, 2009).  
Both focus group and survey research methods are useful; however, the survey 
method is unmatched in reliability85. It is easier to analyse the collected data, and 
respondents tend to be more honest in responding to surveys. Furthermore, focus 
groups can be driven by the researcher’s interests, and their influence on the data is 
prominent; thus, there is always some residual uncertainty about the accuracy of 
respondents’ comments (D.L. Morgan, 1997).  Having considered the pros and cons 
of focus group and survey research methods, this study chose the latter for validating 
user privacy requirements. Therefore, a survey was designed to verify SN user 
privacy requirements. 
4.3.1 Pre-pilot assessment of user privacy requirements 
A workshop with a panel of 7 expert judges was organized for 9 October 2012, 
to initially assess user privacy requirements. The judges were engaged to assess the 
reviewed and synthesized SN user privacy requirements, and to group these into 
themes. They were researchers in various areas and themes such as Social Media, 
Information Grounds, Business Process Innovation, Enterprise Web 2.0, Information 
Disclosure, and Tacit Knowledge Sharing.  Each of the expert judges was a member 
of at least one SN.  
The judges were randomly divided into three groups. At the outset, the goal of 
the workshop was explained, including the meaning of the concept of ‘primary 
 90 Chapter 4: SN user privacy requirements 
privacy requirements’. The judges’ generated themes assisted the further analysis of 
SN user privacy requirements. The generated themes can be found in Table A.1.  
The themes were modified (Refer Table 7) into five primary requirements, 
based on the expert judges’ classification and comments from privacy advocates 
(Refer Table 8); for  example: privacy advocates were inclined to concede ‘reduced 
judgement’ as a privacy requirement, and the ‘combining data’ requirement can be 
included in the ‘collection or unauthorised secondary use’ requirement (Smith et al., 
1996); ‘Improper or unauthorized access’ and ‘Unwanted execution or inflow of 
data’ are merged into the ‘Information Access’ requirement; ‘Accountability and 
Transparency’, ‘Error’ and ‘Deletion’ requirement are parts of ‘Information Control’ 
requirement; and the ‘Undesirable or over exposure’ requirement is renamed under 
‘Undesirable or over activities’. 
Additionally, in the initial assessment, ‘Group 1’ divided the privacy 
requirements under three themes which include: ‘Worry that information may be 
disclosed to others and misused’, which is part of ‘Collection and storage’; ‘Users 
desire for the ability to control their information’, which is part of ‘Information 
Control’; and ‘Worry about how the platform will use their information’, which is 
part of ‘Information access’ (in Table 8).  
‘Group 2’ divided privacy requirements under 5 themes, and were not able to 
group some requirements under any of these themes. The theme ‘Third Party 
Applications – SN Interaction’ is covered by ‘Information Control’ and ‘Information 
access’ themes; and ‘Data Control by User’, ‘SN Policy’ and ‘Data Security’ themes 
are covered by ‘Information Control’. The ‘Public Visibility’ theme merges into the 
‘Undesirable or over activities’ theme.  
‘Group 3’ divided privacy requirements under 5 themes. ‘System requirement’, 
‘Other privacy or security threat’, and ‘Information control requirement’ are merged 
under ‘Information Control’ theme. ‘Data storage requirement’ are merged under 
‘Collection and storage’, and ‘Information Leakage concerns’ are merged under 
‘Information access’. After the initial assessment, primary privacy requirements were 
validated through the conduct of a survey. 
Table 8: Primary privacy requirements after initial assessments 
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# Primary 
privacy 
requirement 
Description Sub privacy requirements Major literature 
references 
1 Information 
Control 
 
Privacy issues 
avoided due to 
proper user 
control 
 
SN users should be able to control 
how their information is added, 
collected, deleted, used, and shared. 
(Malhotra et al., 
2004; Smith et 
al., 1996; 
Stewart & 
Segars, 2002) 
SN users should be able to delete 
their information permanently on a 
per item basis. 
(Spiekermann & 
Cranor, 2009; 
Wallbridge, 
2009) 
SN users expect simple and user-
friendly data deletion processes. 
(Balachander 
Krishnamurthy 
& Wills, 2010) 
SN users expect simple and user-
friendly privacy policies.  
(Tan et al., 
2012) 
SN user privacy should not be 
controlled or minimized by others for 
any reason.  
(Taraszow et al., 
2010) 
 
Service providers should offer a 
verification function when SN users 
add a new application developed by a 
third party. 
(Tan et al., 
2012) 
SN users should be able to control the 
use of their information by 
advertisers. 
(Facebook 
Ireland Ltd, 
2011) 
2 
 
Collection and 
storage 
Privacy issues 
created due to 
unlimited, 
inappropriate 
Privacy and data use policies should 
clearly explain how SN user 
information will be used.  
(Tan et al., 
2012); (Privacy 
Rights 
Clearinghouse, 
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and extensive 
amounts of 
personal 
information 
collection and 
storage in SN 
(Brown & 
Muchira, 2004; 
Malhotra et al., 
2004; Smith et 
al., 1996) 
 
 
 
2011)  
SN user information cannot be 
collected and stored without users’ 
authorisation.  
(American Civil 
Liberties Union, 
2010; Smith et 
al., 1996) 
Service providers should not able to 
analyse or delete any SN user 
information without their 
authorisation.  
(Spiekermann & 
Cranor, 2009; 
Tan et al., 2012; 
Wallbridge, 
2009) 
SN users should know the retention 
policies for deleted information.  
(Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse, 
2011)  
Service providers should not keep SN 
users’ deleted information. 
(Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse, 
2011) 
3 
 
Information 
access 
 
Privacy issues 
created due to 
information 
leakage 
(Malhotra et al., 
2004; Smith et 
al., 1996; 
Spiekermann & 
Cranor, 2009). 
SN user information should be well 
protected so it cannot be leaked 
through direct attacking techniques. 
(Guo, 2010) 
 
SN users should be able to determine 
whether their information is 
accessible by others, and whether it 
can be copied and reposted when 
privacy settings are bypassed.  
(Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse, 
2011); (Guo, 
2010) 
SN users should be well protected so 
that they do not receive unwanted 
communication. 
(Taraszow et al., 
2010); (Guo, 
2010); 
(Bhatnagar et 
al., 2009) 
SN user location information should 
not be disclosed or used for tracking. 
(J. Tsai et al., 
2012); (Canales 
& Licon, 2011) 
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Third parties should not have 
unauthorized access to SN user 
information.  
(Taraszow et al., 
2010) 
Third party application providers 
should specify the extent of 
information collection through their 
application. 
(Taraszow et al., 
2010); (Canales 
& Licon, 2011); 
(Rizk et al., 
2010) 
SN users should not face identity 
issues such as false names, 
impersonation or identity theft. 
(Canales & 
Licon, 2011) 
SN users’ trusted contacts should not 
be involved in unsolicited privacy 
issues. 
(Ahern et al., 
2007; Taraszow 
et al., 2010) 
Information leakage should not occur 
with mobile or hand-held devices.  
(Ahern et al., 
2007) 
 
4 Unauthorized 
secondary use 
(Internal & 
External) 
 
Privacy issues 
created due to 
unauthorized 
and 
inappropriate 
secondary use of 
the SN data by 
the service 
provider, third 
parties or other 
external parties. 
(Smith et al., 
1996); (Brown 
& Muchira, 
2004); 
(Malhotra et al., 
Service providers should not use SN 
user information for any purpose 
unless it has been authorised by the 
user. 
(Ahern et al., 
2007) 
 
SN users’ publicly available 
information should not be collected 
or misused by others without their 
authorisation. 
(Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse, 
2011); (Pekárek 
& Pötzsch, 
2009) 
When SN users provide information 
for one reason, it should not be used 
for other reasons. 
(Canales & 
Licon, 2011); 
(Rizk et al., 
2010) 
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2004); 
(Spiekermann & 
Cranor, 2009) 
 
Users should not be tracked to 
identify their exact location (such as 
their home or workplace) using SN 
information. 
(Smith et al., 
1996) 
Pop-up applications should not use 
SN user location information without 
users’ authorisation.  
(J. Tsai et al., 
2012) 
SN users must not be forced to 
participate in dynamic interactions 
with third parties for any reason. 
(Balachander 
Krishnamurthy 
& Wills, 2010) 
5 Undesirable 
activities 
Privacy issues 
created by 
undesirable 
activity or 
overactivity of  
other SN users 
(Spiekermann & 
Cranor, 2009) 
SN user information should not be 
overexposed to known or  unknown 
users (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 
2011). 
(Bhatnagar et 
al., 2009); 
(Ahern et al., 
2007) 
SN user information should not be 
publicly disclosed without their 
authorisation. 
(Gürses, 2010) 
Others should not tag SN users in 
offensive and unflattering photos, 
posts, and real life activities without 
their authorisation. 
(Ahern et al., 
2007) 
SN user location information should 
not be disclosed through real time 
uploaded photos. 
(Ahern et al., 
2007) 
 
4.3.2 Pilot Survey 
This research included a ‘pilot survey’ to validate SN user privacy 
requirements after the initial assessments by the expert judges, and to validate the 
survey instruments. The pilot survey recruited respondents from various privacy 
forums, such as the International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP)90 in 
LinkedIn. The researchers also recruited experts in the Privacy and SNs field, and 
adapted the final survey to reflect their feedback.  
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Objectives 
The pilot survey aimed to: 
i. Validate survey instruments 
ii. Identify new survey instruments 
Method 
The pilot survey was conducted online between 7 and 14 December, 2012, with 
privacy expert respondents. This survey was anonymous, and both closed and open-
ended questions were used. It mainly focused on validating the survey questions and 
approach, included a comment section for each question to facilitate the experts’ 
feedback.  
The pilot survey was also used to capture the diversity of the user privacy 
requirements through an open-ended question: ‘What is the issue that concerns you 
most about your privacy when you use SNs such as Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn?’. 
The responses and comments from the question assisted to understand general user 
privacy requirements. Some of the instruments were designed as ‘Reverse’ items to 
avoid inconsistent and invalid responses (for example, a respondent may choose ‘7 = 
strongly agree’ for all questions without reading the survey instruments). For 
analytical purposes, standard demographics for cross-tabulations were collected for 
age, occupation and main social network. The question ‘Do you have any other 
comments/concerns/requirements for SN privacy?’ was included to encourage 
further comments from the respondents.  
A final set of cross-tabulations was created based on respondents’ responses to 
thirty-one Likert Scale questions. Closed questions were planned on a 7-point Likert 
Scale: 1 = strongly disagree (if you don’t support the statement at all); 2 = disagree; 
3= tend to disagree (if you seem to disagree with the statement, but not strongly); 4= 
neutral or unsure (if you are unsure, don’t know, or haven’t thought about it); 5 = 
tend to agree (if you seem to agree with the statement, but not strongly); 6= agree; 
and 7 = strongly agree (if you fully support the statement).  
Instruments 
The pilot survey was developed from the primary and secondary privacy 
requirements (See Table 8).  The Question Analysis Code was used for each of the 
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pilot survey question. Table 9 shows the privacy requirements and pilot survey 
instruments. 
Table 9: Privacy requirements and pilot survey instruments 
# Question 
Analysis 
Code 
Privacy requirements Pilot survey questions 
 
Information Control 
1.    
    
 ICP1       
  
SN users should be able to control how their 
information is added, collected, deleted, 
used and shared. 
I should be able to control how 
my information is added, 
collected, deleted, used and 
shared. 
2.    
    
 ICP2       SN users should be able to delete their 
information permanently on a per item basis. 
I should be able to delete my 
information permanently on a 
per item basis. 
3.    
    
 ICP3        SN users expect simple and user-friendly 
data deletion processes. 
I expect simple and user-
friendly data deletion processes. 
4.    
    
 ICP4        SN users expect simple and user-friendly 
privacy policies.  
I expect simple and user-
friendly privacy policies.  
5.    
    
 ICP5   SN user privacy should not be controlled or 
minimised by others for any reason.  
My privacy should not be 
controlled or minimised by 
others for any reason.  
6.    
    
 ICP6       
  
Service providers should offer a verification 
function when SN users add a new 
application developed by a third party. 
Service providers should offer a 
verification function when I add 
a new application developed by 
a third party. 
7.    
    
 ICP7        SN users should be able to control 
advertisers’ use of their information. 
I should be able to control 
advertisers’ use of my 
information. 
Information collection and storage 
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8.    
    
CSP1      
  
Privacy and data use policies should clearly 
explain how SN user information will be 
used.  
Privacy and data use policies 
should clearly explain how my 
information will be used.  
9.    
    
CSRP2   SN user information cannot be collected and 
stored without their authorisation.  
My information can be collected 
and stored without my 
authorisation. (Reverse the 
privacy requirements in the pilot 
survey.) 
10.  
    
CSP3      
  
Service providers should not able to analyse 
or delete any SN user information without 
their authorisation.  
Service providers should not be 
able to analyse or delete any of 
my information without my 
authorisation.  
11.  
    
CSRP4   SN users should know the retention policies 
for deleted information.  
It is reasonable if I do not know 
the retention policies for deleted 
information. (Reverse the 
privacy requirements in the pilot 
survey.) 
12.  
    
CSRP5   Service providers should not keep SN users’ 
deleted information. 
It is reasonable for service 
providers to keep my deleted 
information. (Reverse the 
privacy requirements in the pilot 
survey.) 
Information access 
13.  
    
  
IAP1       
  
SN user information should be well 
protected so it cannot be leaked through 
direct attacking techniques. 
My information should be well 
protected so it cannot be leaked 
through direct attacking 
techniques. 
14.  
    
  
IARP2    
     
SN users should be able to determine if 
information is accessible to others through 
copying and reposting when privacy settings 
are bypassed.  
It is reasonable if SN users are 
not able to determine if 
information is accessible to 
others through copying and 
reposting when privacy settings 
are bypassed.  (Reverse the 
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privacy requirements in the pilot 
survey.) 
15.  
    
 IAP3        SN users should be well protected so that 
they will not receive unwanted 
communication. 
I should be well protected so 
that I will not receive unwanted 
communication. 
16.  
    
 IAP4        SN user location information should not be 
disclosed or used for tracking. 
My location information should 
not be disclosed or used for 
tracking. 
17.  
    
 IAP5       
  
Third parties should not have unauthorized 
access to SN user information.  
Third parties should not have 
unauthorized access to my 
information.  
18.  
    
 IAP6       
  
Third party application providers should 
specify the extent of information collection 
through their application. 
Third party application 
providers should specify the 
extent of information collection 
through their application. 
19.  
    
 IAP7       
  
SN users should not face identity issues such 
as false names, impersonation or identity 
theft. 
I should not face identity issues 
such as false names, 
impersonation or identity theft. 
20.  
    
 IAP8        SN user-trusted contacts cannot be involved 
in unsolicited privacy issues. 
My trusted contacts cannot be 
involved in unsolicited privacy 
issues. 
21.  
    
 IAP9        Information leakage should not occur when 
using mobile or hand-held devices.  
Information leakage should not 
occur when using mobile or 
hand-held devices.  
Unauthorized secondary use (internal & external) 
22.  
    
UUP1      
  
SN user information should not be used by 
service providers for any purpose unless it 
has been authorised by users. 
My information should not be 
used by service providers for 
any purpose unless it has been 
authorised by me. 
23.  
    
UUP2      
  
SN user publicly available information 
should not be collected or misused by others 
My publicly available 
information should not be 
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without their authorisation. collected or misused by others 
without my authorisation. 
24.  
    
UUP3      
  
When SN users provide information for one 
reason it should not be used for other 
purposes. 
When I provide information for 
one reason, it should not be used 
for other purposes. 
25.  
    
UURP4  
      
Users should not be tracked to identify their 
exact location (such as their home or 
workplace) using SN information. 
It is reasonable to be tracked to 
identify my exact location (such 
as my home or workplace). 
(Reverse the privacy 
requirements in the pilot 
survey.) 
26.  
    
UUP5      
  
Pop-up applications should not use SN user 
location information without their 
authorisation.  
Pop-up applications should not 
use my location information 
without my authorisation.  
 
27.  
    
UUP6      
  
SN users must not be forced to participate in 
dynamic interactions with third parties for 
any reason. 
I must not be forced to 
participate in dynamic 
interactions with third parties 
for any reason. 
Undesirable activities 
28.  
    
UAP1     
       
SN user information should not be 
overexposed to users they know or to users 
they do not know. 
My information should not be 
overexposed to users that I 
know or do not know. 
29.  
    
 UAP2     SN users’ information should not be publicly 
disclosed without their authorisation. 
My information should not be 
publicly disclosed without my 
authorisation. 
30.  
    
UAP3      
  
SN users should not be tagged by others in 
offensive and unflattering photos, posts, or 
real life activities without their authorisation. 
I should not be tagged by others 
in offensive and unflattering 
photos, posts or real life 
activities without my 
authorisation. 
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31.  
    
UAP4       SN user location information should not be 
disclosed through real time uploaded photos. 
My location information should 
not be disclosed through real 
time uploaded photos. 
After generating the survey questions, the pilot survey instruments, the 
Questions Analysis Code, and the demographics instruments were included in Table 
10. 
Table 10: Pilot survey instruments 
Demographics instruments 
UIP1-You are a  
UIP2-Age 
UIP3-Which is your main Social Network? 
UIP4-What is the issue that concern you most about your privacy when you use SNs such as 
Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn 
Measuring privacy requirement instruments 
Information Control 
General requirements for Information Control 
ICP1-I should be able to control how my information is added, collected, deleted, used and 
shared. 
ICP2-I should be able to delete my information permanently on a per item basis. 
ICP3-I expect simple and user friendly data deletion processes. 
ICP4-I expect simple and user-friendly privacy policies.  
ICP7-I should be able to control my information use by advertisers. 
Level of Information Control 
ICP5-My privacy should not be controlled or minimised by others for any reason.  
ICP6-Service providers should offer a verification function when I add a new application 
developed by a third party. 
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Information collection and storage 
General requirements for collection and storage 
CSP1-Privacy and data use policies should clearly explain how my information will be used.  
CSRP2-My information can be collected and stored without my authorisation. (Reverse) 
Analysis of collected and stored information 
CSP3-Service providers should not able to analyse or delete any of my information without my 
authorisation.  
Disposal policies of deleted information 
CSRP4-It is reasonable if I do not know the retention policies of deleted information. (Reverse) 
CSRP5-It is reasonable if service providers keep my deleted information. (Reverse) 
Information access 
General requirements on information access 
IAP1-My information should be well protected so it cannot be leaked through direct attacking 
techniques. 
IARP2-It is reasonable if I cannot determine information accessibility by others through 
copying and reposting when privacy settings are bypassed. (Reverse) 
Information access by undesirable communication (external and internal) 
IAP3-I should be well protected so that I will not receive unwanted communication. 
Information access by external parties 
IAP4-My location information should not be disclosed or used for tracking. 
IAP5-Third parties should not have unauthorized access to my information.  
IAP6-Third party application providers should specify the extent of information collection 
through their application. 
IAP7-I should not face identity issues such as false names, impersonation, or identity theft. 
IAP8-My trusted contacts cannot be involved in unsolicited privacy issues. 
Information access by using mobile or hand-held devices 
IAP9-Information leakage should not occur while using mobile or hand-held devices.  
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Unauthorized secondary use (internal & external) 
General requirements for unauthorised secondary information uses 
UUP1-My information should not be used by service providers for any purpose unless it has 
been authorised by me.  
UUP2-My publicly available information should not be collected or misused by others without 
my authorisation.  
UUP3-When I provide information for one reason, it should not be used for other purposes.  
Location information uses 
UURP4-It is reasonable to be tracked to identify my exact location (such as my home or 
workplace). (Reverse)  
UUP6-I must not be forced to participate in dynamic interactions with third parties for any 
reason. 
Unauthorised implicit secondary uses 
UUP5-Pop-up application should not use my location information without my authorisation.  
Undesirable activities 
General requirements on undesirable activities 
UAP1-My information should not be overexposed to users that I know or do not know.  
Publicly undesirable disclosure 
UAP2-My information should not be publicly disclosed without my authorisation.  
UAP3-I should not be tagged by others in offensive and unflattering photos, posts, and real life 
activities without my authorisation.  
Location information disclosure 
UAP4-My location information should not be disclosed through real time uploaded photos. 
Analysis 
The pilot survey analysis involved a descriptive analysis ((Poustie, Russell, 
Watling, Ashby, & Smyth, 2006) (Bauhofer et al., 2001) (Lancaster, Dodd, & 
Williamson, 2004) where no formal power calculations were conducted, and results 
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were treated as preliminary results. The descriptive analysis used opinion inputs from 
19 privacy experts (Refer to Appendix A6 for pilot survey detail analysis). 
Summary  
The pilot survey validated the survey instrument and formed a basis for the 
final survey. As well as being amended, the final survey instruments were grouped in 
terms of primary privacy requirements. An open question (for each of the 
requirements), which asked respondents if they wished to make any further 
comment, was added. The comment sections were considered as ‘allowed to skip’ 
sections as respondents might not have had any further comment on a specific 
section or theme.  
The following additional questions were used for collecting comments for each 
of the primary requirements: 
Do you have any other concerns about: 
Controlling your information? 
Collecting and storing your information? 
Accessing your information? 
Unauthorized secondary use of your information? 
Over-disclosing or undesirable disclosing of your information? 
 
4.3.3 Survey 
This research included a survey, which primarily focused on validating 
collected user privacy requirements in the first stage of the research; however, the 
survey also aimed to collect new privacy requirements. The development and 
validation process of the survey instruments is mapped in Figure 18 below. 
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Figure 18: Survey instrument development and validation process (Adapted from (Smith et al., 1996); 
(Churchill Jr, 1979) 
Method 
Pilot survey instruments were initially generated from known privacy 
requirements, and then validated before being included as the final survey 
instruments. The survey was conducted online. Both closed and open-ended 
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questions were used. Some of the instruments were designed as ‘Reverse’ items to 
avoid inconsistent and invalid responses (for example, a respondent may choose ‘7 = 
strongly agree’ for all questions without reading the survey instruments). The survey 
primarily focused on validating collected user privacy requirements in Stage 1 (Refer 
Figure 18). It also captured the diversity of user privacy requirements through an 
open-ended question (Refer Section 0). The responses enabled a deep understanding 
of users’ general privacy requirements.  
Standard demographics for cross-tabulations – such as age, occupation and 
main social network – were collected for analytical purposes. A final set of cross-
tabulations were established from Likert Scale questions. Closed questions were 
designed on a 7-point Likert Scale: 1= strongly disagree; 2= mostly disagree; 3= 
somewhat disagree; 4= neutral or unsure; 5= somewhat agree; 6= mostly agree; 7= 
strongly agree (Refer Appendix 0 for survey details). 
Administration details 
The survey was developed in the English language and conducted through Key 
Survey which is a free, official resource for all QUT staff and students 
(http://survey.qut.edu.au). Each question in the pilot survey was open-ended, with a 
Likert Scale response. The survey was modified according to the feedback received 
from the pilot survey. 
Respondents’ recruitment and sample  
The survey recruited respondents via university mailing lists and the 
researcher’s personal contacts, and was advertised on various renowned and popular 
SN sites91 such as Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn. These sites have large numbers 
of estimated monthly visitors – 750 000 000, 250 000 000, and 110 000 
000 respectively – and were appropriate sources for capturing diverse user privacy 
requirements.  The purpose was to use those SN site features, such as groups or 
pages, to advertise the survey and thus attract more general users.  
Evaluation 
Initial survey evaluation was done through a pilot survey. The pilot survey was 
conducted before commencement of the final survey to test the effectiveness of the 
research methodology and survey questions. The survey was modified based on the 
feedback from the pilot survey.  
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Time estimation 
The 40 questions were concise and clear. It was estimated that it would not 
take more than 15 minutes to answer them.  
Strength and limitation of the survey 
One of the strengths of the designed survey was its online delivery, which 
attracted more respondents. This research focused on online delivery, since 86% of 
the 9600 respondents (in 31 countries) spend time on social networking every day; 
and, according to a recent survey, more than a quarter of these say that they dedicate 
more than 2 hours per day to social networking activities (KPMG International 
Cooperative, 2011). 
Data cleaning and analysis 
For cleaning the data, this research considered completed respondents only. 
Any incomplete respondents, and respondents with inconsistent responses, were 
rejected. After manually checking the responses, the data was analysed using IBM 
SPSS Statistics 21 and IBM SPSS Amos 21. 
Targeted audiences and prospective respondents 
The survey aimed to attract general SNs users as targeted audiences and 
prospective respondents. The general users did not need to be expert in SN and 
privacy fields; they could simply use an SN for various purposes, such as social 
networking or publicizing personal information; they could be frequent SN users or 
rarely use them; they could be concerned or unconcerned about their own privacy. 
Respondents were selected in a simple random sampling technique, with no 
demographic clustering; thus, any SN user could participate in the survey. 
Question types 
The survey consisted of open-ended and closed questions. Closed questions 
were answered on a 7-point Likert Scale: 1= strongly disagree; 2= mostly disagree; 
3= somewhat disagree; 4= neutral or unsure; 5= somewhat agree; 6= mostly agree; 
7= strongly agree. There was one open-ended question for collecting general user 
privacy requirements.  
The survey 
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The survey was conducted electronically. An electronic survey is simple to 
administer and tabulate. The survey was also conducted through Key Survey 
(http://survey.qut.edu.au). 
Instruments 
Table 11: Privacy requirements and related survey instrument 
 
Collecting users’ new privacy requirements 
UI5-What are the issues that concern you most about your privacy when you 
use the SNs such as Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn? 
 IC9-Do you have any other concerns about controlling your information?  
CS7-Do you have any other concerns about collecting and storing your 
information? 
IA8-Do you have any other concerns about leaking your information? 
UU6-Do you have any other concerns about unauthorized secondary use of 
your information?  
UA7-Do you have any other concerns about over-disclosing or undesirable 
disclosing of your information? 
UI6-Do you have any other comments/concerns about SN privacy? 
Information Control 
General requirements for Information Control 
IC1- I should be able to control how my information is added, collected, 
deleted, used, and shared. 
IC4-I expect simple and user-friendly privacy policies to control my 
information. 
Level of information Control 
IC2-The level of control I expect is… (Rank out of 7; 1= no control and 7 = 
full control). 
IC5-My level of privacy should not be altered or reduced for any reason. 
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Control over information deletion 
IC3-I should be able to delete my information on a per item basis. 
Control over information use by external parties (i.e. third parties, advertisers)  
IC6-Service providers should show an authorization dialog box for permission 
to access my information when I add a new application developed by a third party. 
IC7-I should be able to control how advertisers use my information. 
Control over fixing privacy issues 
IC8-I should be able to fix a privacy issue; for example, tagging or posting of 
content about me, spreading my information on SNs of which I am not a member. 
OD3-I should be allowed to block offensive and unflattering content about 
me. 
Information collection and storage 
General requirements for collection and storage  
CS1-Privacy and data use policies should clearly explain how my information 
will be collected and stored.  
CSR2-My information can be collected and stored at any time because I 
provided my authorisation when I registered. (Reverse) 
 
Analysis of collected and stored information 
CS3-Service providers should not be able to analyse any of my information 
without my authorisation; for example, the service providers might want to target 
advertising based on age, location or other demographic information.  
Information collection and storage by external parties 
CS4-I should be informed about the information a third party collects about me. 
Disposal policies for deleted information 
CSR5-I do not need to know the disposal policies of deleted information. (Reverse) 
CS6-SNs should not keep my deleted information by storing it out of sight in their 
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system. 
Information access 
General requirements on information access 
IA1-My information should be well protected so it cannot be improperly accessed. 
Information access by copying 
IAR2-I am not worried that my copied information can be reposted by others. 
(Reverse) 
Information access by undesirable communication (external and internal) 
IA3-My account should be well protected from receiving undesirable 
communication. 
Information access by external parties 
IA4-Third parties should not have unauthorized access to my information.  
IA5-Verification procedures for genuine names should be in place to avoid identity  
theft.  
Information access by using mobile or hand held devices 
IA6-Information leakage should not occur when using mobile or hand-held devices. 
Information access by tracking 
IA7- I should not be tracked even when I am not on the Social Network; for 
example, you would not like to have your web browsing behaviour  tracked when 
you are not even logged in. 
Unauthorized secondary use (internal & external) 
General requirements for unauthorised secondary information uses 
UU1-My publicly available information should be used without my authorisation. 
(Reverse) 
UU2-When I provide information for one reason, it should not be used for other 
purposes without my authorisation. 
Location information uses  
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UUR3-I am happy to have my exact location (such as my home or workplace) 
identified. (Reverse) 
UU4-Location-based applications should not use my location information without 
my authorisation.  
Unauthorised implicit secondary uses 
UU5-I should not be forced to participate in implicit interactions with third parties 
for any reason. 
Undesirable activities 
General requirements on undesirable or over disclosure 
OD1-My information should not be over-disclosed or undesirably disclosed to users 
I know and do not know. 
Publicly undesirable or over-disclosure  
OD2-My information should not be publicly disclosed without my authorisation. 
OD5-My location information should not be disclosed through real time uploaded 
photos. 
Location information disclosure 
OD4-My location information should not be disclosed unless I post it myself. 
Disclosure and privacy relationship 
ODR5-I believe that some disclosure is necessary in SNs and, therefore, privacy 
cannot be completely guaranteed. (Reverse) 
4.3.4 Analysis 
The survey included demographic questions, open and closed questions, and 
SN users’ central tendency analysis regarding privacy and disclosure. This research 
considered completed respondents only for further analysis. Key survey provides 
features for keeping record for the number of completed, in progress, not started, 
click-through responses. Any incomplete respondents, and respondents with 
inconsistent, in progress, not started and click- through responses, were rejected and 
manually deleted to cleanse the data before exporting the responses into SPSS data 
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format. This research obtained in total of 139 completed responses and the responses 
rate was 76.6%. 
Demographic profile 
For analytical purposes, standard demographics for cross-tabulations were 
collected for gender, age, most-used SN, and SN which caused the most concern. 
The survey had 67.93% male and 32.08% female respondents (Refer Figure 
19). Most respondents were in the 26-30 (27.86%) and 31-35 (26.43%) age groups, 
indicating that these groups are more concerned about SN privacy. 
  
Figure 19: Participants’ gender 
  
Figure 20: Participants’ age groupings 
The respondents were asked which Social Network(s) they use the most (Refer 
Figure 21), and which Social Network(s) concerns them the most (Figure 22) to 
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determine if there is any relationship between these two factors. Even though 
respondents mostly use Facebook (94.29%), they are concerned about their privacy 
while doing so (89.29%). While only approximately half of LinkedIn and Twitter 
users have concerns about their privacy, almost 100% of respondents who mostly use 
Facebook are concerned about theirs.  
  
Figure 21: The Social Network(s) most respondents use 
  
Figure 22: Social Networks which concern most respondents in terms of privacy 
Open-ended question analysis 
The survey included an open-ended question: ‘What are the issues that concern 
you most about your privacy when you use the SNs such as Facebook, Twitter or 
LinkedIn?’. The responses from the open-ended question and comments provided an 
in-depth understanding of general user privacy requirements; this lead to a more 
detailed exploration of user privacy requirements. More factors were explored to 
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determine privacy requirements – factors which were not included in earlier 
explorations of privacy issues.  
The thematic analysis method (Refer 4.2 for details) was used to further 
explore open-ended questions. The responses were grouped into the existing privacy 
requirements; however, some respondents’ responses did not belong to the themes 
described in Table 8 (e.g. Information Control, Information collection and storage, 
Information access, Unauthorized secondary use (internal & external) and 
Undesirable activities). These uncategorised responses are now listed in Table 12 
(below). They are categorized into privacy requirements under the sub-themes of 
‘Visibility and Transparency’ and ‘Accountability’, and these sub-themes are listed 
under a new privacy requirement, ‘SN Practice’. These new theme and sub-themes 
are discussed in the results section in Section 4.4. 
Table 12: Open-ended question analysis 
Participants’ statements or 
criticisms on privacy issues 
for SN 
SN user practice 
privacy 
requirements 
Privacy 
requirements’ 
sub-themes 
Privacy 
requirements’ 
theme 
I want to see how other 
people (e.g., in my network, 
in a list) see particular 
content. 
Users want to see 
how other users 
in their network 
see particular 
content to find 
out how much 
privacy they 
have. 
  
  
  
  
  
Visibility and 
Transparency 
  
  
  
  
  
 SN Practice 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
When I see my children 
using Facebook, I 
surprisenly find how few 
guidelines and how little 
understanding they have for 
Facebook privacy. 
I am unsure how much 
privacy I have. I don't want 
to go into Facebook settings 
all the time and check for 
changes. 
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Whether privacy setting is 
doing what it is supposed to 
do..!!!! 
  
  
Default options for SNs are 
quite open (especially for 
underage and those not 
concerned with security). 
Lack of awareness about 
privacy in social networks 
Users should be informed 
when any type of linking 
information or content about 
them is given or linked by 
others by default without 
prior submission.  
Users should be 
informed when 
any type of 
linking 
information or 
content about 
them is given or 
linked by others 
by default. 
  
  
  
Accountability
Visibility and 
Transparency 
  
  
  
You just can never be certain 
if there is something out 
there about you that should 
not be there. How can you 
ensure it’s all ok? 
Contacts can be viewed by 
all; some photos can also be 
viewed by my friends’ 
contacts and, for Skype, 
random people ask to be my 
friend and I don't know 
them!! 
Unannounced changes to the 
way the site works 
Users should be 
informed of any 
type of changes 
in the Social 
Accountability 
  
  Changes to security and 
privacy rules without notice 
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(Facebook in particular)  Network. 
  
  
  
  
Enforced changes to privacy 
settings; complexity of 
settings; unintended 
consequences  
I should be asked before any 
changes are made. 
Closed question analysis 
Thirty-one closed questions were used to verify SN user privacy requirements 
and to determine primary and secondary requirements. Several steps were taken to 
create and test the primary and secondary requirements. The Exploratory Factor 
Analysis (EFA) (Refer to Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)) and Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis (CFA) (Refer to Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), that derive 
five orthogonal factors underlie SN user privacy requirements on a number of 
various issues representing Information Control, Information Access, Unauthorized 
Secondary Use, Information Collection, and Undesirable Activities.   
SN users’ central tendency analysis 
The mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) was calculated to understand the 
SN user’s central tendency. The question, ‘I believe that some disclosure is 
necessary in SNs and therefore privacy cannot be completely guaranteed’, aimed to 
identify users’ view of privacy and disclosure. Of the respondents, 55.71% accepted 
some disclosure, 29.29% prioritized privacy, and 15.00% were neutral.  
Mostly disagree  12.14% 
Somewhat disagree 4.29% 
Neutral or unsure 15.00% 
Somewhat agree 20.71% 
Mostly agree  16.43% 
Strongly agree  18.57% 
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Figure 23: I believe that some disclosure is necessary in SNs and, therefore, privacy cannot be 
completely guaranteed. 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
A principal component factor analysis determined which of the 31 items were 
most useful in measuring privacy requirements and if those factors correlate with 
each other.  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 9 iterations. 
The Descriptive Statistics (Table 13) reports the mean, standard deviation, and 
number of cases for each variable included in the analysis. For example, in Table 13, 
the mean value for IC1 was 6.5612 indicates that most of the respondents were 
asking for strong control over their own SN information. Standard deviation 
measured the distribution of a data in the data set. Low standard deviation values in 
indicate that the data points tend to be very close to the mean values, while a high 
standard deviation indicates data is ‘spread out’ over the data. For example, in Table 
13, high Standard deviation (2.01485) of ODR6 indicates that SN users choice over 
privacy and discloser vary. Some users liked to disclose information whether others 
prefer strict privacy.  
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Table 13: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation Analysis N 
IC1 6.5612 1.16168 139 
IC3 6.4388 1.25753 139 
IC4 6.5108 1.22396 139 
IC5 6.4173 1.30717 139 
IC6 6.5540 1.07793 139 
IC7 6.4748 1.11856 139 
IC8 6.2518 1.37310 139 
OD3 6.2950 1.34839 139 
CS1 6.5324 1.11187 139 
CSR2 3.7914 2.15176 139 
CS3 5.7482 1.73244 139 
CS4 6.5755 1.07662 139 
CS5 3.1223 2.16514 139 
CS6 6.3957 1.40712 139 
IA1 6.7770 .89316 139 
IAR2 3.3094 2.14965 139 
IA3 6.2518 1.16776 139 
IA4 6.7194 .80783 139 
IA5 5.6835 1.79789 139 
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IA6 6.5755 .97042 139 
IA7 6.4820 1.22387 139 
UUR1 3.7266 2.26762 139 
UU2 6.3813 1.35879 139 
UUR3 2.9712 2.14659 139 
UU4 6.2446 1.49803 139 
UU5 6.3813 1.28760 139 
OD1 6.3597 1.26266 139 
OD2 6.6331 1.12381 139 
OD4 6.4388 1.24595 139 
OD5 5.9281 1.49705 139 
ODR6 4.4388 2.01485 139 
 
The table used by Kaiser-Meyer-Olking (KMO) (Refer to Table 14) was to test 
assumptions indicates that statistic should be greater than 0.600 and the Bartlett's test 
should be significant (for example,p < .05). KMO was used to assess sampling 
adequacy and evaluated the correlations and partial correlations to determine if the 
data was likely to coalesce on components (i.e. some items highly correlated, some 
not). The Bartlett’s test evaluated whether the correlation matrix was an identity 
matrix (1 on the diagonal & 0 on the off diagonal). Here, it was indicated that 
correlation matrix (of items) was not an identity matrix, which can be verified by 
examining the correlation matrix. The off-diagonal values of correlation matrix were 
not zeros; which indicated the matrix was not an identity matrix. 
Table 14: KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .886 
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Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 2224.085 
df 465 
Sig. .000 
A communality (h²) is the sum of the squared component loadings and 
represents the amount of variance in that variable accounted for by all the 
components. For example, all five extracted components were accounted for 60.5 % 
of the variance in variable IC1 (h² =  .605) (Refer to Table 15). 
Table 15: Communalities using Principal Component Analysis Extraction Method 
 Initial Extraction 
IC1 1.000 .605 
IC3 1.000 .692 
IC4 1.000 .673 
IC5 1.000 .577 
IC6 1.000 .706 
IC7 1.000 .653 
IC8 1.000 .552 
OD3 1.000 .680 
CS1 1.000 .607 
CSR2 1.000 .457 
CS3 1.000 .731 
CS4 1.000 .775 
CS5 1.000 .589 
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CS6 1.000 .617 
IA1 1.000 .790 
IAR2 1.000 .619 
IA3 1.000 .635 
IA4 1.000 .606 
IA5 1.000 .618 
IA6 1.000 .656 
IA7 1.000 .648 
UUR1 1.000 .654 
UU2 1.000 .509 
UUR3 1.000 .626 
UU4 1.000 .649 
UU5 1.000 .716 
OD1 1.000 .753 
OD2 1.000 .735 
OD4 1.000 .568 
OD5 1.000 .709 
ODR6 1.000 .575 
The Table 16 was intuitively named and reported the variance explained by 
each component as well as the cumulative variance explained by all components. The 
variance explained with regard to this table, refers to the amount of variance in the 
total collection of variables/items is explained by the component(s). For instance, 
component 7 explains 3.245% of the variance in the items; specifically, in the items' 
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variance-covariance matrix. The statistics also indicated that 64.445% of the variance 
was explained by the 7 extracted components. 
Table 16: Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 10.790 34.806 34.806 10.790 34.806 34.806 
2 2.322 7.491 42.297 2.322 7.491 42.297 
3 1.872 6.038 48.335 1.872 6.038 48.335 
4 1.513 4.881 53.215 1.513 4.881 53.215 
5 1.334 4.303 57.518 1.334 4.303 57.518 
6 1.141 3.682 61.200 1.141 3.682 61.200 
7 1.006 3.245 64.445 1.006 3.245 64.445 
8 .933 3.008 67.453    
9 .876 2.827 70.280    
10 .810 2.611 72.892    
11 .740 2.388 75.280    
12 .692 2.233 77.513    
13 .664 2.143 79.656    
14 .627 2.021 81.677    
15 .563 1.817 83.495    
16 .524 1.690 85.184    
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17 .509 1.643 86.828    
18 .475 1.533 88.361    
19 .433 1.396 89.757    
20 .423 1.363 91.120    
21 .391 1.262 92.382    
22 .360 1.163 93.545    
23 .342 1.102 94.647    
24 .305 .985 95.632    
25 .270 .871 96.503    
26 .225 .725 97.228    
27 .210 .676 97.905    
28 .186 .599 98.504    
29 .184 .592 99.096    
30 .167 .537 99.633    
31 .114 .367 100.000    
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Figure 24: Scree plot 
The scree plot (Refer to Figure 24) graphically displayed the components’ 
eigenvalues from Table 16. 
The next table displays each variable's loading on each component. Few items 
(italic font) in Table 17 did not load on the first component (always the strongest 
component without rotation) but created their own retained component (also with 
eigenvalue greater than 1). A component should have, as a minimum, 3 
items/variables; but deletion of items was reserved until further discovery as to 
whether or not the components are related. 
Table 17: Component Matrix 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
IC1 .666 -.030 .356 -.038 -.080 -.025 -.157 
IC3 .654 .102 .296 -.169 -.029 .203 -.309 
IC4 .636 .105 .201 -.170 -.363 .222 .088 
IC5 .617 .025 .345 -.055 -.081 -.075 -.247 
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IC6 .764 -.012 .109 .015 -.273 -.116 -.148 
IC7 .734 .114 -.135 .138 .005 -.070 .242 
IC8 .561 .220 .092 -.106 -.322 .253 .050 
OD3 .559 .145 -.386 -.325 -.239 -.173 -.074 
CS1 .746 -.046 .147 .061 -.039 -.005 .144 
CSR2 -.199 .544 .200 .040 .240 -.053 -.139 
CS3 .565 .156 -.277 .151 .393 .353 -.095 
CS4 .791 .011 -.117 .132 .079 -.280 .182 
CS5 -.271 .561 -.344 -.015 -.055 .208 .188 
CS6 .372 .080 -.055 -.119 .529 -.157 -.387 
IA1 .841 .064 .032 -.033 -.061 -.205 -.175 
IAR2 -.067 .646 .309 -.127 .175 -.147 .184 
IA3 .665 .126 -.390 -.022 .107 -.101 -.051 
IA4 .624 -.098 -.070 .176 .092 -.364 .174 
IA5 .375 .412 -.480 -.039 -.159 -.005 -.226 
IA6 .757 .115 -.119 -.013 -.009 -.230 .035 
IA7 .629 -.025 .224 -.073 .043 -.230 .376 
UUR1 -.182 .553 .493 .130 .210 -.028 .101 
UU2 .644 -.039 .049 .298 .008 -.005 .032 
UUR3 -.296 .404 -.150 .531 -.048 -.138 -.220 
UU4 .605 -.090 .336 -.014 .302 .265 .021 
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UU5 .551 -.133 -.117 .498 .162 .258 .199 
OD1 .732 .027 -.134 .289 -.093 .317 -.075 
OD2 .772 -.131 .137 .292 -.076 .092 -.065 
OD4 .568 .047 -.158 -.407 .211 .001 .091 
OD5 .530 .103 -.163 -.466 .227 .283 .206 
ODR6 -.194 .644 .080 .111 -.308 .027 .094 
A simple correlation on the saved component scores was run to determine if 
the components are related (Refer to Table 18).  
Table 18: Correlations matrix 
 REGR 
factor 
score   1
REGR 
factor 
score   2 
REGR 
factor 
score   3 
REGR 
factor 
score   4
REGR 
factor 
score   5 
REGR 
factor 
score   6 
REGR 
factor score 
7  
REGR 
factor score 
1 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Sig. (2-tailed)  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
REGR 
factor score 
2 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.000 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
REGR 
factor score 
3 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.000 .000 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
REGR 
factor score 
4 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.000 .000 .000 1 .000 .000 .000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 
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REGR 
factor score 
5 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.000 .000 .000 .000 1 .000 .000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000 
REGR 
factor score 
6 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1 .000 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 
REGR 
factor score 
7 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  
N 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 
Table 18 identified none of the factor scores were related suggesting that the 
factors themselves were not related, which in turn indicated the use of an ‘orthogonal 
or verimax rotation’ in subsequent factor analysis. 
Factor Analysis 
The rotated component matrix in Table 19 showed which items/variables load 
on which components after rotation. The rotation cleaned up the interpretation by 
eliminating the global first component to provide a clear depiction of principal 
components (marked with various color for each group). Items loaded higher than 
0.4 on any factor (Tabachnick, Fidell, & Osterlind, 2001) were considered for further 
analysis.  Generally, a factor loading was considered acceptable if the primary factor 
loading was at least double any secondary factor loadings.  
Table 19: Rotated Component Matrix 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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IC1 .695 .295 .089 -.020 -.012 .112 .113 
IC3 .744 .048 .178 .129 .056 .224 .184 
IC4 .641 .189 .126 .185 -.005 .294 -.300 
IC5 .692 .252 .026 .032 .026 .055 .172 
IC6 .666 .424 .080 .235 -.146 .019 .008 
IC7 .253 .615 .342 .251 -.002 168 -.050 
IC8 .535 .129 .191 .283 .067 .227 -.276 
CS1 .484 .506 .262 .029 -.062 .204 -.031 
CSR2 -.041 -.149 -.028 .033 .617 -.123 .188 
CS3 .127 .134 .689 .289 .028 .219 .301 
CS4 .265 .758 .235 .204 -.071 .124 .113 
CS5 -.373 -.208 .119 .409 .386 .037 -.271 
CS6 .155 .146 .117 .151 .082 .129 .715 
IA1 .599 .517 .108 .304 -.067 .094 .215 
IAR2 -.005 .083 -.146 .010 .760 .116 -.005 
IA3 .162 .443 .266 .500 -.102 .171 .229 
IA4 .169 .723 .138 .066 -.119 .025 .132 
IA5 .120 .106 .147 .751 .050 -.028 .059 
IA6 .356 .596 .139 .340 -.028 .148 .125 
IA7 .314 .657 .033 -.097 .060 .318 -.053 
UUR1 .041 -.041 .000 -.239 .765 -.093 -.007 
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UU2 .376 .458 .385 .043 -.078 -.035 .035 
UUR3 -.217 -.075 .121 .195 .309 -.651 .012 
UU4 .476 .198 .405 -.222 .041 .356 .203 
UU5 .122 .385 .723 -.047 -.158 -.007 -.042 
OD1 .454 .255 .613 .278 -.160 .023 -.047 
OD2 .584 .417 .432 .018 -.179 -.025 .024 
OD3 .249 .321 -.101 .648 -.166 .238 .028 
OD4 .183 .299 .079 .279 -.040 .558 .218 
OD5 .151 .140 .231 .268 .015 .731 .081 
ODR6 .003 -.109 -.066 .249 .552 -.216 -.382 
The Component Transformation Matrix (Refer Table 20) displayed the 
correlations among the components prior and after rotation. 
Table 20: Component Transformation Matrix 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 .610 .578 .351 .260 -.125 .271 .123 
2 .017 -.035 .047 .488 .865 -.059 -.084 
3 .555 -.053 -.190 -.706 .390 -.011 -.048 
4 -.089 .228 .563 -.202 .033 -.755 -.111 
5 -.356 .074 .324 -.291 .248 .288 .731 
6 .140 -.625 .641 -.029 -.051 .318 -.273 
7 -.407 .462 .081 -.264 .141 .412 -.596 
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Finally, the few items (italic) were eliminated which (a) by themselves created 
a component (components should have more than 2 items or variables) and (b) did 
not load on the un-rotated or initial component 1. Component 6 and 7 were 
eliminated in this way and the red marked variables were removed. The extraction 
proceeded and the numbers of factors were extracted from 7 to 5. Refer to Table 22 
for ‘Total Variance Explained’ after removing two components/factors. 
All the communalities indicated 50% or more of the variance in each 
variable/item was explained by the combined four components; with three exceptions 
that were lower (Refer to Table 21). 
Table 21: Communalities after removing two components 
 Initial Extraction 
IC1 1.000 .596 
IC3 1.000 .617 
IC4 1.000 .629 
IC5 1.000 .526 
IC6 1.000 .658 
IC7 1.000 .623 
IC8 1.000 .552 
CS1 1.000 .591 
CSR2 1.000 .428 
CS3 1.000 .617 
CS4 1.000 .763 
CS5 1.000 .546 
IL1 1.000 .758 
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ILR2 1.000 .598 
IL3 1.000 .635 
IL4 1.000 .552 
IL5 1.000 .606 
IL6 1.000 .658 
IL7 1.000 .551 
UUR1 1.000 .655 
UU2 1.000 .489 
UU4 1.000 .557 
UU5 1.000 .693 
OD1 1.000 .754 
OD2 1.000 .710 
OD3 1.000 .660 
ODR6 1.000 .491 
 
Table 22: Total Variance Explained after removing two components/factors 
Compon
ent 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulativ
e % 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulativ
e % 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulativ
e % 
1 10.05 37.223 37.223 10.050 37.223 37.223 4.868 18.029 18.029 
2 2.210 8.185 45.408 2.210 8.185 45.408 4.504 16.681 34.710 
 Chapter 4: SN user privacy requirements 131 
3 1.817 6.731 52.139 1.817 6.731 52.139 2.960 10.963 45.673 
4 1.316 4.873 57.011 1.316 4.873 57.011 2.208 8.176 53.849 
5 1.121 4.152 61.163 1.121 4.152 61.163 1.975 7.314 61.163 
6 .978 3.624 64.787       
7 .872 3.228 68.015       
8 .801 2.968 70.982       
9 .757 2.805 73.788       
10 .697 2.583 76.371       
11 .652 2.414 78.784       
12 .588 2.178 80.963       
13 .574 2.127 83.090       
14 .527 1.953 85.043       
15 .486 1.801 86.843       
16 .470 1.742 88.585       
17 .424 1.569 90.154       
18 .402 1.491 91.645       
19 .383 1.417 93.062       
20 .348 1.289 94.351       
21 .323 1.195 95.545       
22 .286 1.059 96.604       
23 .218 .808 97.412       
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24 .205 .761 98.173       
25 .195 .723 98.896       
26 .173 .639 99.535       
27 .125 .465 100.000       
 
Table 23: Grouped users privacy requirements 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
Information control 
IC1 .652 .362 .137 -.008 -.146 
IC3 .744 .164 .190 .030 .006 
IC4 .750 .140 .120 -.038 .179 
IC5 .625 .348 .077 .035 -.087 
IC6 .637 .437 .161 -.145 .121 
IC8 .670 .059 .157 .005 .274 
CS1 .533 .458 .293 -.092 -.057 
OD2 .552 .337 .503 -.180 -.085 
Information Access 
IC7 .290 .581 .397 -.012 .210 
CS4 .263 .763 .313 -.081 .089 
IA1 .571 .605 .185 -.084 .156 
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IA3 .151 .587 .303 -.119 .402 
IA4 .150 .679 .234 -.118 -.019 
IA7 .353 .628 .110 .070 -.123 
IA6 .374 .654 .191 -.056 .226 
Unauthorized Secondary Use 
CS3 .127 .228 .694 .007 .258 
UU2 .319 .404 .470 -.053 -.016 
UU4 .438 .274 .457 .070 -.275 
UU5 .117 .223 .778 -.149 -.041 
OD1 .443 .202 .661 -.158 .237 
Collection and storage 
CSR2 -.125 -.013 -.056 .639 .017 
IAR2 .038 .087 -.126 .755 .060 
UUR1 .032 -.123 .024 .780 -.174 
ODR6 .051 -.234 -.088 .547 .357 
Undesirable or over activites 
OD3 .308 .439 -.049 -.196 .576 
IA5 .118 .227 .162 .031 .716 
CSR5 -.240 -.268 .035 .336 .549 
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Items were grouped according to each the component score and each the 
groups were named as primary user privacy requirements based on how the sub-
factors were loaded. Primary user privacy requirements were Information control, 
Information Access, Unauthorized Secondary Use, Collection and storage and 
Undesirable or over activites (Refer to Table 23).  These primary user privacy 
requirements were used in the next step to confirm the factors for user privacy 
requirements. 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was performed to confirm the primary 
SN user privacy requirements. IBM Amos 2192 Structural Equation Modelling 
(SEM) program was used to examine how well structural coefficients conform to 
user primary user privacy requirements. A Principal Component Analysis method 
was considered for the analysis. Alternative models of SN user privacy requirements 
described in 4.2 were used for furher analysis. The CFA techniques test four 
potential models for comparison to confirm the primary user privacy requirements. 
The best fit model was considered to represent primary user privacy requirements. 
Each model was drawn to underlie the 27 observed variables were extracted. 
Each of the models contained unobserved or latent and observed variables. 
Rectangles were observed variables and ovals were unobserved variables in Figure 
25, Figure 26, Figure 27 and Figure 28. For SEMs, latent variables are almost always 
assumed to ‘cause’ the manifest variables, so the arrows all point towards the 
observed variables93 in Figure 25, Figure 26, Figure 27 and Figure 28. For example, 
there were a total of twenty seven latent variables in the Figure 25 one representing 
the common factor and twenty seven additional variables (d1 to d27) representing 
measurement errors specific to each of the observed indicators. These error variables 
also exist in Figure 26, Figure 27 and Figure 28. The same naming conventions was 
used for the observed variables Figure 25, Figure 26, Figure 27 and Figure 28. 
‘Model 1’, (Refer to Figure 25), all observed variables pointing from the latent 
variable ‘Privacy Requirement’. In ‘Model 2’ (Refer to Figure 26); all observed 
variables were pointing from two latent variables ‘maintenance’ and ‘collection’. 
‘Model 3’ shows (Refer to Figure 27) that all observed variables were pointing from 
three latent variables ‘control’, ‘collection’ and ‘management’. The ‘Model 4’ shows 
(Refer to Figure 28) all observed variables pointing from the five latent variables 
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‘Control’, ‘Access’, ‘Secondary Use’, ‘Collection’ and ‘Undesirable Activities’.  The 
estimation of the overall model fit for observed variables (Refer to 
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Table 24). 
 
Figure 25: Model 1 
 Chapter 4: SN user privacy requirements 137 
 
Figure 26: Model 2 
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Figure 27: Model 3 
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Figure 28: Model 4 
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Table 24: The overall model fit for observed variables 
 Model 1: 
One Factor 
Model 2: 
Two Factors 
Model 3: 
Three 
Factors 
Model 4: 
Five Factors 
χ2(CMIN) 623.16 522.56 553.88 476.64 
DF 299 296 298 289 
χ2/DF 2.084 1.766 1.859 1.649 
p-value 0 0 0 0 
RMSEA 0.083 0.07 0.074 0.064 
The overall fit for ‘Model 4’ exhibited much stronger measures of fit than any 
of the hypothesied models substantially better than the single, two or three factor 
models. The Chi-squared, χ2 test yields a value of 476.64 which, had a 
corresponding lowest value of χ2/DF (Chi-squared/Degrees of freedom, DF) at 
1.649. Prediction (p-value) of 0 was good since too high a p-value rejects the null of 
a good fit. Additionally, the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation  (RMSEA) 
was 0.064, well close to the .05 cut-off. Both tests suggest that the model was a good 
fit to the data. Therefore, properties of the ‘Model 4’ were considered further. 
The factor Control in ‘Model 4’ (Refer to Figure 28), had strong standardized 
loadings for some factors ( .79 for IC6, .76 for CS1 and .8 for OD2) and moderate 
standardized loadings on other factors (.69 for IC1, .67 for IC3, .66 for IC4, .65 for 
IC5 and .56 for IC8), suggesting that Information Control was a reliable indicator for 
those sub-factors. The squared multiple correlations provided information on how 
much variance the common factors account for in the observed variables. Control 
had a strong coefficient of determination, R2 of .618 with IC6, .576 with CS1, and 
.638 with OD2. The remaining moderate R2 statistics were IC1 (.476), IC3 (.449), 
IC4 (.434), IC5 (.419), IC8 (.316).  
The factor Access had strong standardized loadings on all factors (.74 for IC7, 
.84 for CS4, .85 for IA1, .65 for IA4, .78 for IA6 and .63 for IA7), suggesting that 
Information Access was a reliable indicator for those sub-factors. Access had a 
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strong R2 of .611 with IA6, .719 with IA1, .702 with CS4 and .552 with IC7. The 
remaining moderate R2 statistics were IA7 (.393) and IA4 (.422). 
The factor Secondary Use had strong standardized loadings on all factors ( .620 
for CS3, .689 for UU2, .583 for UU4, .626 for UU5 and .838 for OD1), suggesting 
that Secondary Use was a reliable indicator for those sub-factors. Secondary Use had 
a strong R2 of of .703 with OD1. The remaining moderate R2 statistics were 
UU5(.392), UU4 (.340), UU2 (.475) and CS3 (.384). 
The factor Collection had strong standardized loadings on some factors (.66 for 
IAR2 and .70 for UUR1) and moderate standardized loadings on some factors (.46 
for CSR2 and .49 for ODR6), suggesting that Collection was a reliable indicator for 
those sub-factors. Collection had a moderate R2 of .21 with CSR2, .43 with IAR2, 
.48 with UUR1 and .24 with ODR6. 
The factor Undesirable Activites had moderate standardized loadings on some 
factors (.34 for OD3 and .24 for IA5) and low standardized loadings on -.23 for CS5, 
suggesting that Undesirable Activites may be a reliable indicator for those sub-
factors since two factors moderately loaded  this factor. Undesirable Activites had a 
moderate R2 of .12 with OD3 and low R2 of .06 with IA5, .06 with CS5. 
The final correlation between factors Control and Access was very strong at 
0.878 and the covariance between Control and Access was significantly various from 
zero (p<.0.001). The correlation between Control and Unauthorized Secondary Use 
and between Control and Undesirable Activities were also very strong which were 
.830 and 1.303 accordingly. The correlation between Undesirable Activites and 
Secondary Use was very strong which was 1.206 and the covariance between those 
factors was significantly various from zero (p<.0.001). The correlation between 
Access and Secondary Use were also very strong which was .799 and the covariance 
between them was significantly various from zero (p<.0.001). However, the 
correlation between Collection with the other factors Control, Secondary Use, 
Undesirable Activites and Access  were very small which were -.164, -.226, -.490 
and -.193 accordingly. The covariance between them were .152, .068, .057, .152 and 
are significantly various from zero (p>.0.001). 
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4.4 RESULTS 
The analysis of the closed questions provided the five orthogonal privacy 
requirements of: Information Control, Information Access, Unauthorized Secondary 
Use, Information Collection, and Undesirable Activities. irement provided a deeper 
understanding of general user privacy requirements. A new requirement – ‘SN 
Practice’ – was synthesized as a primary privacy requirement. Additionally, the 
factor ‘Undesirable Activities’ moderated standardized loadings on some sub-factors, 
thus suggesting that ‘Undesirable Activities’ could belong to another factor. 
Moreover, the ‘SN Practice’ requirement covered factors categorized in ‘Undesirable 
Activities’, as these can limit the accountability and transparency of SN practices.  
Taking these modifications into account, SN users have five primary  user 
privacy requirements: Information Control, Information Access, Unauthorized 
Secondary Use, Information Collection and SN practice (Refer Table 25; section 
4.4.1; section 4.4.2; section 4.4.3; section 4.4.4; and section 4.4.5). 
Table 25: Primary and secondary privacy requirements 
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Primary privacy 
requirements 
Secondary privacy requirements Analysis code 
Information Control 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Information addition IC1 
Information deletion IC2 
Information sharing IC3 
Information altering IC4 
Information re-use IC5 
Information export IC6 
Control over fixing privacy issues, even if not the SN 
member 
IC7 
Information collection 
and storage 
  
  
  
Information collection and storage   CS1 
Analysis of collected and stored information CS2 
Notification of information collection and storage CS3 
Disposal of collected and stored information CS4 
Information access 
  
  
  
  
  
Information access IA1 
Communication IA2 
Information access by copying IA3 
Information access by using mobile or hand-held 
devices 
IA4 
Information access by tracking IA5 
Behavioral information access IA6 
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Unauthorized 
secondary use (Internal 
& External) 
  
  
Secondary information uses UU1 
Location information uses UU2 
Implicit secondary information uses UU3 
SN Practice 
  
  
  
  
Information disclosure SP1 
Notification of linking information; for example, 
location information, behavioral information with 
content 
SP2 
Practice accountability SP3 
Practice visibility and transparency SP4 
Notification of any type of information changes SP5 
4.4.1 Information control 
SNs have become virtual public spaces for the private information of users. 
That is, users use the public space, the SN, to deposit and share their personal 
information; however, they may lose their privacy as soon as the information is 
published in these virtual public places.  
Privacy issues can be created without proper user control. Users may want to 
control their own information; for example, they may wish to delete or post data on a 
per item basis for a friend, or even to permanently delete their own account 
(Wallbridge, 2009); (Spiekermann & Cranor, 2009). Privacy issues can also be 
created due to inappropriate data deletion in SNs (Wallbridge, 2009). By controlling 
the deletion process, users may be able to control their information and thus limit the 
unwanted consequences of  poor judgements they may have made when posting 
information. Users may not want other users to be influenced by their incorrect or 
partial information on their profile (Taraszow et al., 2010) ; thus, they may want to 
control their information by deleting, editing, or updating it.  
Privacy issues can also be created by a lack of SN accountability for the way 
they handle their users’ information (Wallbridge, 2009). For example, users might 
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want to exercise more control over their addition to various groups or networks 
(Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2011), and may want to control their visibility and the 
transparency of their information (Wallbridge, 2009). Users may also want 
simplified, transparent and user friendly privacy policies (Tan et al., 2012), which 
indicate how they can control their own information. 
This research measures SN user privacy issues with respect to this Information 
Control requirement. It defines this requirement as ‘the degree to which SN users are 
concerned about the amount of control SNs have over user information’. 
4.4.2 Information access 
Information access – internally to third parties, or externally to other parties – 
can create privacy issues. Information access through improper or unauthorized 
access, or unwanted execution or inflow of data to various SN stakeholders can 
initiate user privacy issues. Improper or unauthorized access to view or work with 
data may also create privacy issues (Malhotra et al., 2004; Smith et al., 1996). For 
example, unwanted communication from restricted or unwanted contacts inside or 
outside the networks can trigger information access (Bhatnagar et al., 2009; Guo, 
2010; Taraszow et al., 2010). Additionally, privacy issues may be created by 
unauthorized execution in personal devices, or by the operation of spyware which 
triggers unauthorized collection of personal data (Spiekermann & Cranor, 2009). 
Eventually, user information can be leaked through direct attacking techniques (Guo, 
2010).  
This research measures SN user privacy issues with respect to this Information 
Access requirement. This requirement is defined as ‘the degree to which SN users 
are concerned about the amount of SN access to user information’. 
4.4.3 Collection and storage  
Privacy issues can be created due to the unlimited, inappropriate and extensive 
amounts of personal information collection and storage in SNs (Smith et al., 1996); 
(Brown & Muchira, 2004); (Malhotra et al., 2004). User information and activities in 
SN can be collected and stored indefinitely by service/platform providers (Privacy 
Rights Clearinghouse, 2011); (Smith et al., 1996), and can be accessed by other 
interested parties. Users cannot be sure how this collected information will be used 
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against them in the future. They might need to consider the privacy risk/benefits 
trade-off of their information usage, and limit their personal information collection 
and storage accordingly.  
This research measures SN user privacy issues with respect to this Collection 
and Storage requirement. This requirement is defined as ‘the degree to which an SN 
user is concerned about the amount of SN user information collection and storage’. 
4.4.4 Unauthorized secondary use (internal & external) 
Privacy issues are also created by the unauthorized and inappropriate 
secondary use of SN data by the Service Provider, third parties, or other external 
parties (Smith et al., 1996); (Brown & Muchira, 2004); (Malhotra et al., 2004); 
(Spiekermann & Cranor, 2009). These types of issues can be created when a SN does 
not follow the code of fair information practice. User information can be collected 
for one purpose, but used for another internal or external purpose (Smith et al., 
1996), and thus privacy issues can be triggered. Users might be worried about how 
the service/platform provider will use user uploads (Ahern et al., 2007) or other 
information. User might want to limit their information uses and may not grant 
license for further use (Canales & Licon, 2011) (Rizk et al., 2010).  
Privacy issues might also be created as a result of the combination of personal 
data with other information, such as location information; this combination then 
provides more comprehensive user profile information (Smith et al., 1996; 
Spiekermann & Cranor, 2009). Combining data is an unauthorized secondary use of 
information (Smith et al., 1996), since user information meshes with other external 
information to create privacy breaches and user concerns (J. Tsai et al., 2012). Users 
might be worried how a service platform or other external parties will eventually use 
their information. 
This research measures SN user privacy issues with respect to this 
Unauthorized Secondary Uses requirement. This requirement is defined as ‘the 
degree to which a SN user is concerned about the amount of unauthorized secondary 
use of SN user information”.  
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4.4.5 SN practice 
The practice requirement describes the cognitive understanding or perception 
(Stewart & Segars, 2002) of SN practices. This requirement concerns privacy issues 
arising from various stakeholder practices in SN services. SN service practices are 
not limited to, but can include visibility, transparency and accountability.  
Users might expect transparent views (Gürses, 2010) of how information is 
used, shared, collected, accessed, or aggregated with other information and 
information flows. This transparency would  assist them to understand the SN 
services that are available to protect their privacy; for example, SN service providers 
can employ a privacy monitoring system such as ‘Privacy Mirror’ (Nguyen & 
Mynatt, 2002) –  an example of this is ‘View as’ feature in Facebook – or Identity 
Mirror (H. Liu, Maes, & Davenport, 2006) to view data in a transparent and 
understandable way. Such a system can assist users to understand how their profile is 
seen by others.  
There are three issues with ensuring transparency (Gürses, 2010) in SN 
services, however. Firstly, data protection authority to ensure transparency is not 
enforced. The second issue is related to aggregated services, where the need for all 
parties to agree with the transparency might make the services complicated. The final 
issue is that SN service providers or data mining parties may not wish to disclose 
their algorithms.  
Users might be interested in accountability for service providers. While it is 
unlikely, SN services could readily change their privacy rules and users would then 
be unaware of the current and valid privacy settings. Furthermore, SN users might 
not be aware of the unintended consequences of the enforced changes, and this could 
initiate major privacy issues; for example, personal information could suddenly 
become publicly visible.  
The trustworthiness of SN services can be highly doubtful, and users should be 
made aware of changes to privacy settings. Continuous changes in settings (always to 
the detriment of user privacy) are something the users could abhor; they should be 
aware and take measures to limit the possible disclosure of private information as a 
result of these changes. Other stakeholders, as well as service providers, should be 
accountable for their activities in SN services. 
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Privacy issues can also be created due to undesirable or over-exposure by other 
SN users (Spiekermann & Cranor, 2009), service/platform providers, or other 
stakeholders. By definition, SNs promote sharing and exposure through SN 
functionalities; however, in some circumstances, undesirable or over-exposure of 
user information (for example, by other users or stakeholders who want to control 
others’ information) might be considered inappropriate. In other words, private 
information can become publicly available; information can be displayed 
unexpectedly (Ahern et al., 2007); information might be misused by interested 
parties; and users might be tagged by undesirable offensive photos or activities, or 
overexposed through real life activities.  
This research measures SN user privacy requirements with respect to this SN 
Practice requirement. This requirement is defined as ‘the degree to which a SN user 
is concerned about SNs’ practices in dealing with SN user information’. This 
requirement will assist in identifying how user information is intervened in practice, 
and the pre-emptive action users can take to protect their privacy. This requirement 
also deals with the sub-requirements of transparency and accountability.   
4.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter investigated SN user privacy requirements to develop the SN privacy 
architecture and privacy framework. SN user privacy requirements were grouped into 
‘information collection’, ‘unauthorised information access’ and ‘secondary use of 
information’ to form the superset of ‘concerns about information control’. Therefore, 
SN user privacy requirements are classified and represented as ‘SN practices’ and 
‘control of practices’. The findings align with those of Stewart and Segars (Stewart 
& Segars, 2002). 
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Chapter 5: Privacy Principles for Social 
Networks 
The purpose of this chapter is to present seven principles of privacy protection, and to 
determine which principles are the most effective for ensuring privacy protection in Social 
Networks (SNs). This chapter also evaluates how these principles should be built into the 
way information is controlled, collected, accessed, used and practised.  
The previous chapter investigated user privacy requirements for SNs. These privacy 
requirements must not be ad-hoc or post-fact, but designed in a systematic and 
comprehensive manner. Privacy protection in SNs must be supported by their functionalities 
and practices, and should be embedded in their design and development stages. The result 
would be privacy-friendly SNs which would attract more users.   
This chapter is organized into five sections. The first section presents a research model, 
and the second provides an overview of the leading principles for protecting privacy and 
incorporating privacy-enhancing technology in SNs (The best approach for protecting user 
privacy in SNs is also presented here). The third section demonstrates various approaches to 
‘Privacy by Design (PbD)’ principles in various privacy-invasive areas, including SNs. The 
fourth section presents the case studies, which examine the two open sources of SNs 
Diaspora and Clique, and evaluates the extent to which they are meeting PbD principles and 
how effective these principles are. The final section assesses how these PbD principles will 
protect various SN user privacy requirements. This chapter concludes by identifying the 
various barriers to adopting PbD principles, and how privacy can be ensured in SNs by 
incorporating PbD principles.  
5.1 RESEARCH MODEL 
In the United States, the European Union, Canada and Australia, there are currently 
various best practice principles for privacy-enhancing technologies. After critically analysing 
these principles (Section 5.2) and identifying that Privacy by Design (PbD) principles are the 
most effective principles for protecting user privacy in SNs (Section 0), this research 
investigated PbD approaches for diverse privacy-invasive areas (including SNs) in order to 
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understand how to incorporate PbD principles into SNs. Two case studies were conducted on 
two open source SNs – Diaspora and Clique – which claim to be privacy-aware systems to 
assess on how these follow the PbD principles (discussed in Section 5.4). PbD principles and 
user privacy requirement mapping was undertaken as the final research stage (Section 5.5). 
This research model for investing privacy principles for SNs is mapped in Figure 29 below. 
 
Figure 29: Research model for investigating privacy principles for SNs 
5.2 PRIVACY-ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES AND PRIVACY-PROTECTING 
PRINCIPLES FOR SNs 
Users want privacy; however, they seldom know ‘how to specify’ what they need and 
‘what to seek’ to achieve it (Shapiro, 2009). Embedded privacy-enhancing technologies 
(PETs) at the design level can be the solution for ensuring privacy from the beginning of a 
system’s development. The PET concept was developed in the early 1990s. It is a coherent 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) representation that protects privacy by 
eliminating or reducing unnecessary disclosure, collection, retention, sharing or trading of 
personal data without losing functionality of information systems; for example, it prevents 
the use of personal data or prevents automated data capture through cookies, HTTP headers, 
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web bugs, spyware (Cavoukian, 2009). However, a PET is not necessarily innovative or new, 
as existing technologies are accumulated in an information system and, subsequently, act as 
PETs (Blarkom et al., 2003). 
PET might be seen as a supplement or complement to, or substitute for, the laws and privacy-
protection schemes of regulatory bodies; however, it should never be regarded as a quick fix 
(Raab, 2004). PET is necessary for SN privacy protection and should complement existing 
regulatory and self-regulatory law to incorporate legal principles into technical specifications 
as the instrument. Additionally, legal, organizational and cultural conditions must be taken 
into account when designing a PET approach to privacy protection. 
The PET concept alone may at times be found to be insufficient; for example, the ‘positive-
sum’ paradigm was required to incorporate in ICT system which evolved the term to ‘PETs 
Plus’(Cavoukian, 2009). Additionally, it was emphasized to incorporate Fair Information 
Practices (FIPs) directly into the design and operation of information systems, which claimed 
to be part of the ‘Privacy by Design’philosophy. 
5.2.1 Existing privacy protecting principles 
There are various principles available for protecting privacy. These principles are Fair 
Information Principles (FIPs), OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development) Principles, CSA Model Code Principles, Information Privacy Principles 
(IPPs), National Privacy principles (NPPs), Nine Architectural Principles, and Privacy by 
Design (PbD) principles. 2.3 section reviews these various principles. 
Table 26 includes the prospective privacy-protecting principles and Table 27 
comparing these principles 
Table 26: Various privacy-protecting principles 
Principles 
# 
Fair 
Informatio
n 
Principles 
(FIPs)  
OECD 
Principles  
CSA Model 
Code 
Principles 
Nine 
Architectura
l Principles 
 Information 
Privacy 
Principles 
(IPPs) 
National 
Privacy 
Principles 
(NPPs) 
Privacy by 
Design (PbD) 
Principles 
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Principle 1 Collection 
Limitation 
Collection 
Limitation  
Accountabilit
y 
Openness 
and 
Transparenc
y 
Manner and 
purpose of 
collection 
Collection Proactive not 
Reactive; 
Preventative 
not Remedial 
Principle 2 Disclosure Data 
Quality 
Identifying 
Purposes 
Purpose 
Specificatio
n and 
Minimizatio
n 
Collecting 
information 
directly from 
individuals 
Use and 
Disclosure
Privacy as 
the Default 
Principle 3 Secondary 
Usage  
Purpose 
Specificatio
n 
Consent Collection 
Limitation 
Collecting 
information 
generally 
Informatio
n Quality 
Privacy 
Embedded 
into Design 
Principle 4 Record 
Correction 
Use 
Limitation 
Limiting 
Collection 
Use 
Limitation 
Storage and 
Security 
Security Full 
Functionality 
: Positive-
Sum, not 
Zero-Sum 
Principle 5 Security  Security 
Safeguards 
Limiting Use, 
Disclosure, 
and Retention
Individual 
Participation 
and Control
Access to 
Records  
Openness End-to-End 
Security: Full 
Lifecycle 
Protection 
Principle 6   Openness Accuracy Data 
Integrity 
and Quality
Alteration of 
Records 
Access 
and 
Correction
Visibility and 
Transparency
: Keep it 
open 
Principle 7   Individual 
Participatio
n 
Safeguards Security 
Safeguards 
and 
Controls 
Record-
keeper to 
check 
accuracy 
Identifiers Respect for 
User Privacy 
Principle 8   Accountabil
ity 
Openness Accountabil
ity and 
Oversight 
Information 
use only for 
relevant 
purposes 
Anonymit
y 
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Principle 9     Individual 
Access 
Remedies Limits on use 
of personal 
information 
Trans-
border 
Data 
Flows 
  
Principle 
10 
    Challenging   Disclosure Sensitive 
Informatio
n 
  
 
Table 27: Comparing privacy-protecting principles 
FIPs OECD 
Principles   
CSA Model 
Code Principles  
Nine Core 
Principles  
Information 
Privacy 
Principles 
(IPPs)   
National 
Privacy 
Principles 
(NPPs) 
PbD 
Principles 
These 
principles 
are engaged 
in the 
national 
level but not 
in the federal 
level of the 
Government. 
Confined to 
European Union 
directive to 
protect personal 
data. 
Provide 
‘Consent’ and 
‘Accountability’
features. 
  
  
Designed 
especially to 
protect 
privacy in a 
networked 
environment 
(such as in a 
Personal 
Health 
Record 
System) 
  
  
Manage 
personal 
information 
for 
government 
agencies 
  
  
Regulate 
private sector
  
  
Can be used 
for adopting 
PET directly 
at the system 
design level in 
SNs  
Will increase 
the use of PET 
and FIP SNs  
No 
safeguards 
exist to 
implement 
these 
principles 
Limited in 
‘Consent’ and 
‘Accountability’ 
principles 
  
Can be used to 
ensure SN 
practices and 
control of 
those practices 
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Allow 
agencies to 
use private 
sector data 
without any 
appropriate 
protections 
from the law 
Implement 
nine focus 
areas for 
compliance 
auditing: 
i) Intention 
and 
notification 
ii) 
Transparency 
iii) Finality 
principle 
iv) Legitimate 
grounds of 
processing 
v) Quality 
vi) Data 
subject’s 
rights 
vii) Security 
viii) 
Processing by 
a processor 
ix) Transfer of 
personal data 
outside the 
network  
5.2.2 Privacy-protecting principles for SNs 
Blarkom et al. (Blarkom et al., 2003) identify nine focus areas for compliance auditing: 
i) Intention and notification; ii) Transparency; iii) Finality principle; iv) Legitimate grounds 
of processing; v) Quality; vi) Data subject’s rights; vii) Security; viii) Processing by a 
processor; ix) Transfer of personal data outside the EU. Blarkom et al. (2003) claim that 
engaging all of these nines areas of attention is what is now commonly known as ‘Privacy by 
Design’. Blarkom et al. also claim that not all of these nine areas can be implemented by 
using PETs; for example; ‘notification to the Supervisory Authority’ cannot be implemented 
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since it is a purely administrative process. Other areas can, at least partially, be achievable 
through PETs.  
The ‘Privacy by Design (PbD)’ concept (Cavoukian, 2009) includes seven principles, 
which can be used to protect Personally Identifiable Information (PII). This research suggests 
that these seven principles should be incorporated into a system at the design stage. Indeed, 
one of the specific objectives of this research is to encourage the engagement of privacy 
requirements in the system design stage for two reasons: i) System development costs 
increase substantially in later stages of system development, so it is useful if privacy can be 
incorporated at this initial stage; and ii) Privacy functionality can easily be engaged in the 
initial design stage, while it is extremely difficult to incorporate privacy in the later stages of 
system development. 
PbD principles can be used for adopting PET directly at the system design level in SNs. 
Adopting PbD principles will also increase the use of PET and FIP, and the implementation 
of the nine focus areas (Blarkom et al., 2003). Additionally, PbD principles can ensure users’ 
legitimate right to control their private information. This could eventually increase user 
satisfaction and confidence in using SNs. This satisfaction and confidence, in turn, could 
eventually lead to an increase in reliability of the systems, and the engagement of more social 
networking users.  
5.3 PRIVACY BY DESIGN APPROACHES 
PbD applies to diverse privacy-invasive areas, including SNs. It is becoming 
increasingly difficult to ignore user privacy and the importance of personal information. One 
of the most significant current organizational discussions, for example, is the protection of 
both user information and business interests. Recently, researchers have also shown an 
increased interest in protecting user information in miscellaneous privacy-invasive areas 
through the use of PbD approaches. This section reviews the effectiveness of these diverse 
approaches to the use of PbD principles. This review, in turn, assisted this research to 
understand the way to approach the use of PbD principles in SNs.  
5.3.1 Proactive not Reactive; Preventative not Remedial  
Conducting a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) is one of the early approaches to 
preventing privacy threats (Cavoukian & Spencer, 2010); however, the PIA should be 
repeated and updated after a period of time (say, half-yearly or yearly). 
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Cavoukian and Spencer (2010) also demonstrate a practical case study, utilizing PbD 
principles proactively. In this case study, the Ontario Health Study team proactively provided 
de-identified protected information to assist researchers to enable further comprehensive 
studies of cancer, vascular diseases, and other chronic diseases. The case study also found 
that physical privacy another proactive consideration as important as information privacy; if 
the former is not provided, the respondents may not feel comfortable in providing the 
protected information.  
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) within the  health sector is an area that requires 
privacy measures (Cavoukian, 2009). Cavoukian suggested that RFID usage in this sector 
should not be linked to personal identifiers so as to avoid potential short or long-term threats 
to personal privacy proactively.  
Williams and Weber-Jahnke (2010) provide three solutions to privacy breaches in 
healthcare SNs. These are: the use of automated queries to detect false user accounts; the 
development of improved business processes to detect credentialed users; and preventing 
users from locating hidden network information. These solutions can also be considered in 
other privacy-invasive areas.  
As a precaution,  users should be well informed about the privacy policy and conditions 
and terms of use of a SN.  They should always be told: ‘who’ will access their private 
information; ‘how’ it will be accessed; and ‘where’ it will be accessed in the SN. However, a 
lengthy, text-based privacy policy is not sufficient as the user seldom reads such privacy 
policies (Kelley et al., 2009); rather, service providers should provide graphical-based 
understandable privacy policies.  
Preventive rather than remedial privacy features must be an aim for SNs; however, 
raising user awareness of privacy issues, as well as the provision of proactive features, can 
assist in improving privacy before breaches occur. The user must be aware that their SN 
profile is linked to their real world social identity; they should also be aware that failing to 
protect their own privacy will eventually also increase the threat and risk to the privacy of 
friends and family. 
5.3.2 Privacy as the Default  
Privacy should be built into the SN system to protect a user’s private information and to 
ensure privacy by default. This is necessary as personal information in the user’s SN profile 
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can represent and/or replicate their social identity. Thus, if the service provider reveals the 
user profile information to a third party, it may be harmful to the user.  
There are many ways in which service providers can build automatic privacy features 
into the systems; for examples: 
i) Privacy settings should not include an opt-in approach to automatically disclose 
private and protected information (The removal of this opt-in approach might avoid 
unwanted disclosure problems). 
ii) When the user initially engages in a Social Network, the default settings must not 
disclose any protected information such as location information, email address, date 
of birth or financial information (A possible approach could be to use a pseudonym 
for every user; hence, the service providers would not be able to access the actual 
name of that person and misuse their protected information). 
iii) Friendship requests from other users must not be accepted or approved by default in 
the SN. 
iv) Location-based features should be deactivated by default in the mobile SNs (Extra 
care should be taken while activating location-based services and information in a 
mobile SN; users may not be aware of the activated location-based service, which can 
eventually lead to a privacy breach). 
v) Providers can create a user-centric Identity Management Infrastructure (If there are 
any changes in the system, the user has to approve the updates and receive feedback 
for the changes in the system. After some time, the user might feel comfortable and 
satisfied with the system’s privacy; at that point,  they might choose to change their 
privacy settings (Ahern et al., 2007) and relax their privacy requirements). 
vi) Information can be generalizing after a period of time (Williams & Weber-Jahnke, 
2010)  by automatically generalizing the accessible information to an inactive 
connection (for example, the connection between a user and health care provider can 
be degraded over many years in a Healthcare SN). 
Built-in default privacy might be advantageous; however, it could cause the user to be 
relaxed about their privacy and to fail to verify the system’s default privacy features. While it 
is unlikely, in reality, these settings themselves can be a source of various privacy breaches 
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(such as leaking information to an untrustworthy third party). Therefore, the user should be 
well informed about the status of the default privacy settings. 
5.3.3 Privacy Embedded in Design  
Privacy embedded in design is a key issue in implementing privacy. One of the privacy-
invasive systems – Biometric Encryption – could utilize PbD principles to provide privacy 
and ensure full functionality (Cavoukian & Stoianov, 2007). Such systems should be 
designed so that they store only the biometrically encrypted code, rather than the biometric 
information itself. In this approach, third parties will have less interest in collecting and 
accumulating actual biometric information; thus, embedded privacy in the design will protect 
user information and the required functionality will be ensured.  
Another privacy-invasive area is Video Surveillance which seeks to ensure public 
safety with respect to governance, but at the expense of the privacy of law-abiding citizens 
(Cavoukian, 2009). To address this privacy issue, one approach could be to publish general 
information on a website to inform citizens about the locations of public video surveillance 
and reasons for its installation. Another approach could be to strictly control the PII, such as 
face images and location data, and thus avoid unauthorized access.  
Williams and Weber-Jahnke (2010) suggest two privacy mechanisms that can be 
incorporated at the system design level. The first mechanism involves the adoption of only 
those architectures that allow for anonymity; the other requires that third parties comply with 
the system’s user privacy policy. In these ways, service providers can ensure the availability 
of information required by interested third parties through provided interfaces rather than 
direct access, while at the same time ensuring user privacy.  
Safebook is a PbD-driven innovative and decentralized SN architecture developed by 
Cutillo et al. (2010). Cutillo et al. (2010) claim that the user-centric Safebook structure 
preserves privacy, data integrity, data availability and data lookup by using the Matryoshka 
structure; however, the feasibility of the decentralized approach in terms of availability of 
data and responsiveness of the system remains an open question. Furthermore, Cutillo et al. 
(2010) do not consider the existing large-scale SN frameworks. Another major limitation of 
this proposed system is that it does not explain who will be the first trusted person. 
Additionally, the proposed SN could have an inadequate growth rate as the system utilises a 
recommendation-based approach; accumulating or deleting user information could be an 
issue for their system. 
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Another innovative PbD-driven, cloud-based architecture – Contrail is provided by 
Studi, et al. (2010), and is based on a peer-to-peer approach.  Studi, et al (2010) claim that 
this architecture affords enhanced privacy and bandwidth efficiency. They also note that the 
system encrypts the data when sending it to the cloud and that even this data cannot be 
viewed by others, and that it can be replaced at any time in the event of any un-trusty activity; 
however, their proposed system involves a pre-assumption of mutual user trust.  
Privacy embedded in the design stage should be the key approach to SN development, 
and additional PET solutions should be considered as a means of achieving this.  
5.3.4 Full Functionality: Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum  
The future of privacy-preserving SN applications is expected to be a win-win scenario: 
service providers’ business models will not be destroyed (Weiss, 2009), and user privacy will 
be protected. Weiss (2009) proposes a privacy threat model that can be used to enhance 
information privacy to protect personally identifiable information (PII). In the proposed 
model, the SN application user will have fine-grained three dimensional controls over their 
PII. Such control is one of the fundamental requirements of major privacy laws in Europe.  
Obviously, a positive-sum paradigm is achievable in the system design (Cavoukian, 
2009). There is a myth that one goal is achieved at the expense of another. This is not 
necessarily true, especially in the health sector; Cavoukian, for example, demonstrate a 
framework which provides de-identified e-health records with a low level of re-identification 
risk. Hence, privacy and data quality is ensured.  
Similarly, Biometric Encryption ensures full functionality (Cavoukian, 2009) by storing 
biometrically encrypted codes only, rather than storing biometric information; hence, third 
parties will not be interested in collecting and storing actual biometric images. In addition, 
Cavoukian also examines (along with Bering Media’s Technology), the application of the 
positive-sum paradigm so that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can ensure they provide full 
functionality with zero disclosure of subscribers’ PII (Cavoukian, 2010b). With this 
innovative double-blind privacy architecture, ISPs never learn the physical location of the IP 
address for precise geo-locations (such as postal code or ZIP+4 information), and advertisers 
are referred to an identifier number without any actual details. 
Zeng and Cavoukian (2010) also outline an innovative architecture which addresses a 
number of privacy requirements – such as automated protection, privacy assurance, and audit 
and reporting capabilities – without negatively impacting data availability or usability in 
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cloud computing. They also claim that this innovative architecture would be of great benefit 
to both users and service providers.  
Without a privacy mechanism, unbiased consultation will not be possible when 
accessing the centrally collected patient information in Healthcare (Williams & Weber-
Jahnke, 2010). Williams and Weber-Jahnke (2010) also argue that providing privacy can 
ensure patient safety.  
Users’ personal information is an asset for many enterprises (Cutler, 2010). Encrypting 
User ID (Vernal, 2010) can prevent the  revelation of private information to these third party 
enterprises. Using this approach, third parties such as data brokers or advertising networks 
will not be able to access users’ private information; however, full functionality, such as 
access to users’ images or other resources, will still be ensured.  
Additionally, private identifiers, such as Credentica/Microsoft Private Digital Identity 
(Credentica Inc., 2004-2010), can be a possible privacy safeguard. It provides for minimal 
disclosure and prevents the unwanted correlation of user activities by online identity 
providers, without diminishing transaction accountability or control. However, in mobile 
SNs, personal information needs to be accessed with special care as real-time spread of 
information can have an immediate and disruptive effects on users.  
5.3.5 End-to-End Lifecycle Protection 
Williams and Weber-Jahnke (2010) describe possible solutions to end-to-end protection 
in the Healthcare Social Network. One solution is anonymizing network information if 
requested by interested parties such as governments, researchers or advertising companies. 
Another possible solution can be a fine-grained access control mechanism where user 
information can be accessed by third parties; in this way, others can access general 
information rather than actual information. 
Another example of an end-to-end protection solution is given by Narayanan and 
Shmatikov (2010). In this approach, individual and sensitive information can be ‘de-
identified’ by removing or modifying PII (such as social security numbers, drivers’ license 
numbers or financial accounts). Narayanan and Shmatikov (2010) claim that differential 
privacy, de-identification and re-identification, are effective privacy protection. However, 
their findings might have been more convincing if they had considered data accessibility in 
the proposed process. 
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Custodian or service providers must have procedures to securely dispose of personal 
records such as health records, SN member information or other PII in a timely manner. The 
user information can be discontinued for particular reasons (for example, someone is 
deceased) (Facebook Inc., 2011c). Furthermore, precautionary measures can be taken to 
simplify the end-to-end protection process. One such precautionary measure could be the use 
of the physical security features already available for mobile phones; for example, not storing 
the password, never leaving the phone unattended, and  reporting immediately if it is stolen. 
One precautionary measure to deal with the possibility of the latter can be to encrypt user 
information when transferring it to hand-held devices. Information can also be encrypted 
when the information is being transferred to a centralized server, and decrypted when it is 
transferred to a hand-held device to avoid communication privacy breaches. 
5.3.6 Visibility and Transparency  
The accessing of information must be visible and transparent. For example, RFID 
technology can enhance visibility and transparency; however, wherever possible, it is 
necessary to minimize the identifiable, observable and linkable RFID information to prevent 
future threats to privacy (Cavoukian, 2009). Additionally, the individual participant should be 
informed of any changes, so as to make the RFID system as open and transparent as possible.  
The user should have a transparent view of how any system is collecting their 
information. Delgado et al. (2010) propose a solution where a SN application indicates how it 
will collect the user’s information. In this way, the user will know which applications can 
access which information from their profile.  
Williams and Weber-Jahnke (2010) claim that mobile SN service providers might 
provide an unclear view of their privacy policies since these contain only text. They also 
claim that visibility has not been a strong point of SNs, and suggest that diagrams or 
interactive tools could be incorporated to increase the visibility or transparency of their 
policies. Nevertheless, a user could still have an unclear view of unexpected information 
propagation across the SN. It is also unlikely that the user will dispute the long textual 
privacy policies as this would mean that they would not be able to use the system. In most 
cases, a typical user does not read such policies (Kelley et al., 2009).  
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5.3.7 Respect for User Privacy  
Roig (2010) concludes that Privacy Enhanced Technology (PET) and Transparency-
enhancing Technology (TET) are needed to be incorporated in the initial design level to 
ensure user privacy. Roig (2010) also claims that PETs should not be limited to anonymity, 
pseudonymity, unlinkability or unobservability, but should also be required to include 
transparency, automatic compliance assurance functions, and proactive techniques for risk 
analysis. Furthermore, TETs such as ‘sticky policies’ should provide clear information 
mechanisms and cross-disciplinary professions such as lawyers and designers are also 
required to work together to address the privacy issues in SN applications.   
SN service providers should take the necessary steps to decrease the user burden and to 
respect user privacy (Williams & Weber-Jahnke, 2010). They should provide an interactive 
user interface for controlling privacy settings; in this way, the user can edit, hide, or delete 
their personal information. If anyone sees their profile or personal information without their 
consent, the user will know, and be cautious when publishing information in future. In SNs, 
user-centric identity management can be one means of  enabling users to protect their own 
privacy details. 
5.4 CASE STUDIES 
This section includes an investigation of the effectiveness of the PbD principles in 
ensuring SN user privacy. To date, very little earlier work has focused on the effectiveness of 
these principles in SN contexts, or on integrating PbD into SN design. Section 5.4.1 explores 
the effectiveness of the PbD principles through the case study research which guided the 
integration of PbD principles into the design of SN. 
This research did not consider traditional and closed-source SN services such as 
Facebook10, LinkedIn11 and Twitter12 when testing the effectiveness of the PbD principles; 
rather, it limited the investigation to open source SN services. Open source applications are 
claimed to have real-time communication and transparency in sources, and are proven to 
provide better value, to limit costs, to provide improved security, and to address the most 
important enterprise considerations94. The open-source SN platform also provides 
organizations with the complete freedom to use any social networking application they 
require95. Open source SN may also make it easier for users to obtain a customized solution 
to meet their requirements. 
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This research considered various open source SN services such as Diaspora (Diaspora, 
2010), Clique96, The Distributed Friends and Relations Network97, GNU Social98, Lorea99, 
NoseRub100, and StatusNet101. However, it limited its further investigation to case studies of 
Diaspora and Clique to investigate and assess the effectiveness of the PbD principles.  
The Diaspora system was included in the research as it has received immense media 
attention102 and some technologists 103 104 claim that it could attract users from other well-
recognized SNs105 . Secondly, Diaspora claims to be the first ‘privacy-aware’ social network. 
The Clique system was also selected for this study because of its open-source and effective 
privacy features.  Clique was produced through the research project Primelife106 which was 
funded by the European Commission’s 7th Framework Program. It illustrates how privacy and 
sociality in SNs can be reconciled in a user-friendly way107.  
5.4.1 Case study research design 
The central components of case study design and functions include: a specific research 
question or hypothesis, study propositions, units of analysis, logic linking the data to the 
propositions, and criteria for interpreting the findings (Yin, 2009). This research conducted 
two cases studies on the effectiveness of the PbD principles and followed a research pattern 
similar to that described by Yin (2009) above. 
Research question for the case studies 
This section includes a ‘how’ research question or hypothesis which defines the 
investigation. The question is: 
o How effective are the PbD principles when employed by the SN service 
providers?  
Propositions 
This step of the research process assisted in: determining the study’s focus areas; 
limiting the research scope; and in suggesting possible links between case study phenomena 
and PbD principles. The SN test cases were analysed in terms of how they followed the PbD 
principles, and whether these principles were able to ensure user privacy in these SNs.  
While PbD principles are generally claimed to assist in the protection of user privacy in 
various privacy-invasive areas, they were not integrated into the design stage of the 
development of the test cases. Thus, this research also examines how effective these privacy-
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protecting principles would be if they were to be incorporated into the SNs’ design. (Section 
5.4.2 provides details of the test cases.) 
Units of analysis 
In the case study research method, the main units of analysis must be similar in nature 
to the study questions, and typically comparable to issues previously studied in the field (Yin, 
2009). This research included ‘effectiveness of the PbD principles when employed by the 
Social Network providers’ as its main unit of analysis. The objective of the study was to 
explore and describe the factors affecting the effectiveness the PbD principles in protecting 
user privacy. Dependent variables of the study were the PbD principles, and its analytical 
method was descriptive. 
Logic linking the data to the propositions 
This section matches the rival patterns that were derived from the propositions from the 
case studies. There were two assessments of the test cases (Diaspora and Clique): an initial 
assessment and a final assessment.  
The initial assessment was based on ‘Assessment Criteria’ and ‘Privacy Score’ (Refer 
to Development of assessment criteria for details).  The initial assessment of the test cases 
was designed on a 4-point Likert Scale. If an ‘Assessment Criterion’ of a system’s feature did 
not comply with the PbD principles, it scored ‘0’; ‘Low Compliance’ scored ‘1’, ‘Medium 
Compliance’ scored ‘2’; and ‘High Compliance’ scored ‘3’ (similar to SN user privacy 
positions (Refer to Privacy positions section)). 
 The final assessment of Diaspora and Clique was based on the approximate average of 
the ‘Privacy Score’, and was also designed on a 4-point Likert Scale. An approximate 
average ‘Privacy Score’ of 0 gave a final level of ‘No Compliance’; 1 was ‘Low 
Compliance’; 2 was ‘Medium Compliance’; and 3 was ‘High Compliance’ with the PbD 
principles. The exception in the final assessment scoring was that values greater than ‘0’ 
produced ‘Low Compliance’ with the PbD principles. 
Development of assessment criteria 
A set of ‘Assessment Criteria’ was formulated by mapping available system features of 
the Diaspora and Clique systems and PbD principles. Each of the PbD principles are 
measured by relevant, objective, complete and measurable criteria (Cavoukian, 2009) and 
actions (Cavoukian, 2012) (Refer to 
 Chapter 5: Privacy Principles for Social Networks   165 
Table 30 for more detailed analysis of PbD principles). Each PbD principle is also assigned a 
set of objectives, requirements, responsibilities and standards.  
Both the Diaspora and Clique systems have a set of features and views on privacy. 
These are found on the systems’ ‘main page’, along with ‘Terms of Use’ (rights and 
responsibilities, roughly comparable to a privacy policy), ‘Wiki’, ‘Frequently Asked 
Questions for users’, ‘Developer Resources’, and ‘Contributor Resources’. The ‘Assessment 
Criteria’ in 
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Table 28 were taken from the Diaspora and Clique systems. For example, the table illustrates 
that a particular Diaspora system feature includes the following assessment criteria: ‘Provides 
security levels such as ‘No’, ‘Low’, and ‘High Compliance’, and ‘Produces a Privacy Impact 
Assessments (PIA) to outline the possible future privacy impacts’.  
Assessment methodology 
Each assessment criterion taken from the Diaspora and Clique systems was mapped 
with relevant objectives, requirements, responsibilities and standards for each PbD principle. 
For example, 
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Table 28 illustrates that the Diaspora system features mentioned above – ‘Provides security 
levels such as ‘None’, ‘Low’, and ‘High’ and ‘Produces Privacy Risk Assessment’ – are 
mapped to the ‘Proactive not Reactive; Preventative not Remedial’ PbD principle. This 
mapping helped to determine the ‘Privacy Score’ which measures the level of compliance 
with PbD principles for the specific initial assessment. The approximate average ‘Privacy 
Score’ was calculated to indicate the final level of compliance with the principles.  
For the initial assessment, if an ‘Assessment Criterion’ of the Diaspora or Clique 
system feature did not comply with the PbD principles, it scored a ‘0’; ‘Low Compliance’ 
scored ‘1’; ‘Medium Compliance’ scored ‘2’; and ‘High Compliance’ scored ‘3’. For the 
final assessment, an approximate average ‘Privacy Score’ of 0 gave a final level of ‘No 
Compliance’; 1 was ‘Low Compliance’’, 2 was ‘Medium Compliance’’, and 3 was –‘High 
Compliance’ with the PbD principles. The exception in the final assessment scoring was that 
values greater than ‘0’ produced ‘Low Compliance’ with the PbD principles. 
5.4.2 Test cases 
Diaspora 
Diaspora (2010) claims to be a privacy-aware, personally-controlled and distributed 
open-source SN. It was created to replace centralized SNs since these have failed to protect 
user privacy. Diaspora also states that its aim is to protect user information with a philosophy 
of ‘secure as much as you can, but no more’. Diaspora claims to make private sharing easy 
and simple without increasing the user burden. The Diaspora architecture (Figure 30) 
includes a Server (Pod) to host user accounts (seeds), and claims that the seed is owned by 
the user and can be used to aggregate other profiles, tweets or social data.  
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Figure 30: Diaspora System including user, client, user accounts and server 
Clique 
Clique108 claims to secure user privacy by enabling users to create their own set of faces 
or profiles. The ‘faces’ or ‘profiles’ can be defined as segregated profiles/identities in various 
real life contexts; for example, a user can have a work, private or family ‘face’ (Berg, 
Pötzsch, Leenes, Borcea-Pfitzmann, & Beato, 2011). The system also clusters contacts, and 
claims to define accessibility-of-contact information by these clusters. Users are able to 
customize audience segregation through their own set of faces and clusters in their system. 
Clique is built using Elgg109 Open Source software, thus making the source transparent and 
visible. Moreover, it claims that users use a system called ‘Scramble”110 as a part of Clique. 
Scramble uses a hybrid encryption scheme for protecting content from the platform provider 
and other unauthorized parties. Figure 31 below shows the interface of the Clique system. 
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Figure 31: Clique interface 
5.4.3 Assessment of Diaspora and Clique 
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Table 28 shows how the Diaspora and Clique systems follow the PbD principles. For 
example, 
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Table 28 illustrates a Diaspora system feature – which ‘Provides security levels such as 
‘None’, ‘Low’, and ‘High’ – to be highly compliant with PbD principles; this scored a ‘3’. 
On the other hand, the feature ‘Produces Privacy Risk Assessment’ does not comply with the 
PbD principles and scores a ‘0’. The second column ‘Assessment Criteria’ in 
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Table 28 demonstrates system features which are or are not supported, and which also 
assisted in encoding a ‘Privacy Score’ for each test case (Refer section Logic linking the data 
to the propositions for interpreting assessment criteria and Development of assessment 
criteria for assessment criteria details).  
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Table 29 shows the final assessment for Diaspora where the average of the privacy 
scores indicates the final assessment level of compliance with the PbD principles; for 
example, an average score of 1.36 gives a final level of ‘Low Compliance’ for Diaspora and 
‘High Compliance’ for Clique in terms of ‘Privacy as the Default’.  Figure 32 represents the 
privacy assessment comparison for Diaspora and Clique. 
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Table 28: Assessment of test cases-Diaspora and Clique 
# Principle  Assessment Criteria Privacy 
Score 
Diaspora 
Privacy 
Score 
Clique 
1  Proactive not 
Reactive; 
Preventative 
not Remedial  
Users are able to use own servers 3 0 
Provides flexibility for user to set up own server 3 0 
Provides security levels such as ‘None, ‘Low’, and 
‘High’ Compliance 
3 3 
Produces Privacy Risk Assessment 0 0 
Platform owner documents privacy policies 0 0 
Platform service provider makes privacy policies 
available to users and third parties 
0 0 
Addresses personal information collection strategy in 
privacy policy 
3 3 
Identifies and classifies personal information such as 
private, protected or public information 
3 3 
Classifies profiles such as personal, business or 
public profile 
3 3 
Provides features for privacy awareness and trains 
users through system features 
3 3 
Develops or uses universal, user-centric privacy 
symbols or icons that indicate how information will 
be collected and  used 
1 2 
Engages users to use the provided privacy 
protections features 
3 3 
Practices Fair Information collection policy 3 3 
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Provides understandable form  of user information 3 3 
Provides ongoing procedures for monitoring over 
personal information.  
1 2 
2  Privacy as the 
Default  
Ensures privacy using open source architecture 3 3 
Uses privacy model 0 3 
Considers encryption where possible  3 3 
Encrypts user information automatically   3 3 
Allows users to differentiate between roles 3 3 
Notifies user about implicit or explicit collection, use 
and disclosure of personal information 
0 3 
Notifies user of the consequences of denying or 
withdrawing consent 
0 2 
Notifies user of the types of personal information 
collection and methods of collections, such as 
cookies or web beacons111   
0 2 
Monitors information access by third parties 0 3 
Abides by Global Privacy Standard 1 2 
Uses privacy-protection default settings 2 3 
  Maintains personal information retention time, 
unless there is a justified business or legal reason not 
to 
0 0 
  Provides functionalities and policies for disposing of 
user content 
0 0 
  Provides functionalities and policies for disposing  of 
original, backup and archived information 
0 0 
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  Provides functionalities and policies for retention of  
original, backup and archived information 
0 0 
  Provides functionalities and policies for redaction of 
original, backup and archived information  
0 0 
  Provides functionalities and policies for destructing 
original, backup and archived information 
0 0 
3  Privacy 
Embedded 
into Design  
Uses open source privacy guard such as GNUPG, or 
its own designed privacy guard 
3 3 
Uses built-in privacy protection  3 3 
Provides quick and easy privacy setup process  0 3 
Ingrates fine-grained, cross-platform privacy 
controls 
3 3 
Defines privacy requirements and security standards 
for provided services 
3 3 
4  Full 
Functionality:  
Positive-Sum, 
not Zero-Sum  
Considers philosophy of ‘Secure as much as you 
must, but no more’ 
3 3 
Documents how information is used in a client and 
server side of the system 
1 2 
Easy accesses to personal information by user  3 3 
Provides solutions; thus, users are able to review, 
update and correct information 
3 3 
Provides solutions; thus, users are able to control 
access to their personal information by other users 
and third parties 
3 3 
Facilitates reporting mechanism for users 2 2 
5 End-to-End Maintains ‘Security by Default’ as policy 3 3 
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Security:  
Full Lifecycle 
Protection  
 
Handles end-to-end lifecycle protection using 
existence procedures 
0 2 
Provides functionalities and policies for deleting user 
content  
0 3 
Provides functionalities and policies for re-
distributing user content  
0 0 
Provides consistent security measures for personal 
Information 
0 0 
Provides logical access controls; that is, controls 
access according to the level and type of information 
1 3 
Provides restricted physical access controls for 
personal information 
0 0 
Provides protected information transmission over the 
Internet, public and other non-secure networks 
1 0 
Provides effective test procedures for security 
safeguards 
1 2 
6  Visibility and 
Transparency
: Keep it open 
 Ensures open source code availability 3 3 
Provides transparent third party communication with 
server 
3 3 
Provides transparent third party communication with 
client 
3 3 
Provides transparent personal information access by 
authorized persons 
3 3 
Notifies users  of implicit or explicit access to 
personal information  by third parties 
0 0 
Provides processes to address inquiries, complaints, 
and disputes 
0 0 
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Uses a direct relationship with users to promote 
privacy education 
0 3 
7 Respect for 
User Privacy 
Contains a model for securing private 
communications and data between the server, client 
and user.  
3 3 
Claims to be a trusted system  3 3 
Provides procedures for user content collection by 
third parties 
0 0 
Confirms identity  and authenticates individual users 
who are given access to other users 
2 3 
Provides functionality to change  information type 
(e.g., from public information to protected 
information)  
0 2 
Provides updating or correcting functionality for 
users’ personal information 
2 3 
Provides appealing procedure for correction of 
denied correcting personal information  
0 0 
Provides sharing/disclosure procedures for personal 
information to third parties 
0 0 
Notifies users of implicit or explicit sharing 
information with third parties. 
0 0 
Provides remedial action in response to misuse of 
personal information by third parties 
0 0 
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Table 29:  Final assessment of test cases-Diaspora and Clique 
System PbD Principle Average Score and Final 
Assessment 
Diaspora 
Average Score and 
Final Assessment 
Clique 
Principle 1 Proactive not Reactive; 
Preventative not 
Remedial 
2.13 
2-Medium Compliance 
1.87 
2-Medium Compliance 
Principle 2 Privacy as the Default 0.88 
1-Low Compliance 
1.76 
2- Medium Compliance 
Principle 3 Privacy Embedded into 
Design 
2.40 
2-Medium Compliance 
3.00 
3-High Compliance 
Principle 4 Full Functionality: 
Positive-Sum, not Zero-
Sum 
2.50 
2-Medium Compliance 
2.67 
3-High Compliance 
Principle 5 End-to-End Security: 
Full Lifecycle Protection  
0.67 
1-Low Compliance 
1.44 
1-Low Compliance 
Principle 6 Visibility and 
Transparency: Keep it 
open 
1.71 
2-Medium Compliance 
2.14 
2-Medium Compliance 
Principle 7 Respect for User Privacy 1.00 
1-Low Compliance 
1.40 
1-Low Compliance 
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Figure 32: Privacy assessment comparison for Diaspora and Clique 
The Diaspora system claims to be ‘Proactive not Reactive; Preventative not Remedial’. 
This is supported by the current case assessment; that is, the Diaspora system shows 
‘Medium Compliance’ with Principle 1. Neither Diaspora nor Clique produces a Privacy Risk 
Assessment to outline possible future privacy risk; therefore, both score a ‘0’ in this 
assessment criterion. Diaspora follows Principle 1 more than Clique. 
The Diaspora system claims to be a ‘Privacy as the Default’ policy; however, in this 
system, only the advanced user is able to use their own prepared server to achieve control 
over their personal content. The Diaspora system utilizes encryption where possible, with 
various security models and settings; however, the average user might have no knowledge of 
encryption. The Clique system, on the other hand, preserves privacy as the default and is, 
therefore, superior to Diaspora. Clique  ‘Medium Compliance’ with Principle 2. 
Diaspora claims to embed privacy in its design; however, this depends on having an 
open source third party privacy guard (GNUPG) rather than its own architecture.  This 
GNUPG could create a possible future privacy issue. Clique scored ‘3’ and shows high 
compliance with Principle 3. However, Clique uses Scramble tools such as the Firefox112 
browser add-on to protect information from service providers.  It would be much more 
appropriate if privacy was embedded directly into their architecture.  
Diaspora claims to provide full functionality in a win-win scenario, and that privacy 
and security are both ensured; however, users’ control of access for other users is not 
considered. While Diaspora documentation provides a multiple security access for other 
users, this may not be sufficient to ensure privacy.  The assessment of Diaspora indicates a 
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‘Medium Compliance’ with Principle 4, whereas Clique ‘Highly’ complies with this 
principle. However, both have a similar limitation in their reporting mechanism and 
documentation. More transparent documentation by both would help users establish a greater 
degree of satisfaction; this, in turn, could engage more users.  
One of the important PbD principles are that all data be securely destroyed at the end of 
its life cycle and provide end to end security. However, the Diaspora and Clique system did 
not seem to provide this end-to-end lifecycle protection including content deletion, 
alterations, updates and re-distribution policies or content access by the third parties.  This 
assessment identifies Diaspora and Clique both as ‘Low Compliance’ with Principle 5. 
Visibility and transparency is one of the major goals of the Diaspora and Clique Social 
Network which they have demonstrated in the system, so far. Figure 32 demonstrates, there 
are similarities between the attitudes expressed by Diaspora and Clique and both show 
‘Medium Compliance’ with Principle 6. 
The principle aim of developing Diaspora was to protect and respect user privacy; 
however, as with other distributed systems, ‘trust’ becomes more complicated in Diaspora.  
Additionally, Diaspora and Clique both show ‘Low Compliance’ with Principle 7 because no 
procedures exist for information collection by third parties. Both systems have inadequate 
procedures for correcting user information, and for sharing/disclosure of user information to 
third parties. Another problem is that they fail to take ‘Notification of implicit or explicit 
sharing’ into account. Further research needs to be undertaken as a basis for the provision of 
more respect for the user. 
At this stage, the Diaspora system does not truly support full privacy as it primarily 
substantiates the securing of personal content by using encryption features. The Clique 
system is more focused on solving user privacy issues from the user’s perspective. More 
effort needs to be taken to respect user privacy in both systems. And, as privacy-aware 
Diaspora and Clique SNs are in their early development stages, there are opportunities to 
address these issues in the future.  
This research demonstrates the effectiveness of the PbD principles (Refer to section 
5.4.1 for the case studies’ hypothesis). Overall, Diaspora and Clique follow only some of the 
PbD principles and, consequently, fail to ensure full privacy. The findings from the case 
studies also emphasise the need to incorporate PbD principles while designing and 
developing a new SN or modifying an existing one. These findings also influenced the 
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direction of this research, with its further investigation considering PbD principles as privacy-
protecting principles, since two proclaimed privacy-aware SNs fail to ensure full user privacy 
without these principles. The findings of this assessment emphasise and justify the use of 
PbD principles as the best currently available instrument to design protection for user privacy 
in SNs. 
5.5 PBD PRINCIPLES AND USER PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS MAPPING 
The purpose of this section is to describe the mapping of PbD principles (Refer to 
2.3.7) and SN user privacy requirements (Refer to 4.4 for details). Section 2.3.7 presents 
seven PbD principles, which can be used to deal with new challenges and to facilitate user 
privacy requirements in SNs. Each of the principles can deal with multiple privacy 
requirements or facilitate simple privacy requirements. The analysis detailed in Sections 5.3 
and 5.4 assisted this research in gaining an in-depth understanding of PbD principles and 
their approaches, in order to map the relationship between these principles and users’ privacy 
requirements.  
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Table 30 includes seven PbD principles, and an analysis of the way in which each principle 
can be used to meet SN users’ privacy requirements. 
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Table 30: Privacy by Design principles (Cavoukian, 2009), actions (Cavoukian, 2012) and analysis 
 Principle Principle 
Details  
(Cavoukian, 
2009) 
Sub-principles and required 
actions (Cavoukian, 2012) 
Analysis and mapping of user privacy 
requirements 
1 Proactive not 
Reactive; 
Preventative 
not Remedial  
Privacy 
protection 
comes 
before-the-
fact, not 
after.  
1. Affirm commitment to a 
strong, proactive privacy. 
2. Commit to concrete 
actions, not just policies; 
reflect a commitment to 
privacy; monitor through a 
system of regularly reviewed 
metrics 
3. Develop systematic 
methods to assess privacy 
and security risks and to 
correct any negative impacts 
well before they occur. 
4. Encourage privacy 
practices demonstrably 
shared by diverse user 
communities and 
stakeholders, in a culture of 
continuous improvement. 
Privacy should not be reactive. 
Privacy- invasive events should be 
prevented. Privacy functionality should 
be incorporated at the earliest stages of 
a system’s life cycle. In other words, it 
should be added at the design level. 
Privacy functionality should aim to 
protect user information to prevent 
future privacy threats. The principle 
underpinning the mechanism is how 
the information privacy will be 
observed and resolved before problems 
arise. 
Using Principle 1, from the design 
stage  of  an SN, Information control, 
Information access, Collection and 
storage, and Unauthorized secondary 
use (internal & external) requirements 
and user friendly practices will be 
facilitated.  
This principle will assist the system-
designer to ensure strong and proactive 
privacy from the very beginning of the 
system. The providers may also 
measure and monitor privacy 
requirements, functionalities and risks 
through regularly reviewed metrics. 
This metrics will assist the providers to 
ensure SN user’s privacy eventually. 
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2 Privacy as the 
Default 
No action is 
required on 
the part of 
the 
individual to 
protect their 
privacy. It is 
built into the 
system, by 
default.  
1.  Limit data collection to 
collection for specific  
purposes. Begin with no 
collection of PII data. 
2.  Minimize the collection 
of data at the outset to what 
is strictly necessary. 
3. Limit the use of personal 
information to the specific 
purposes for which it was 
collected. 
4. Create technological, 
policy and procedural 
barriers to data linkages with 
PII. 
Privacy should not be ‘a quick fix’ or 
an ‘add-on’; it should be built into the 
system by default. The user will 
automatically support privacy by 
default. Privacy-preserving default 
settings should be easily accessible. If 
there is any update in the system the 
user should receive it automatically. 
The principle underpinning the rules is 
how the information will be collected 
and used with respect to individual 
privacy. 
This principle facilitates various SN 
user privacy requirements. 
Sub-principles 1&2 together ensure SN 
user information Collection and storage 
requirements. 
Sub-principle 3 ensures SN user 
information authorized secondary use 
(Internal & External). 
Sub-principle 4 ensures the protection 
against information access by copying, 
using mobile or hand-held devices, 
tracking and behavioural information 
access. 
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3 Privacy 
Embedded 
into Design 
Privacy is 
integral to 
the system, 
without 
diminishing 
functionality
. 
1. Make a Privacy 
Risk Assessment an integral 
part of the design stage of 
any initiative; e.g., when 
designing the technical 
architecture of a system, pay 
particular attention to 
potential unintended uses of 
the personal information. 
2. Base identity meta-
systems on the ‘Laws of 
Identity’, which are intended 
to codify a set of 
fundamental principles to 
which universally adopted, 
sustainable identity 
architecture must conform.  
3. Consider privacy in 
system development 
lifecycles and organizational 
engineering processes. 
System designers should be 
encouraged to practice 
responsible innovation in the 
field of advanced analytics. 
4. Embed privacy into 
regulatory approaches which 
may take the form of self-
regulation, sectoral privacy 
laws, omnibus privacy 
legislation and more general 
legislative frameworks, 
while at the same time 
calling for an approach 
guided by ‘flexibility, 
common sense and 
pragmatism’. 
Privacy is essential, and privacy 
functionality should be embedded into 
the design level of a system 
(Cavoukian, 2009) to protect users’ 
personal information.  Privacy 
assurance should not compromise 
system functionality. The principle 
underpinning the mechanism is how to 
implement the system policies to 
ensure user privacy. 
This principle needs to be ensured 
when designing the SN privacy- 
friendly architecture and framework. 
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4 Full 
Functionality: 
Positive-Sum, 
not Zero-Sum 
It is possible 
to have both  
privacy and 
security.  
1. Acknowledge that 
multiple, legitimate business 
interests must coexist. 
2. Understand, engage 
and partner. Practice the 3Cs 
– communication, 
consultation and 
collaboration –  to better 
understand multiple and, at 
times, divergent interests. 
3. Pursue innovative 
solutions and options to 
achieve multiple 
functionalities. 
Privacy is required, but it does not 
mean that it will be ensured without the 
appropriate functionality. The user 
might be more interested in the 
required functionality than preserving 
privacy. The service providers might 
also be interested in maintaining the 
economic value of the system while 
protecting individual privacy 
(Cavoukian, Taylor, & Abrams, 2010). 
The principle underpinning the 
methodology is how to create full 
functionality while protecting 
individual privacy. 
According to this principle, it is 
possible to have SN functionalities to 
both disclose information and facilitate 
privacy (the core of this privacy 
architecture). A system is needed for 
expressing individual privacy positions 
(These will be discussed in the 
following chapters). 
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5 End-to-End 
Lifecycle 
Protection 
PbD ensures 
cradle to 
grave 
lifecycle 
management 
of 
information.  
1. Employ encryption 
by default to mitigate the 
security issues associated 
with the loss, theft or 
disposal of electronic 
devices such as laptops, 
tablets, smart phones, USB 
memory keys and other 
external media. The default 
state of data, if breached, 
must be ‘unreadable’. 
2. Deploy encryption 
correctly, and carefully 
integrate it into devices and 
workflows in an automatic 
and seamless manner. 
3. Ensure the secure 
destruction and disposal of 
personal information at the 
end of its lifecycle. 
End-to-end lifecycle protection informs 
the accountable service providers and 
will ensure privacy from the beginning 
of the service to end of the service. 
User information protection will be 
provided in every process in the 
system. Also, service providers should 
ensure that an individual’s information 
is withdrawn when they no longer use 
the service. The principle underpinning 
the assessment is how the withdrawn 
information will be pre-processed to 
ensure individual privacy. 
With this sub-principle, users will be 
provided with proper protection; 
however, encryption may not be the 
right solution. There may be other 
privacy models available for providing 
end-to- end protection for SN users. 
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6 Visibility and 
Transparency 
Trust but 
verify.  
1. Make the identity 
and contact information of 
the individual(s) responsible 
for privacy and security 
available to the public and 
well known within the 
organization. 
2. Implement a policy 
that requires all “public 
facing’ documents to be 
written in ‘plain language’ 
that is easily understood by 
the individuals whose 
information is the subject of 
the policies and procedures.  
3. Make information 
about the policies, 
procedures and controls 
relating to the management 
of Personal Information 
readily available to all 
individuals. 
4. Consider 
publishing summaries of 
various audit results, such as 
Privacy Impact Assessments 
and third party audit results. 
5. Make available a 
list of data holdings of 
Personal Information 
maintained by your 
organization. 
6. Make audit tools 
available so that users can 
easily determine how their 
data is stored, protected and 
used. Users should also be 
able to determine whether 
the policies are being 
properly enforced. 
Every system should have visible and 
transparent policies regarding how they 
collect user information. The service 
providers must be accountable for their 
provided system, and this system 
should notify the user of any update. 
The user should also have a clear view 
of the privacy policies of a system. The 
principle underpinning the 
investigation is how the accountable 
organization will be open and honest 
with individual privacy. 
These sub-principles will assist in 
facilitating SN practice requirements. 
Users will able to practice 
accountability using Sub-principle 1. 
Users will be able to practice visibility 
and transparency requirements using 
Sub-principles 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. 
Users will able to control information 
by using Sub-principle 3. 
Users will have a clear idea about their 
information is stored, protected and 
used based on Sub-principle 6 using  
audit tools such as ‘Privacy Mirror’ 
(Nguyen & Mynatt, 2002) –  an 
example of similar tool  is ‘View as’ 
feature in Facebook – or Identity 
Mirror (H. Liu et al., 2006). 
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7 Respect for 
User Privacy 
Keep the 
system user-
centric.  
1. Offer strong 
privacy defaults. 
2. Provide appropriate 
notice. 
3. Consider user-
friendly options. 
4. Make user 
preferences persistent and 
effective. 
5. Provide users with 
access to data about 
themselves. 
6. Provide access to 
the information management 
practices of the organization. 
The user of a system should have the 
ultimate control over their own 
information. The user should able to 
disclose their own private information 
whenever they want or wherever they 
want if there is no legitimate reason to 
block that information. The principle 
underpinning the investigation is how 
to share, disclose or access, rectify, 
delete, and block information that is 
consistent with respect for individual 
privacy. 
These sub-principles will assist in 
facilitating user-centric SNs. 
Sub-principles 1 and 2 and 3(a) will 
facilitate control over users’ 
information and ensure SN practices 
such as disclosure and accountability. 
User will be able to access their own 
information by using Sub-principles 3 
(b) and (c). 
5.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
PbD is more of a concept than a tangible technique or framework, and complying with 
its principles requires focusing on both regulatory and engineering issues (Davies, 2010). 
Information and privacy commissioners can help solve the regulatory and legislation issues, 
and technical issues can be addressed by engineers and researchers adopting the PbD 
principles in their information system design practices.  
PbD principles, however, are not only limited to compliance or technical issues but also 
involve organizational and managerial issues. Business managers also have a definite 
responsibility for engaging PbD principles and should have clear perceptions of these in an 
organizational ecosystem so as to avoid future privacy corruption issues.  However, several 
challenges such as management, process and technology can affect the issue of privacy at the 
design level of information systems. The reluctance of management to engage, poor attitudes 
towards privacy and data protection, lack of appropriate privacy languages, and uncertain 
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benefits of privacy management are all factors that impact on privacy support in online 
information systems. PbD can also be a matter of political choice (Le Métayer, 2010). 
Additionally, information system designed with PbD principles may need to support various 
legislation requirements. Harmonizing the understanding between regulators, engineers, 
business managers and politicians will, therefore, assist in achieving ultimate success in 
protecting user privacy when implementing the PbD concept in information systems.  
PbD principles might not be integrated into previously developed and implemented 
system at the outset. Privacy by ReDesign (PbRD)113, an innovative approach and an 
extension of PbD, might be applicable to established systems; however, the scope of this 
research is limited to PbD principles. A future study investigating PbRD is a future challenge. 
While an organization might use a ‘privacy policy’ to protect itself from negative 
outcomes, it may fail to plan appropriate information system privacy support due to 
inadequate risk analysis and limited PIA. Organisations can also fail to consider the value of 
their consumers’ personal information, and external pressure to share this information with 
‘privacy-friendly’ third parties can also lead to various privacy-related issues.  
However, the problems of an inadequate privacy policy can be overcome by 
incorporating PbD principles, which require that service providers increase both the visibility 
and transparency of their operations. Service providers have to be accountable for services 
provided through their information system, including external links or third party services. 
Furthermore, as the PbD principles have various data protection legislation requirements 
(Lusoli & Compañó, 2010), these requirements must be enforced in order for the PbD 
principles to successfully protect user information.  
This research has argued that the PbD concept is currently the best instrument among 
various privacy protecting principles such as Fair Information Principles (FIPs), OECD 
Principles, CSA Model Code Principles, Nine Architectural Principles, Information Privacy 
Principles (IPPs), National Privacy Principles (NPPs) (Refer Table 27 for the comparison of 
privacy-protecting principles) for designing user-privacy protection in online information 
systems. The PbD principles are superior among these principles to ensure users’ legitimate 
right to control their private information from the SN design level. 
This research has assessed the effectiveness of the PbD principles in protecting user 
privacy for the Diaspora and Clique systems. However, further investigation of their 
effectiveness in protecting user privacy in other open-source, distributed, traditional and 
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closed-source SN services is required. Such investigations could assist researchers to design 
explicit technical solutions for ensuring privacy in SNs. 
‘Privacy by Design’ is an emerging and important concept. The analyses here add 
substantially to the understanding of how and why PbD principles can be used to protect user 
privacy in information systems. The conclusion drawn is that PbD principles are important in 
the design and operation of SNs which will manage user privacy more effectively and 
transparently. Results from this chapter are used to develop the privacy architecture and 
framework, and are presented in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6: Social Networks privacy 
framework 
This chapter presents the new Social Network privacy framework established from this 
research. The new technical privacy architecture is also an outcome of the research presented 
below.  
System requirements typically start with a detailed understanding of relevant system 
processes and stakeholder requirements (Spiekermann & Cranor, 2009). User privacy 
requirements, therefore, depend upon the functional requirements of SNs; thus, the latter need 
to be established before the analysis of user privacy requirements (Gürses, 2010). These SN 
functionalities can  create various issues for the collection of personal information, such as: 
unauthorized secondary use (internal and external); unauthorized improper access to personal 
information; mesh up information into several sources (Smith et al., 1996); and gaining 
ownership by complete control. Each SN functionality can have a set of privacy 
requirements; thus, privacy requirements need to be determined and mapped for each 
functionality. Privacy issues which arise, in turn, bridge these SN functionalities and user 
privacy requirements. This research has generated the interrelationships between these 
privacy issues and SN functionalities. 
Chapter 4 of this thesis posited that the major aspects of user privacy requirements in 
SNs can be grouped into information collection, unauthorised information access and 
secondary use of information. These privacy requirements were empirically derived by 
capturing privacy issues as themes and sub-themes, referred to as ‘privacy requirements’ and 
‘sub-privacy requirements’ respectively. These requirements have been established from the 
literature review. Content analysis was used as a guiding analytical framework to identify 
these privacy requirements, which were then verified through a survey of expert judges.   
These privacy requirements demand new approaches to ensure privacy; such 
approaches must not be ad-hoc or post-fact, but systematic and comprehensive.  The analysis 
in Chapter 5 confirmed that PbD principles are the best instruments for incorporating privacy 
features at the systems design level, and can provide end-to-end protection for SN users.  
This research focused on the SN domain where personal information disclosure is a 
major privacy issue. SNs promote disclosure through their various functionalities; users, on 
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the other hand, want privacy without compromising required functionalities. Available 
solutions have failed to resolve this contradiction between providing functionalities and user 
privacy requirements in SNs. This investigation, therefore, identified the relationships 
between SN functionalities and user privacy requirements. It then determined how these can 
be further protected by the application of PbD in a novel privacy-protecting SN Privacy 
Framework. This framework can ensure SN accountability and resolve many privacy issues 
in SNs. 
The freely available TOGAF (The Open Group, 2013) was used to develop the ‘step by 
step’ privacy framework and architecture for SNs. Section 2.8 adequately addressed some 
key reasons why the selection was not an endorsement of TOGAF for SNs; rather, it was 
used to articulate the enterprise architecture in a standardised way. Section 2.8 also justified 
why this research did not consider privacy languages and web services federation as an 
approach for the architecture, and focused on enterprise architecture from a single SN 
provider perspective. The framework and architecture development phases were adapted 
from TOGAF templates. 
This chapter is organized into five sections. The first presents the SN privacy 
framework, and the second provides the architecture and the stakeholders’ analysis. The third 
section demonstrates Business Architecture for SNs, the fourth presents the Data 
Architecture, and the next illustrates Technology Architecture.  The final section 
demonstrates a use case based on the SN privacy model. This chapter concludes with the 
chapter summary. 
6.1 USER-CENTERED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK (UCPF) 
This section includes a User-Centered Privacy Framework (UCPF) which can be used 
to protect SN user information.  This SN privacy framework (Refer to Figure 33) maps SN 
visions and capabilities, and Architecture Development Method (ADM) phases (Refer to 
Section Architecture Development Method (ADM) for more details) and architecture 
contents are also incorporated. The framework was developed by mapping SN functionalities 
and privacy requirements with PbD principles. This three-way mapping provides supports to 
business and technology strategy (Refer to Business and technology strategy section). It 
enables SN users to protect their privacy, and to facilitate SN capabilities. Another purpose of 
the three-way mapping was to establish technical privacy architecture content. 
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The privacy framework incorporates ADM (Refer to Section Architecture Development 
Method (ADM) for more details), SN capabilities, SN user privacy requirements, ADM 
principles and techniques, SN privacy architecture content, and the scope of the architecture 
(Refer to Figure 33). ADM is the core of privacy framework which guides step-by-step to 
developing the SN privacy architecture. ADM contains SN user privacy requirements and 
ADM principles and techniques stages. SN capabilities receive the privacy dimensions from 
ADM phases. SN capabilities focus on putting the appropriate SN structures (Refer to 
Organization unit section for details), process (Refer to Business architecture processes 
section for details), roles, responsibilities (Refer to Role/Actor Allocation and Roles and 
Responsibilities (RACI) section for details), and skills to successfully operate architecture 
function (Refer to Business Functions section for details) within the SN. ADM informs into 
SN privacy architecture which includes architecture content (Refer to 6.2 for details) to 
protect SN user privacy based on privacy principles. SN capabilities weren’t a phase of the 
framework, but rather as an ongoing practices that provide inputs by learning from SN 
operations that creates new SN needs and update to SN vision, operation and drivers (Refer to 
6.2.1 for details). SN user privacy requirements are also ongoing practices that refine into 
‘SN user privacy requirements’ stage. ADM receives necessary requirements from identified 
issues address in SN and updates SN vision, operation and drivers. 
 
 
Figure 33: User-centered privacy framework 
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6.1.1 Architectural principles, methods, vision and requirements 
This section describes the architectural method, principles, vision and requirements for 
the Privacy Architecture Framework.  
Preliminary phase: method and principles 
This section describes the preliminary architecture which was based on TOGAF, an 
industry standard framework used in a wide variety of organizations to develop an 
architecture116. However, TOGAF recommends tailoring the framework to effectively 
develop the architecture. In this case, the TOGAF framework was tailored into two levels so 
as to fit within the Social Network (SN) privacy architecture. Firstly, the framework was 
tailored to fit the SN context. This tailoring included: SN process management frameworks; 
customization of terminology; development of presentational styles; and the selection, 
configuration, and deployment of architecture tools. Secondly, the formality and detail of the 
adopted frameworks was aligned with other contextual SN factors, such as culture, 
stakeholders, commercial models of SN architecture, and the existing level of architecture 
capability.  
Tailored Architecture Method 
These tailoring steps required selecting the appropriate deliverables and artefacts to 
meet the SN context and its stakeholder needs. In this stage, the Architecture Development 
Method (ADM) was also devised. 
Architecture Development Method (ADM) 
Figure 34 presents the ADM, which forms the core of the SN privacy framework. The 
ADM starts with the preliminary stage for devising SN privacy frameworks and determining 
privacy-protecting principles. Phase A of this preliminary step is the architectural vision. At 
the center of the ADM is ‘SN user privacy requirements’, which is aligned with the different 
types of architectures such as ‘Business architecture’, ‘Information system architecture’ and 
‘Technology architecture’. The ADM is a continuous process (Varveris & Harrison, 2005) 
and the arrows indicate the process flow. 
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Figure 34: Architecture Development Method (ADM) 
Tailored Architecture Content 
This section includes the deliverables and artefacts for the architecture. Architectural 
artefacts were created to describe the privacy architecture for SNs. The concepts and steps 
discussed in this section were adapted from the more formal definitions of architecture, which 
are contained in ISO/IEC 42010:2007114 (Refer Figure 35) and TOGAF. The concepts and 
steps were then mapped to the current research scope.  
The ‘mission’ of this research was to investigate how user privacy can be protected 
within SNs (Refer 1.3 for details). Here SN works as a ‘system’ which is a collection of 
components such as various services (Refer Business Services section), processes, (Refer  
Business architecture processes section), and functions (Refer Business Functions section) to 
accomplish social networking and related tasks for SN users. SN architecture embodies these 
components and the relationships between the social environment and the SN. 
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In this research, ‘User-Centered Privacy Architecture (UCPA)’ (Refer Section 6.2 for 
details) is included as one of the key architectural artefacts. In the privacy architecture, SN 
‘Stakeholders’ have key roles and concerns (A list of these various stakeholders with their 
various roles is included in Stakeholders and SN user concerns section). As one of the key 
stakeholders, a SN user has ‘Concerns’ – one of the key considerations of this research. 
UCPA represents a ‘view’ of the privacy architecture from the perspective of a set of SN user 
privacy concerns. Users’ SN concerns were investigated in Chapter 4 as a basis for 
generating their privacy requirements. The privacy architecture was created from the SN 
user’s viewpoint or from the vantage point or perspective of a key SN stakeholder. The 
architectural model is representative of the overall architecture in terms that are meaningful 
to SN stakeholders in terms of addressing their privacy concerns. 
 
Figure 35: Basic architecture concepts (Adapted from ISO/IEC 42010:2007) 
Figure 36 details the content framework by ADM phases and depicts the relationships 
within entities in the SN architecture, business driver, goals and principles for the SN 
stakeholders. SN privacy architecture consists of business, data and technology architecture. 
The content framework also contains ‘architectural method’, ‘principles’, ‘vision’ and 
‘requirement’. The content framework also contains the method for developing the 
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architecture (Refer to Architecture Development Method (ADM) for details) and PbD 
principles as architectural principles which exist in the ‘Preliminary: method and principles’ 
component.  
 
Figure 36: Relationships within entities in SN architecture 
UCPA includes various key relationship concepts related to the core architectural 
entities. The entities are linked, and influence and impact each other. Figure 37 includes the 
architecture’s core entities and their relationships. SN service provider ‘organization’ 
includes a ‘Business and Technology strategy’ which is developed by three-way mapping 
between SN functions, user privacy requirements, and PbD Principles (Refer Business and 
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technology strategy Section for details). This ‘Business and Technology strategy’ component 
targets SN privacy architecture to simultaneously provide SN functions and protect user 
information. The functions describe units of business capability at all levels of granularity, 
encapsulating terms such as ‘process area’, ‘capability’, and ‘business function’ in the SN 
context (Refer Business Functions for details). ‘Process’ is used to describe the flow of 
interactions between functions and services in SNs (Refer Business and technology strategy 
section for details). ‘Business services’ support SN objectives and are defined at a level of 
granularity consistent with the level of governance needed to implement or support a SN 
service (Refer Business Services for SN services details). ‘Business services’ can be 
deployed onto application components that are part of the application of the architecture (but 
which are beyond the scope of this research). SN applications can be implemented on logical 
data components. Logical data components and data entities are deployed onto technology 
components. 
 
Figure 37: Architecture’s core entities and their relationships 
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Business and technology strategy 
The purpose of this section is to describe the high-level business and technology 
strategies that map onto the target privacy architecture for SNs. The business strategy 
typically defines ‘what to achieve’ but not ‘how to get there’ – in terms of the system goals 
and drivers, and the metrics for success (The Open Group, 2013) which is part of Business 
Architecture (Refer to 6.2.2). Technology strategy provides the necessary technical 
foundation for an effective system strategy, which is the core of any successful modern 
business strategy.  
Privacy preservation should not be partial, but should ensure end-to-end privacy for a 
SN service. An integrated architecture with collaborative technologies can achieve this goal. 
In the architecture, SN functionalities, SN user privacy requirements and PbD principles 
collaborate together to accomplish privacy preservation. It achieves this through a three-way 
mapping between SN functionalities; SN user privacy requirements and PbD principles 
(Refer to Chapter 5). 
According to Principle 1 of the PbD principles, users should be able to use SN 
functionalities which ensure their privacy requirements from the beginning of their SN usage; 
three-way mapping provides supports to achieve this assurance. 
Principle 2 and its Sub-principles 1 and 2 together ensure authorized collection and 
storage of user information, and Sub-principle 3 ensures authorized secondary use (internal 
and external) of user information. Sub-principle 4 of Principle 2 ensures authorized 
information access. 
The three-way mapping provides support to achieve privacy when designing a SN’s 
privacy-friendly architecture according to Principle 3 of the PbD principles. 
Principle 4 of the PbD principles (which is embedded as the core of the proposed 
privacy architecture and supports through the three-way mapping) means that it is possible to 
have SN functionalities to both disclose information and facilitate privacy.  
By using sub-principles of Principle 5 of the PbD principles, SN platform owners are 
able to offer proper protection over user information through encryption; however, encryption 
may not be suitable for the real time features of the SN. Other privacy models are available to 
provide end-to-end protection for real time SN users.  
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Sub-principles of Principle 6 mean that the SN platform owners are able to facilitate SN 
practice requirements through SN privacy architecture: Sub-principle 1 means that users will 
be able to practise accountability, whereas Sub-principles 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 mean that SN 
platform owner will be able to express visibility and transparency requirements. SN platform 
owner will be able provide control information facility for users by using Sub-principle 3, 
and SN users will have a transparent view of SN practices using Sub-principle 6. 
Sub-principles of Principle 7 mean that SN service providers will facilitate user-centric 
SN privacy architecture. Sub-principles 1, 2 and 3(a) will facilitate control over user 
information and ensure SN practices such as disclosure and accountability. Moreover, SN 
platform owners are able to provide system features, so SN user will be able to access their 
own information through Sub-principles 3 (b) and (c). 
SN functions and mapping of user  privacy requirements  
There is a significant amount of private information involved in SNs, such as private 
activities and images which are accessed through SN functionalities. User information is 
generally shared with various entities such as friends, family, and the public. SN members 
may also participate in various protected geo-location activities. Through SN functionalities, 
they may also disclose protected information such as age, gender, yearly income or a 
relationship between two individuals. Such disclosure, even to friends or family, can 
significantly affect a person. The user privacy requirements that were identified in this 
research enabled the construction of a SN privacy-protecting framework to prevent the 
inappropriate disclosure of information. 
Each privacy requirement should fulfil a set of functional system requirements. 
Functional system requirements were mapped against a single, or a set of, listed privacy 
requirements. This research used the mapping of privacy requirements to generate the final 
mapping of privacy requirements and SN functionalities; for example, ‘Identity management’ 
may link to a user’s real-world identity and is used for managing identity information 
(Richter & Koch, 2008) (Refer to Business Functions for other SN functions). ‘Identity 
management’ needs to ensure information control, information collection and storage, 
information access, unauthorized secondary use (internal and external), and SN practice 
(Table A. 6 and Figure 38 show the mapping between privacy requirements and SN 
functionalities).  
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SN users seek privacy protection and specific functionality. This research suggests that 
user privacy requirements can be represented in 5 privacy requirements, which are used to 
protect SN functionalities; however, these requirements are neither absolute nor static, since 
the perceptions of privacy advocates, consumers, users and scholars could shift over time 
(Smith et al., 1996). SN service providers can also add more SN functionalities, which can be 
mapped with SN user privacy requirements to ensure privacy.  
 
  
Figure 38: Mapping of SN functions and users’ privacy requirements  
Mapping of privacy requirements and Architectural Principles 
 
 
Figure 39: Mapping of SN user privacy requirements and PbD principles  
Three-way mapping to protect SN functions using architectural principles 
The next step involved three-way mapping where SN functionalities are protected by 
various PbD principles which used the mapping between SN functions and SN user privacy 
requirements (Refer SN functions and mapping of user  privacy requirements section for 
details). Figure 40 shows the three- way mapping of SN functionalities, users’ privacy 
requirements, and PbD principles; for example, ‘Identity management’ has functional privacy 
requirements e.g. to allow an identified user to have control over her/his identity information, 
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the collection and storage of identity information must be PbD principles compliant. Each of 
the principles deals with multiple privacy requirements or facilitates privacy requirements 
while, at the same time, protecting SN functionalities. (Refer to Table A. 6 and Figure 40 for 
all of the mappings). 
 
Figure 40: Three-way mapping between SN functions, SN user privacy requirements and PbD principles (parts 
of Business and technology strategy)  
This three-way mapping led to the building of the SN system architecture. The mapping 
between SN functionalities and user privacy requirements, and the mapping between privacy 
requirements and PbD Principles, was implemented through this privacy architecture (Its 
formation is demonstrated in Figure A. 12). 
This three-way mapping enables SN service providers to ensure SN functionalities and 
protect user information. However, storing user information is a significant challenge in SN 
services; determining the way in which the service provider should store user information and 
facilitate the sharing of user information with SN stakeholders, while at the same time 
protecting privacy, is especially challenging.  Moreover, SN user information is not free from 
the threat of service providers who might purposely access and alter user information.  It is 
likely that SN users would always want full ownership and control of their information so 
that they can, at any time, prevent access and ensure their information privacy.  
Architectural principles 
The purpose of this section is to define the Architectural Principles which will ensure 
privacy in SNs. Principles are generic rules and guidelines intended to be enduring and 
seldom amended, and are used to inform and support the way in which an organization sets 
about fulfilling its mission. Chapter 5 presented seven leading principles of privacy 
protection, and determined the PbD principles (Refer to 2.3.7) which can be used for the 
design and operation of SNs (Refer to 5.5 for details) in order to manage user privacy more 
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effectively and transparently. Table A. 4 lists the high-level PbD principles which will be 
engaged to ensure SN user privacy. Figure 36 illustrates the seven PbD principles as the 
Architectural Principles.  
Architectural Requirements 
The architectural requirements are such that they need to support the SN user privacy 
requirements in some manner(s). Chapter 4 posited SN user privacy requirements and Figure 
36 depicts SN user privacy requirements (Refer Table 25 for details of primary and secondary 
SN user privacy requirements, and analysis codes such as IC1, CS1 and SP1).  
6.1.2 Scope of the architecture 
This research considered four dimensions which are typically used115 to define and 
limit the scope of SN privacy architecture: Breadth, Depth, Time Period, and Architecture 
Domains. 
Breadth 
In terms of breadth, overall SN activity was covered through SN services, functions, 
and organization model. The architecture was also modelled at three levels: Business, Data, 
and Technology.  
Depth 
In terms of depth, overall analysis of the SN stakeholders was covered and, as a key 
stakeholder, SN user privacy requirements were investigated. However, the scope of the 
targeted architecture did not include the internal roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders. 
Furthermore, details of the system design and related activities for the target SN privacy 
architecture were not covered.  
Time Period 
This research was conducted, and the architecture developed, between 2010 and 2013. 
During this period, a detailed vision of the architecture and its requirements was developed 
and incorporated into the privacy architecture.  
Architecture Domains 
A complete enterprise architecture description should contain all four architecture 
domains (business, data, application, and technology)116. However, considering the available 
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timeframe and the realities of resources constraints, this research focused, modelled and 
designed the architecture at three levels: Business, Data, and Technology. Application 
architecture can be designed based on the privacy framework. 
6.2 USER-CENTERED PRIVACY ARCHITECTURE (UCPA) 
This section includes the User-Centered Privacy Architecture (UCPA) for SNs which 
incorporates the Stage A-architecture vision and architecture at three levels: Stage B-
Business Architecture, Stage C-Data Architecture, and Stage D-Technology Architecture. 
6.2.1 Stage A- Architecture Vision 
The Architecture Vision is based on the TOGAF. TOGAF needs to be established early 
on in the project lifecycle and provides a high-level, inspirational view of the end architecture 
product. The purpose of the vision is to agree at the outset what the desired outcome of the 
architecture should be, so that architects can then focus on the critical areas which will ensure 
its feasibility.  Providing an Architecture Vision also supports SN stakeholder communication 
by providing an Architecture Definition – an executive summary of the full architecture.  
This section provides the Architecture Vision, as sketched in Figure 41 below. 
However, real world SN service providers can also use a wiki or an intranet rather than a text-
based document, or a licensed TOGAF tool that captures the architecture vision (The Open 
Group, 2013).   
 
Figure 41: Architecture vision 
Stakeholders and SN user concerns 
This section describes the architecture’s stakeholders for the vision, together with any 
issues SN users may have with the stakeholders.  
 ‘User’ is a term frequently used in a SN. A user is connected with other users who may 
access their information. SN user information is accessed directly or indirectly by various 
stakeholders who can be categorized into: SN users, SN service providers, third parties and 
external parties (Kumari, 2010) (Figure 42 shows these various SN stakeholders). A SN user 
has various privacy threats from other stakeholders, and can also be the source of  privacy 
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threats to other users. A SN service provider is an entity which provides the platform and 
necessary services for SN users. This SN service provider may have direct or indirect access 
to the user information and has a major role in ensuring user privacy.  
Third parties are those entities which access user information directly (as developers 
and plug-in/add-on application providers from inside the network), and indirectly (as 
advertising agencies and head-hunters). Third parties can be the source of potential threats to 
user privacy. Law enforcement agencies, research organizations, employers, universities, 
governments and secret services can be included in this category (Kumari, 2010). External 
parties may not be directly linked to SNs; however, they can access user information through 
various stakeholders. External parties can also be a source of possible threat to SN user 
privacy.  
Each of these stakeholders might create various stakes, concerns and demands (Baida, 
2001) for SN users; as a result, users express various requirements for their specific needs and 
interests with respect to  stakeholders. User concerns are important as they are a key SN 
stakeholder; therefore, they are worthy of investigation as the key focus of this research.  
  
Figure 42: Various stakeholders in SNs 
Users have the ability to block or control privacy settings for some stakeholders in 
advance. This is particularly true for users who are interested in what the SN architecture can 
perform; others may not care; thus, users may need to be aware of stakeholders and their 
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requirements.116 The TOGAF provides the opportunity for such an analysis where 
stakeholders are likely to be advocates and supporters of the framework and architecture 
initiative. This also indicates the priorities for focusing on those stakeholders for possible 
privacy threats. The stakeholder groups are explained in Table 31 below. 
Table 31: Stakeholder map 
Stakeholders  Involvement  
Users This stakeholder group is usually kept informed about SN changes. However, the user 
should be a key player since they might be interested in the various levels of SN drivers, 
goals, and objectives.  
Users can be further classified as ‘a friend’, ‘a friend-of-a-friend’, a ‘network member’, 
‘stranger’ (Madejski et al., 2011), or ‘public’. This group is further classified as a ‘group of 
specific  friends and colleagues’, a ‘second level of friends or colleagues’, or ‘all groups’ or 
‘some groups’ (Governatori & Iannella, 2011). This research considers ‘A friend’, ‘A friend 
of a friend’, ‘A network member’ and ‘A stranger’ when demonstrating the privacy 
architecture and framework.  
A friend A trustworthy person known to a user, whose access to user information 
might lead to various privacy breaches 
A friend-
of-a-friend 
The friend of a user’s friend whose access to user information might lead 
to various privacy breaches 
A network 
member 
A member of the SN which accesses user information and might cause 
various privacy breaches 
A stranger Does not have any ‘friends’ and is not the member of the SN; however, 
their access to user information might lead to various privacy breaches 
 
Service 
Providers 
Involved in facilitating SN user services, various levels of drivers, goals, and objectives, and 
their translation into effective processes and architecture to ensure privacy 
Third Parties  
(Inside the 
network) 
May facilitate services, various levels of drivers, goals, and objectives for SN users and 
access user information; these activities may lead to various privacy breaches  
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External 
Parties  
(Outside the 
network) 
May facilitate services, various levels of drivers, goals, and objectives for SN users and 
access user information; these activities may lead to various privacy breaches 
The survey’s descriptive analysis (Section 4.3.4) identified user requirements for the 
understanding, commitment, and support of stakeholders (Refer Table A. 5). Generally, users 
expect a high commitment from stakeholders.  
6.2.2 Stage B-Business architecture 
The purpose of this section is to define the Business architecture needed to scope the 
SN. Business architecture includes motivation, organizational roles, actors, and functions. 
Conceptual Business Architecture 
Figure 43 outlines the conceptual Business architecture, and presents the relationships 
between entities in business architecture where the relationships are extended to data 
architecture and technology architecture.   
 Chapter 6: Social Networks privacy framework   211 
 
Figure 43: Relationships withing entities in business architecture 
Motivation 
 Drivers and Opportunities 
The purpose of this section is to identify the change in drivers and opportunities behind 
this vision for the target architecture. Drivers and opportunities ensure SN privacy practices 
and control of those practices. Protection against unauthorized Information collection, 
unauthorised information access and unauthorized secondary use of information are also 
ensured as a subset of concerns about information control. 
 Objectives 
The purpose of this section is to describe the detailed objectives of  the target 
architecture. The previous section examines the business problem, whereas this section 
determines the objectives of the architecture solution which will resolve the SN privacy 
problem (Refer 1.2 for detailed objectives).  
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 Goals 
The purpose of this section is to define the goals of the target architecture by converting 
the seven PbD principles (Refer 5.3). The goals are organized as: ‘proactive not reactive’ 
‘preventive not remedial’ privacy; ‘compose privacy as the default’; ‘embed privacy into 
Design’, ‘compile full functionality on Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum approach’, ‘generate 
end-to-end security: full lifecycle protection’; ‘Improve visibility and transparency: keep the 
system open’; and ‘user-centric’.  
The ‘Motivation’ section also includes a goal/objective/function diagram (Refer Figure 
44) to define the ways in which SN functions contribute to the achievement of a business 
vision or strategy. SN services are associated with SN functions, drivers, goals, objectives 
and the measures they support, while allowing the enterprise to understand which services 
contribute to similar aspects of business performance. The goal/objective/function diagram 
also provides qualitative input on what constitutes high performance for a particular SN 
function. 
 
Figure 44: Mapping of SN functions, privacy goals, and privacy drivers 
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Figure 44 uses various legends (Refer Table A. 8) which are also adapted from the 
framework117. 
Organization unit 
This section describes the Organization Model for the Social Network Architecture. An 
architecture framework based on the TOGAF template must be supported by the correct 
organization, roles, and responsibilities within the enterprise if it is to be used successfully; 
however, the scope of the proposed architecture does not consider the internal roles and 
responsibilities of the SN service provider. One particularly important feature of this section 
is exploring the scope of the boundaries between various stakeholders, and the governance 
relationships that span these boundaries. 
Stakeholders and SN user concerns groups SN stakeholders into SN users, SN service 
providers, internal stakeholders (third parties), and external stakeholders (external parties). 
SN users are connected with the other stakeholders through the SN service provider who 
offers SN services to other users, and to internal and external stakeholders. Figure 45 shows a 
simple SN Stakeholder connection scenario.  
 
Figure 45: Organization unit 
Role/Actor Allocation and Roles and Responsibilities (RACI) 
The purpose of this section is to describe the roles in the baseline architecture and the 
system users/actors to scope the target architecture. System actors/users are those users who 
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interact with a system. The stakeholders (Refer Stakeholders and SN user concerns section) 
are actors for the SN and perform activities in SN contexts. This section provides a RACI 
chart, which shows key stakeholders and activities, and shows who is (R)esponsible, 
(A)ccountable, (C)onsulted, and (I)nformed in each case. Table 32 demonstrates the 
accountability and responsibility of SN activities, including business components in SNs, 
third parties, and external parties which must be agreed upon in advance.   
Table 32: RACI view of stakeholders 
Activity 
Actors 
Users 
Service 
Providers 
Third parties  
(Inside the network) 
External parties  
(Outside the network) 
Provide privacy framework C & I A & R I, A&R I, A & R 
Publish functional 
requirements C & I A & R I, A & R I, A & R 
Publish privacy 
requirements C & I A & R I, A & R I, A & R 
Publish logical architecture C & I A & R I, A & R I, A & R 
Provide guidelines C & I  A & R I, A & R I, A & R 
Provide privacy policies C & I A & R I, A & R I, A & R 
(R)esponsible, (A)ccountable, (C)onsulted, (I)nformed 
Business Services 
This section provides conceptual-level views of the current SN business services and 
categories (Figure 46). SN services can perform ad hoc networking or traditional social 
networking; they can provide various location services (such as location detail information, 
location-pooling services, route or location-tracking services); they can also include media 
services (such as music, video clips, newsfeeds, RSS feeds or blogs); and messaging services 
(such as messages, emails or SMS). SNs can also offer special services such as feature 
recognition services, which may include face recognition (Chatterjee, 2011).  
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Figure 46: Social networking services 
Business Functions 
This section provides a view of the business functions and business function categories 
of the business architecture (Refer to Figure 47). Social networking services can perform 
various SN functions such as creating, presenting and editing a user profile as part of 
‘Identity management’, provide functions such as ‘Expert search’, various ‘Context 
awareness’ functionalities, ‘Contact Management’ functionality, ‘Exchange views’ between 
SN users and various ‘Network awareness’ functionalities (Richter & Koch, 2008). 
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Figure 47: Social networking functions 
Business architecture processes 
This section illustrates a typical SN process in the business architecture. 
A typical SN service may have various functions118, such as: the presentation of each 
user with their profile; connection with his/her social links within the network; and a variety 
of additional available functions (such as newsfeed, birthday box, messages, emails, 
exchanges or search box link with search engines facilitate through the SN process). Figure 
48 sketches the typical SN process, where each process step is based on, and linked with, 
specific sets of common SN functionalities (Richter & Koch, 2008). 
A typical social networking  process may start with various functions such as creating, 
presenting and editing a user profile (2010). Sample features included in this step are profile 
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creation, group membership, uploading digital contributions and setting access rights. This 
step is linked to an ‘Identity management’ functionality, which may link to a user’s real-
world identity. The Identity management functionality is used for managing identity 
information (Richter & Koch, 2008).  
The next step in the SN process is finding other SN users. Sample features included in 
this step are the availability of a Search box to find other users; this Search box can link to 
various search engines. This step is linked to the functionality ‘Expert search’, which is used 
to search the network according to various criteria (Richter & Koch, 2008) such as name, 
interests, school, company and users’ preferred criteria.  
The next step in the SN process is ‘Discover common context’ which matches various 
SN users according to certain criteria, and suggests users for prospective connections. Sample 
features are: ‘How you are connected with someone box’, ‘In common with some box’, 
‘Suggested friend box’, and ‘People near me’. This step is linked to the ‘Context awareness’ 
functionality which creates awareness of individuals’ common context; this awareness can 
create common trust among users (Richter & Koch, 2008).  
The ‘Crosslink with others’ step, along with the previous step in the SN process (Refer 
Figure 48), includes the functions of ‘Tagging people’, ‘Access restriction to profile’, 
‘Privacy Settings’, and ‘Group management’. This step is linked to the ‘Contact 
Management’ functionality which enables the maintenance of the personal network (Richter 
& Koch, 2008).  
‘Exchange views’ is another step in the SN process; here, views are exchanged and 
shared through ‘Messages’, ‘Emails’ and ‘Uploaded photo/video’. The ‘Exchange’ SN 
functionality is linked with this step, which combines all possibilities for direct and indirect 
exchange (Richter & Koch, 2008).  
The last step is ‘Online activities’ and includes ‘News feeds’, ‘Status updates’, and 
‘Birthday box’ (Refer Figure 48). The functionality ‘Network awareness’ is linked to this 
step.  
Information flow 
The purpose of this section is to describe the information flows that correspond to the 
SN processes which scope the target privacy architecture. SN functionalities in relation to 
each SN process step are included in this section (Refer Figure 48).   
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Figure 48: SN information flow in relation to the SN process 
6.2.3 Stage C-Data Architecture 
This section provides planning-level views of the data architecture for the SNs for 
protecting privacy at the conceptual level (Refer Figure 49). The architecture consists of 
business objects and the relationships between them which handle various types of 
information (Refer Figure 49).  
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Figure 49: Relationships within entities in Data architecture 
Data entities 
This section describes the interaction between data models that cross ownership 
boundaries, and provides a diagram at the level of physical data entities and the relationships 
between them. Primarily, people have three types of information: private, protected and 
public information2 3 4. Table A. 9 lists the data types and entities that people holds (Refer 1.3 
for details), and Table 33 lists SN data types (Refer 1.3 for details).  
Table 33: Social networking data types 
Types of user data Taxonomy of social networking data Code 
Service data Basic profile information SD1 
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Legal name SD2 
Credit card number SD3 
 Authentication information SD4 
Disclosed data Basic profile information DD1 
Basic page memberships DD2 
Photo information DD3 
Comments on photos DD4 
Album information DD5 
Comments on albums DD6 
Links DD7 
Comments on links DD8 
Status updates DD9 
Comments on status updates DD10 
Wall posts DD11 
Comments on  wall posts DD12 
Notes DD13 
Comments on notes DD14 
Video information DD15 
Comments on videos DD16 
Entrusted data Comments on friends’ albums ED1 
Comments on friends’ notes ED2 
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Comments on friends’ tagged notes ED3 
Comments on friends’ photos ED4 
Comments on friends’ tagged photos ED5 
Comments on friends’ status updates participants were tagged in ED6 
Comments on friends’ videos ED7 
Comments on friends’ tagged videos ED8 
Comments on friends’ wall ED9 
Event RSVPs ED10 
Public group memberships ED11 
Incidental data Comments on friends’ status updates participants were tagged in ID1 
Comments on participants’ albums ID2 
Comments on participants’ links ID3 
Comments on participants’ notes ID4 
Comments on participants’ tagged notes ID5 
Comments on participants’ videos ID6 
Comments on participants’ wall ID7 
Comments on status updates ID8 
Comments on participants’ photos ID9 
Status updates the participants were tagged in ID10 
Behavioral data Games users play BD1 
News articles that users access BD2 
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Topics users write about BD3 
Users’ activities BD4 
What activities users undertake with whom BD5 
What users say about political leanings BD6 
Derived data Derived data from any other data types DR1 
Logical Data Architecture 
This section provides logical-level views of the data architecture (Refer Figure 50), 
which consists of logical data entities and the relationships between the SN business 
functions.  
 
Figure 50: Logical data architecture 
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6.2.4  Stage D-Technology Architecture 
The purpose of this section is to provide a high-level view of the technology 
architecture for SNs to protect privacy. 
Conceptual Technology Architecture 
The proposed technology architecture consists of a logical technology component and 
platform services, with relationships between the various entities (Refer Figure 51). SN 
services will be implemented on logical technology components and provide a platform for 
these. The architecture employs SN user privacy positions (Refer to Privacy positions section 
for details), which will be engaged for controlling user information when sharing that 
information with SN stakeholders (other users, third parties or other parties). SN user privacy 
positions are linked to SN user privacy requirements (Refer to 4.4), and will assist SN users 
to determine how much they want to share with their stakeholders. Users can also control 
their privacy settings for stakeholders based on these privacy positions. This privacy 
architecture is fluid and dynamic, allowing for the ongoing addition or amendment of SN 
privacy requirements, functionalities and stakeholders. 
 
Figure 51: Relationships within entities in technology architecture 
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Platform services 
This section provides a description of the generic platform services which ensure the 
technical capability in the technology architecture (Refer Figure 52) to provide enabling SN 
infrastructure that supports the delivery of SN applications. 
As a part of platform services, SN service providers are able to facilitate various 
services (Refer Business Services section) and implement functions (Refer Business 
Functions section) to deliver SN privacy requirements (Refer 4.4). The platform contains the 
possible services implemented on, and supplied by, technology components. Platform 
services also facilitate the privacy model (Refer User-Centred Privacy Model (UCPM) 
section) which interfaces between stakeholders (internal and external) and service providers 
in order to enable SN user information access.  
Logical technology components 
This section provides logical-level views of the target technology architecture, which 
consists of logical infrastructure components with their associated infrastructure services. 
Unless a specific privacy requirement dictates a particular solution, the proposed privacy 
architecture will support various business architecture models (Refer 2.6).  
For the ‘Access Control model’, the target architecture uses the privacy model to 
control access for the data types [Refer Figure 52, ignoring the Minimal information (2) and 
the Information Anonymizer’s Third Party (3) component]. Service providers will pre-define 
the privacy model and SN users have the flexibility to customize it.  
For the ‘Minimal information sharing’, the target architecture uses the minimal 
information sharing component inside the service provider platform [Refer Figure 52, 
ignoring the direct link between Users’ Platform and Service Provider Information (1) and 
Anonymizer’s Third Party (3) component]. Service providers will store partial information 
based on their preferred minimal sharing algorithm.  
For the ‘Third party model’, the proposed architecture uses Anonymizer as third party 
storage to protect user privacy, and consists of three logical technology components: user 
platform, information anonymizer, and service provider platform [Refer Figure 52, ignoring 
the direct link between Users’ Platform and Service Provider Information (1) and the 
Minimal information (2) component]. Information anonymizer works as a middle layer 
between user and service provider. 
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Figure 52: Technology architecture  
 
User platform 
The proposed system architecture contains a user platform to control the uses of their 
information, based on mapping between user ‘data types’, ‘privacy requirements’ and user 
‘privacy positions’. Users can specify ‘High-privacy, ‘Balanced-privacy’ or ‘Low-privacy’ as 
their privacy position preference. Based on this preference, privacy requirements will be 
fixed to control information uses. There may be initial default privacy settings, such as high-
privacy positions which can be pre-configured by the SN provider and tailored by SN users.  
Information anonymizer platform 
In the third party model, the technology architecture contains the information 
anonymizer which uses the special concealing technique of ‘Cloaking’ to anonymize 
information. Cloaking provides entirely different content to the provider for storing, while 
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users browse actual content (Chellapilla & Chickering, 2006). This technique is often used 
for spamming search engines: a spammed document is sent to the engine, while 
simultaneously presenting the intended content to the web user. Information anonymizer uses 
this special technique for blurring or hiding user information from the service provider. The 
information anonymizer blurs SN user data types. To avoid computional costs and overhead 
processing in real time, the information anonymizer will not blur public information. 
Service provider platform 
In the target architecture, the service provider facilitates the SN services (Refer 
Business Services section) and functions (Refer Business Functions section). In the access 
control and minimal information sharing model, service providers store user information 
based on the privacy model. In the third party model, the service provider works as a third 
party storage device similar to cloud-based services provided by Salesforce119 or Amazon 
S3120. The service provider contains information, but is unable to access user information 
directly. The service provider will store cloaked information provided in the ‘Information 
anonymizer’, and will facilitate user information based on the user’s privacy positions. 
User-Centred Privacy Model (UCPM) 
In this privacy model, UCPM, SN users will follow these steps: 
STEP 1: User uploads data 
STEP 2: By default, user privacy position for each user privacy requirement is set as 
‘High’ privacy position for each data type; however, this setting can be altered, and 
users are able to set their own position settings.  
STEP 3: User sets privacy preferences by defining privacy position as High, Balanced 
or Limited; user privacy positions assist the user to deny, be apathetic about, or allow 
operations on their data. 
STEP 4: User defines default privacy requirements for SN stakeholders. 
STEP 5: User defines privacy preferences and updates privacy requirements for each 
data type. 
STEP 6: The privacy model compiles the user preferences for privacy requirements and 
updates the user privacy requirements overarching default system privacy 
requirements being used. 
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STEP 7: The privacy model compiles the data entities for each type of user data, 
compiles privacy stages, and provides appropriate notice and choices based on data 
types and stages. The model also compiles activities and user privacy requirements.  
STEP 8: User is able to define own privacy preference using their privacy position for 
each of their content types and activities, using SN data entities and data types. 
STEP 9: User is able to define own privacy requirements for each of their content types 
and activities, using SN data entities and data types according to privacy stages. 
STEP 10: Data entities and types which are a part of the data architecture are linked to 
SN services. 
STEP 11: SN stakeholders in SN services access user data based on privacy positions 
and privacy requirements. 
Table 34: Users’ privacy positions and privacy requirements 
          User privacy   
                  Positions 
User 
Privacy 
Requirements  
High-privacy position 
(A. F. Westin, 2003) 
Balanced-privacy 
position 
(A. F. Westin, 2003) 
Limited-privacy 
position 
(A. F. Westin, 2003) 
Information Control  
High Control makes the 
information private or secret 
(S. S. Petronio, 2002) 
Moderate control 
(S. S. Petronio, 2002) 
Low control 
(openness) makes 
information to public 
information 
(S. S. Petronio, 2002) 
Information collection 
and storage  Restricted ownership to 
private information  for 
orginal owners, authorired co-
owners [Refer axiom#1, #2,  
(S. Petronio, 2013)] 
Moderate control over 
ownership 
by balancing between 
private and public 
information (S. S. 
Petronio, 2002) 
Open ownership to 
public information (S. 
S. Petronio, 2002) 
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Information access  
Restricted access to private 
information original owners, 
authorized co-owners & 
authorized others 
[Refer axiom#1, #2, #3  (S. 
Petronio, 2013)] 
Moderately allow  
access to 
‘authorized others’ by 
balancing between 
private and public 
information (S. S. 
Petronio, 2002) 
Open access to public 
information (S. S. 
Petronio, 2002) 
Unauthorized 
secondary use (Internal 
& External) 
Restricted use of private 
information to original 
owners, authorized co-owners 
& authorized others 
[Refer axiom#2, #3,#5  (S. 
Petronio, 2013)] 
Moderately allow  
access for secondary 
use to 
‘authorized others’ by 
balancing between 
private and public 
information (S. S. 
Petronio, 2002) 
Open access to public 
information (S. S. 
Petronio, 2002) 
SN Practice Practise privacy on private 
information based on 
motivations, cultural values 
and situations needs 
Follows collective privacy 
boundaries based on how 
much others inside and 
outside may know, and have 
the right to disclose the 
information 
[Refer axiom#4, #6, #7  (S. 
Petronio, 2013)] 
Moderate privacy 
practice to 
authorized co-owners 
& authorized others by 
balancing between 
private and public 
information (S. S. 
Petronio, 2002) 
Openness and 
transparent to public 
information (S. S. 
Petronio, 2002) 
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Figure 53: Privacy model
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Figure 54: SDL diagram for the privacy model 
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Figure 55: Message Sequence of privacy model 
6.3 USE CASE  
Let us imagine the following scenario:  
Alice participated in a political demonstration and uploaded her photos and activities 
onto her Social Network. She has set the default privacy to ‘balanced’. She wants to set 
‘High’ privacy for her new photos so that only one pre-defined group of friends (political) 
can see them, and they cannot reuse these photos. 
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Figure 56: Use case diagram 
In the use case (Refer Figure 56), Alice has ‘balanced’ privacy requirements. So, she is 
apathetic about her privacy requirements and data types. She wants to set ‘High’ privacy for 
her uploaded photo and deny their reuse. The uploaded photos data type is ‘Disclosed data’, 
and the analysis code is ‘DD3’ (Refer Table 25 and Table 33). This data belongs to privacy 
Stage-0. Thus, she receives the notification to choose her privacy requirements. ‘LP’ is set for 
the predefined political ‘Group of friends’. Her settings for stakeholders is developed using 
the privacy model (Refer to Table 35). Her settings for the political group can be found in 
Table 36 (Refer Table A. 10 for her full settings for the political group). Alice also sets ‘LP’ 
for each of the SN users’ privacy requirements, with the exception that IC5- Information re-
uses will be ‘HP’. She will also set ‘HP’ for others, for each of SN privacy requirements. 
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Alice’s settings for others can be found in Table 37 (Refer Table A. 11 for her full settings 
for others). 
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Table 35: Privacy model in tabular format 
  Stakeholders 
  
Users Service provider Third parties External parties 
A friend A friend of a 
friend 
A network member A friend of a friend 
Data 
types 
SN User privacy requirements: IC: Information Control, CS: Information collection and storage, IA: Information access, UU: Unauthorized secondary use 
(Internal & External), SP: SN Practice 
          HP(High Privacy)   BP (Balanced Privacy)   LP (Low Privacy)     
IC
1 
IC
2 
IC
3 
IC
4 
IC
5 
IC
6 
IC
7 
CS
1 
CS
2 
CS
3 
CS
4 
IA
1 
IA
2 
IA
3 
IA
4 
IA
5 
IA
6 
UU
1 
UU
2 
UU
3 
SP
1 
SP
2 
SP
3 
SP
4 
SP
5 
SD1                                                   
SD2                                                   
SD3                                                   
SD4                                                   
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DD1                                                   
DD2                                                   
DD3                                                   
DD4                                                   
DD5                                                   
DD6                                                   
DD7                                                   
DD8                                                   
DD9                                                   
DD10                                                   
DD11                                                   
DD12                                                   
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DD13                                                   
DD14                                                   
DD15                                                   
ED1                                                   
ED2                                                   
ED3                                                   
ED4                                                   
ED5                                                   
ED6                                                   
ED7                                                   
ED8                                                   
ID1                                                   
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ID2                                                   
ID3                                                   
ID4                                                   
ID5                                                   
ID6                                                   
ID7                                                   
ID8                                                   
ID9                                                   
BD1                                                   
BD2                                                   
BD3                                                   
BD4                                                   
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BD5                                                   
BD6                                                   
DR1                                                   
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Table 36: Alice’s settings for political group using the privacy model 
  Stakeholders 
  
Users  
Political group 
    
Data 
types 
SN User privacy requirements: IC: Information Control, CS: Information collection and storage, IA: Information access, UU: Unauthorized 
secondary use (Internal & External), SP: SN Practice 
          HP(High Privacy)   BP (Balanced Privacy)   LP (Low Privacy)     
IC1 IC2 IC3 IC4 IC5 IC6 IC7 CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 IA1 IA2 IA3 IA4 IA5 IA6 UU1 UU2 UU3 SP1 SP2 SP3 SP4 SP5 
DD3                                                   
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Table 37: Alice’s settings for others, using the privacy model 
  Stakeholders 
  
Users Service provider Third parties External parties 
 Other friends or groups  
Data 
types 
SN User privacy requirements: IC: Information Control, CS: Information collection and storage, IA: Information access, UU: Unauthorized 
secondary use (Internal & External), SP: SN Practice 
          HP(High Privacy)   BP (Balanced Privacy)   LP (Low Privacy)     
IC1 IC2 IC3 IC4 IC5 IC6 IC7 CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 IA1 IA2 IA3 IA4 IA5 IA6 UU1 UU2 UU3 SP1 SP2 SP3 SP4 SP5 
DD3                                                   
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6.4 VERIFICATION OF THE PRIVACY MODEL 
This research used the UPPAAL121 model checker for the validation and 
simulation of the privacy model. The model checker technique is used for 
automatically debugging complex reactive systems (Vaandrager, 2011) to capture 
dynamic behaviour of a system. 
6.4.1 UPPAAL and the privacy model 
The privacy model included five automata that represent Privacy Position, 
Privacy Requirements, Stakeholders, Upload Data, and Access and Operation by 
Stakeholders. In UPPAAL these are labelled ‘PrivacyPosition’ (Refer Figure 57), 
‘PrivacyRequirements’ (Refer Figure 58), ‘Stakeholders’ (Refer Figure 59), 
‘UploadData’ (Refer Figure 60), and ‘AccessOperation’ (Refer Figure 61). 
 
Figure 57: PrivacyPosition automata 
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Figure 58: PrivacyRequirements automata 
 
Figure 59: Stakeholders automata 
 
Figure 60: UploadData automata 
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Figure 61: AccessOperation Automata 
6.4.2 Simulations 
Simulations are very useful for obtaining insight into the behavior of a model 
and to assist in finding mistakes (Vaandrager, 2011). The UPPAAL model checker 
includes a Simulator121 which can be used to explore states of a model in a 
systematic fashion. 
The purpose of the simulations was to verify and simulate the privacy model’s 
behaviour. For the simulation, this research considered a simple scenario: ‘Using the 
privacy model, it is possible to simultaneously use SN platform services, access 
various SN services and functions, and ensure SN user privacy. SN users are also 
able to define their privacy requirements and positions, and to specify stakeholders’. 
Five possible scenarios were simulated, and respective Message Sequence 
Chart (MSC) is included in this section to check the privacy model. Figure 62 
includes  MSC for setting up privacy positions; Figure 63 includes MSC for setting 
up privacy requirements; and Figure 64 includes MSC for setting up stakeholders; 
MSC for upload data is illustrated in Figure 65; and MSC for access operation for 
stakeholders is demonstrated in Figure 67. 
UploadData automata were used to demonstrate upload user data. The SN user 
sends an upload data request to the SN service provider, who triggers the required 
position request to PrivacyPosition automata and receives respective privacy position 
for the data. The SN service provider updates privacy position for each data entity. 
Similarly, as the next steps, the SN service provider updates respective stakeholders 
and privacy requirements, using Stakeholders and PrivacyRequirements automata 
respectively. In the next steps, the SN user completes the uploading data, and the SN 
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service provider checks the data entities. The SN service provider updates respective 
privacy positions and privacy requirements, accesses stakeholders for the data, and 
notifies the privacy settings for the uploaded data and the SN user completes the 
uploading data. In this scenario, the SN user has access to upload data functions 
(Refer Figure 65), and simultaneously ensures privacy using the privacy model 
(Refer Figure 67). 
Access and operation starts with a request from a stakeholder to access SN user 
information. The SN service provider requests privacy position (using reqPosition)  
to the SN stakeholder to check the stakeholder’s privacy positions. The next steps are 
request and return privacy requirements. Finally, the SN service provider denies, 
apathies or allows access and operation for the SN stakeholder on the user data. In 
this scenario, a SN stakeholder accesses SN user data, and simultaneously ensures 
privacy using the privacy model. 
 
Figure 62: MSC for setting up privacy positions 
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Figure 63: MSC for setting up privacy requirements 
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Figure 64: MSC for setting up stakeholders 
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Figure 65: MSC for upload data 
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Figure 66: MSC for checking data entities by stakeholders 
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Figure 67: MSC for access operation for stakeholders 
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6.4.3 The verifier 
UPPAAL included a Verifier121 to validate the model. Five possible scenarios 
were simulated, and the model behaved as intended. There were no unintentional 
deadlocks in the model.  
This section includes the following query as verifier. 
“A[] not deadlock”- states that in all reachable states of the privacy model there 
is no deadlock. 
“E<>PrivacyPosition.PrivacyPosition”-states that there is a reachable state in 
the privacy model in which the SN user is able to define their privacy position. The 
notation “E<>‘means “There exists a reachable state such that” 
“E<>PrivacyRequirements.UserPrivacyRequirements”- states that there is a 
reachable state in the privacy model in which the SN user is able to define their 
privacy requirements. 
“E<>Stakeholders.Stakeholders’- states that there is a reachable state in the 
privacy model in which the user is able to define their stakeholders. 
“E<>UploadData.UploadComplete”-states that there is a reachable state in the 
privacy model in which the user is able to complete UploadData by protecting 
privacy from stakeholders. 
“E<>AccessOperation.AccessOperationComplete”-states that there is a 
reachable state in which the stakeholder is able to access user information by 
protecting privacy. 
6.5 THEORETICAL REFLECTION IN UCPA 
SN service providers offer various services (Refer Business Services section) 
and functions (Refer Business Functions section), such as ‘allow to edit’, ‘share’, 
‘export or delete SN data types (Refer Data entities section) from the  services’; 
however, it is not often clear what actual rights SN users have (Schneier, 2010). SN 
users may have specific requirements to control, export, change, or delete their data. 
Chapter 4 explored the details of SN user privacy requirements; for example, users 
may want to delete their information or control ‘information sharing’ as their privacy 
requirements. Table 25 lists primary and secondary user privacy requirements. 
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Another issue with SN data types (Refer Data entities section) is that they may 
contain personally identified and non-identified information, and that data may vary 
within various privacy stages (0-3) (Refer to Privacy stages section). Privacy is 
nested and sophisticated phenomena and has dependencies within and across SN data 
types, and can be protected with a combination of policy and architectural 
approaches. Privacy stages section lists a set of privacy stages and approaches to 
protect SN user data within that privacy stage. 
The existence of a person’s more personally identifiable information makes a system 
less controllable and provides a greater risk of unauthorized use, disclosure and 
exposure of that information (Spiekermann & Cranor, 2009); the information is also 
more vulnerable to other SN user privacy requirements.  
In UCPA, Users will receive notice that they can choose to specify their SN user 
privacy requirements when the user data belongs to Stage-0. If user data belongs to 
privacy Stage-1, the user data protection consists of providing notice and choosing 
unique pseudonyms and passwords, and choosing to specify their privacy 
requirements. Collected data minimization to long-term personal characteristics 
granularity and use of l-diversity principle will be provided for Stage- 2 user data. 
Stage-3 SN user collected profile data will be deleted regularly and data 
anonymization will be provided with a combination of l-diversity large values of l 
(Machanavajjhala et al., 2007), and k-anonymity with  large values of k will be 
provided in this category. Protecting Stage-3 SN user technique is useful where there 
be at least ‘l values for sensitive elements that share the same quasi-identifiers’ 
(Spiekermann & Cranor, 2009). ‘Quasi-identifiers’ are the set of attributes such as 
gender, date of birth and zip code that can be linked to external data such as trend 
analysis data based on SN user data, information of allocation of public funds, 
medical research data to uniquely identify individual in the population 
(Machanavajjhala et al., 2007).   
In order to control user privacy requirements for various SN stakeholders, this 
research has designed a privacy model UCPM in UCPA using three privacy positions 
that people hold, and SN data types with a combination of privacy stages. Table 1 
shows the various privacy stages and approaches to privacy protection.  Table 34 
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shows the detailed relationships between privacy positions and user privacy 
requirements. Figure 53 represents the privacy model and shows the relationships 
and mapping between SN user requirements, user privacy positions and privacy 
stages. Table 35 represents the privacy model in tabular format. These mappings 
were based on the most respected privacy theories: Westin’s theory and CPM 
(Communication Privacy Management) theory (Stephen T. Margulis, 2011). The 
functionality of the privacy model is depicted in a Specification Description 
Language (SDL) diagram in Figure 54. Message Sequence of the Privacy model is 
included in Figure 55. 
A High-privacy position user does not allow information collection and storage and 
unauthorized secondary uses or access, and demands strict information control and 
privacy practice (A. F. Westin, 2003). Users who are also highly concerned about 
privacy, but less so than the high-position group, form the Balanced-privacy position 
group. This group of users allows information collection, access, and secondary 
information uses if there are appropriate benefits. This group is also interested in 
knowing how organizations control their information to determine if they can trust an 
organization. Users who have fewer or no concerns about their privacy are open to 
disclosing their information; they allow personal information collection, access and 
unauthorized secondary uses for business and government. This user group rejects 
information privacy protection and control (A. F. Westin, 2003).  
For representing the privacy model, this research used the initials ‘HP’, ‘BP’ and 
‘LP’. ‘HP’ represents the High-privacy positions, where a user is able to ‘Deny’  any 
operation and data types on their information. ‘BP’ represents the Balanced-privacy 
position where users are ‘Apathetic’ about operation on their information. ‘LP’ 
represents the Low-privacy position where users ‘Allow’ operation on their 
information. 
In UCPM, SN users will be able to customize their rights, using privacy 
requirements for each of the data types using their privacy position. In the model, SN 
users hold by default a high privacy position since the public generally holds high or 
medium concerns about their privacy. One privacy advocate, Alan F. Westin122 
conducted 30 privacy surveys annually and found that most people hold high or 
medium concerns about their privacy; only a small number of participants had a low 
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concern, or were unconcerned (Madejski et al., 2011).  Using the UCPM and UCPA, 
it is possible to use SN platform services which provide both privacy and 
simultaneous access to various SN services and functions. SN users are able to define 
their privacy requirements as well as their privacy, using privacy positions. 
6.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented a privacy framework and technical architecture for 
Social Network services at three levels – Business, Data, and Technology. This 
privacy framework is based on The Open Group Architecture 
Framework (TOGAF®), which can be used by service providers to incorporate 
privacy in the design level of the SN architecture. This chapter also included a 
privacy model which was validated and simulated using the UPPAAL model 
checker. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Work  
This chapter presents an overview of this thesis, its contributions and possible future 
research directions. 
7.1 RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
This research established a new User-Centred Privacy Framework (UCPF) to ensure 
privacy in Social Networks (SNs). A User-Centred Privacy Architecture (UCPA) and User-
Centred Privacy Model (UCPM) were also created. Specifically, this research investigated 
privacy-focusing technical dimensions for SN services; in so doing, it identified that, when 
privacy is incorporated at the SN design level, it is ensured at this early stage and eliminates 
the complexity that can create privacy incidents arising in later stages. The four research 
issues related to Privacy by Design (PbD) in SN services – user privacy requirements, 
privacy protecting principles, privacy framework, and privacy architecture – have been 
addressed.  
SN users each have various privacy requirements to protect their information; to 
address this issue, a six-stage thematic analysis of scholarly articles related to SN user 
privacy concerns were synthesized, and then grouped into primary and secondary user 
privacy requirements (Chapter 4). These SN user privacy requirements were then validated 
through the three steps of a pre-pilot assessment, a pilot survey and final survey. The pre-
pilot assessment engaged expert judges for the initial assessment of SN user privacy 
requirements. Assessment results were integrated into the pilot survey. Experts in the privacy 
in social networks field then assessed the pilot survey, and feedback was integrated into the 
final survey.  
This mixed methods research combines the strengths of quantitative and qualitative 
research to survey general SN users, and thus construct SN user privacy requirements. 
Twenty-five secondary user privacy requirements and five primary user privacy requirements 
were generated into Information control, Information collection, Unauthorized information 
access, Secondary information use, and SN practices (Chapter 4). 
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This research investigated seven leading privacy-protecting principles and incorporated 
the best available PbD principles to protect SN user privacy. The two case studies of 
Diaspora and Clique (both claimed to be privacy-aware SNs) adhered to some of the PbD 
principles only. Diaspora followed ‘Security by Design’ principles rather than PbD 
principles, whereas the Clique system focused on solving privacy issues only from a SN user 
perspective (Chapter 5).  
The issues of SN user privacy are then addressed comprehensively with the new UCPF, 
which was created by mapping SN functionalities with user privacy requirements, and then 
with PbD Principles. This mapping was established as a technology and business architecture 
strategy to enhance privacy at the design level (Chapter 6).  
The next key research outcome was the creation of UCPA. Both the UCPF and UCPA 
were created from the freely available ‘The Open Group Architecture 
Framework’ (TOGAF®) to develop the ‘step by step’ framework and architecture for SN 
user privacy (Chapter 6). This integrated UCPA ensures visibility, transparency and 
accountability for SN user privacy. The UCPA provides a better information privacy 
mechanism and effective system architecture, as the architecture was developed for three 
levels of Business, Data and Technology. 
The UCPM is another research outcome, which was validated using a Use Case, and 
verified and simulated using the UPPAAL model checker. The latter included five automata 
which represent: Privacy Position, Privacy Requirements, Stakeholders, Upload Data, and 
Access and Operation from Stakeholders (Chapter 6).  
7.2 CONTRIBUTIONS 
This research contributes to both the theoretical and practical body of knowledge 
regarding privacy in SNs.  
7.2.1 Contributions related to Research Question 1(i) 
The Research Question 1(i) asked: ‘What are the privacy requirements of SNs users?’ 
(Refer to 1.4) 
In response to this question, this research proposed a new set of SN user privacy 
requirements and constructed 5 primary user requirements and 25 secondary user privacy 
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requirements (Chapter 4) which are essential in specifying user rights in SNs. These findings 
successfully addressed the Research Question 1(i).  
This research has the potential to provide for the development of more sophisticated 
privacy controls which will increase the ability of SN users to: specify their rights in SNs; to 
determine the protection of their own SN data, using primary user privacy requirements and 
secondary user privacy requirements; to specify how they will control their information for 
collection, unauthorized access, and secondary use; and to specify how others will practise 
that control (Chapter 4).  
This research captured the SN user privacy requirements through a mixed methods approach; 
such an approach has been rarely used to examine the privacy issue. To date, many privacy 
requirements had not been addressed by typical SN services; furthermore, these requirements 
could not be uncovered through a study of existing systems. This research, however, 
established this new knowledge of SN user privacy requirements via the qualitative survey 
research method. The practical application of this new knowledge is that SN service providers 
can better design, improve the old, or implements new SN services, using this enhanced 
understanding of essential SN user rights and privacy requirements.  
This research has the potential for SN stakeholders to attain a greater understanding of 
Privacy in the SN context through the new concept of privacy based on SN user privacy 
requirements (Chapter 4). Privacy is classified and represented as ‘SN practices’, and 
‘Control of these practices’, in SNs.  
7.2.2 Contributions related to Research Question 1(ii) 
Research Question 1(ii) asked:  ‘What are the principles required to protect user privacy 
in SNs?’ (Refer to 1.4) 
By exploring seven existing, leading privacy protection principles (Chapter 5), this 
research determined that Privacy by Design (PbD) principles are the best instruments to 
ensure privacy protection from the design level in SNs (Refer to 5.2.2 and Table 27: 
Comparing privacy-protecting principles) (Chapter 5). This research empowers SN service 
providers by presenting 7 Privacy by Design (PbD) principles to deal with new challenges in 
providing user privacy requirements, while at the same time facilitating SN functionalities. 
Most importantly, SN service providers now have a set of privacy-protecting principles to 
protect the Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of SN users from the earliest (design) 
stage of the system. System development costs increase substantially in later stages so it is 
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useful if privacy can be incorporated from the design phase. By engaging PbD principles, SN 
service providers are able to facilitate privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) in the design 
level. By using the PbD principles, SN service providers are able to ensure Fair Information 
Principles (FIPs) and implement nine attention areas for compliance auditing including: i) 
Intention and notification; ii) Transparency; iii) Finality principle; iv) Legitimate grounds of 
processing; v) Quality; vi) Data subject’s rights; vii) Security; viii) Processing by a processor; 
and ix) Transfer of personal data outside the network.  
These findings successfully addressed the Research Question 1(ii). 
7.2.3 Contributions related to Research Question 1(iii) 
Research Question 1(iii) asked: ‘How effective are the privacy principles employed by 
the SN providers?’ and ‘How can these be converted to a usable framework?’ (Refer to 1.4) 
This research evaluated the effectiveness of PbD principles (Chapter 5) by assessing 
how two real world test case SNs (both claiming to be privacy-aware) follow the PbD 
principles. The research formulated a set of ‘Assessment Criteria’ where each of the criteria 
was formulated to assess the test cases according to the relevant objectives, requirements, 
responsibilities and standards for each of the PbD principles. It also generated a ‘Privacy 
Score’ to rate the test cases.  
According to the results, neither of the test cases fully complies with PbD principles 
and, consequently, both fail to ensure full privacy. One of the test cases primarily 
substantiates the securing of personal content, whereas the other focuses on solving privacy 
issues from an SN user perspective. SN service providers will now be able to assess their SNs 
based on these Assessment Criteria and this Privacy Score and, eventually, ensure full 
privacy. These findings successfully address the first part of Research Question 1(iii). 
This research established new knowledge in the area of engaging PbD principles in 
SNs. PbD principles are a recent concept; however, until now, there were neither mechanisms 
nor processes for engaging PbD principles in SNs. This research has established a new formal 
and conceptual privacy framework – the User-Centred Privacy Framework (UCPF) – which 
engages PbD principles (Chapter 6). This research helps SN service providers as this practical 
UCPF incorporates privacy at the design level, as well as facilitating social networking 
functionalities. The service providers are able to allow SN users complete control over 
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collecting, accessing, using information and practising control over it. The UCPF can also 
benefit SN users by achieving privacy and, consequently, attracting more SN users. These 
findings successfully addressed the second part of Research Question 1(iii). 
7.2.4 Contributions related to Research Question 1(iv) 
Research Question 1(iv) asked: ‘How does the privacy framework inform SN 
architecture?’ (Refer to 1.4) 
This research presents a three-level User-Centred Privacy Architecture (UCPA): a 
Business, Data, and Technology architecture (Chapter 6) for SN service providers to 
incorporate privacy at the design level. These findings successfully addressed Research 
Question 1(iv).  
Such a Business architecture enables SN service providers to construct an improved and 
formal Business architecture by incorporating the relationships between entities in the 
architecture by extending these to Data architecture and Technology architecture for SNs. A 
new planning-level view and conceptual SN Data architecture also enables SN service 
providers to determine the relationships between SN data entities, and assists them to 
assemble logical technology components and to provide improved platform services for SNs. 
The new UCPA is flexible and can choose between various business architecture models, 
unless specific privacy requirements dictate a particular requirement. The new UCPA ensures 
privacy from the earliest design stage of a SN.  
This research enables SN users to specify their rights and privacy requirements using a 
new privacy model, UCPM (Chapter 6). Using this model, SN users are able to control each 
of the SN data types based on their privacy positions for individual SN stakeholders, or 
groups of stakeholders.  SN users are also able to ensure the ways in which an individual SN 
stakeholder or group of stakeholders are able to collect, access, and use their information. 
The new UCPM also ensures SN practices such as the visibility, transparency and 
accountability of SN stakeholders. 
This research designed and developed UCPF and UCPA using TOGAF®, one of the 
leading enterprise frameworks (based on a comparison of the top four Enterprise-Architecture 
Methodologies) (Chapter 6). The creation of UCPF, UCPA and UCPM, has achieved the 
goal of providing more accurate, effective and efficient user-centred Social Networking. 
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7.3 LIMITATIONS 
The limitations of this research provide scope for future research, and are presented 
below. 
The research focused on the technical dimensions of privacy and did not consider the 
legal and social dimensions of privacy. Consideration of the legal and social dimensions 
could increase acceptance of the findings regarding SN user privacy requirements. 
This research conducted a survey among general SN users to validate their privacy 
requirements and explore new privacy requirements. A greater number of survey participants 
could also increase the acceptance of the survey findings. 
This research considered open-source and (claimed) privacy-aware social networking 
services. It did not consider traditional and closed-source social networking services such as 
Facebook10, LinkedIn11 or Twitter12, or enterprise SN Yammer123 to evaluate PbD principles 
and whether these services comply with these principles. An investigation of these services 
could lead to the recommendation of more inputs for UCPF and UCPA.  
This research did not develop conceptual application architecture levels for UCPA, or 
implement a SN service based on UCPF and UCPM. Again, these additional investigations 
could increase acceptance of the findings. 
Large scale testing was not undertaken and UCPF, UCPA and UCPM were not globally 
validated on well-known SNs such as Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter.  
7.4 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
This research can be extended in key directions by focusing on the legal, social, and 
technical dimensions of privacy. Harmonizing these dimensions through mutual 
understandings and agreement reached by regulators, engineers, business managers and 
politicians would assist in achieving the ultimate success of protecting user privacy when 
implementing the privacy by design concept in information systems.  
Future surveys can be extended with more questions, an increased number of 
participants, and at various phases; for example, by separately surveying friends, family, and 
colleagues (such as professionals or academics). Future work could also include the 
evaluation of PbD principles on closed-source social networking services such as Facebook, 
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LinkedIn or Twitter and enterprise SN Yammer. Application architecture could be included 
in UCPA, and social networking services could be implemented on an open-source platform 
based on UCPF, UCPA and UCPM.  
Finally, the proposed privacy framework, architecture, and model provide a stable and 
innovative platform for further development and modification to provide even more 
protection for SN stakeholders. This guarantee of privacy, in turn, will attract more users of 
Social Networking services. 
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A1. Survey - Ethical Clearance Certificates 
The ethical clearance certificates for the surveys are given below. 
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Figure A. 1: Ethics certificate for the survey – page 1 
 
Figure A. 2: Ethics certificate for the survey – page 2 
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Figure A. 3: Ethics certificate for the survey – page 3 
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A2. Survey – Survey invitation eMails 
Subject Title:  Participate in a research study looking for SNsusers 
 
Dear colleagues 
 
The use of Social networking has exploded with millions of people using various web 
based services around the world. This increase in SNuse has led to user's anxiety related to 
privacy and exposure of personal information. 
Researchers from the Science and Engineering Faculty at QUT are investigating the 
issues and challenges of maintaining privacy on Social Networks. Please assist us with 
understanding privacy within SNsby completing a 15 minute online questionnaire.  
Please view the attached recruitment flyer for further details on the study and how to 
participate. 
Please note that this study has been approved by the QUT Human Research Ethics 
Committee (approval number 1200000178). 
 
Many thanks for your consideration of this request. 
 
Mohammad Badiul Islam 
PhD Student at 
Queensland University of Technology 
Graduate Researcher at NICTA 
Phone 0061(0)402673340 
Email mb.islam@qut.edu.au
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A3. Survey – Withdrawal of consent for qut research project 
 
WITHDRAWAL OF CONSENT FOR QUT 
RESEARCH PROJECT 
SNsuser’s privacy requirements  
QUT Ethics Approval Number 1200000178 
RESEARCH TEAM CONTACTS                                                                                              
Name – Mohammad Badiul Islam Name – Jason Watson 
PhD Student at QUT, Graduate Researcher at 
NICTA  
Faculty / Institute Science and Engineering Faculty 
Senior Lecturer  
Faculty / Institute Science and Engineering Faculty 
Phone   0 402673340 Phone   07 3138 1656, 0402 254 670 
Email: mb.islam@qut.edu.au 
 
Name – Renato Iannella 
Email: ja.watson@qut.edu.au 
 
Name – Shlomo Geva 
Adjuct Professor 
Faculty / Institute Science and Engineering Faculty 
Associate Professor 
Faculty / Institute Science and Engineering Faculty 
Phone   07 3023 8578, 04 1313 2206 Phone   07 3138 1920  
Email   r.iannella@qut.edu.au Email   s.geva@qut.edu.au 
I hereby wish to WITHDRAW my consent to participate in the research project named 
above. 
I understand that this withdrawal WILL NOT jeopardise my relationship with 
Queensland University of Technology. 
Name  
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Signature  
Date   
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A4. Survey – Participant information for qut research project 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR QUT 
RESEARCH PROJECT 
SNsuser’s privacy requirements 
QUT Ethics Approval Number 1200000178 
 
RESEARCH TEAM 
Principal Researcher: Mohammad Badiul Islam, PhD Student at QUT, Graduate Researcher at NICTA  
Associate Researchers: Jason Watson, Senior Lecturer, SEF, QUT 
Renato Iannella, Adjunct Professor, QUT, Lead Architect, Information & Policy 
Services, Nehta – National E-Health Transition Authority. 
Shlomo Geva, Associate Professor, SEF, Electrical Engineering 
 
DESCRIPTION 
This project is being undertaken as part of PhD for Mohammad Badiul Islam.   
The purpose of this research is to study SNsuser’s privacy requirements to assist in 
understanding the role of user’s information in Social Networks. The research team is looking 
to recruit general users of SNswho are not experts in SNs(SN) or the privacy area. You may 
use SN for various purposes such as general social networking or to publicize personal 
information. You also may be a frequent SN user or may use SN rarely and have various 
concerns about privacy. Any SNuser can participate in this survey. 
 
PARTICIPATION 
Participation in this project is entirely voluntary. You will be asked to complete a 
survey which will not take more than 15 minutes. You do not need to be an expert in SNsor 
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the Privacy area however you do need to be a general user of at least one SNto answer the 
questions.  
 
If you agree to participate you can withdraw from the project at any time before 
submitting your complete survey without penalty. Any information obtained will be analysed 
and used in developing a Privacy framework for Social Networks. Your decision to 
participate or not participate, will have no impact upon your current or future relationship 
with QUT (for example your grades) or with NICTA. 
 
Participation will involve completing a survey with likert scale answers (7-point Likert 
scale (1: Strongly Disagree; 2: Tends to disagree; 3: Disagree; 4: Neutral; 5: Agree; 6: Tends 
to agree; 7: Strongly Agree). Questions will include an open ended question: ‘What do you 
want for your privacy when you use SNssuch as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn etc’. The 
answer from the question will assist our understanding of general users’ privacy 
requirements. 
If you wish to participate, you do not have to complete any question(s) you are 
uncomfortable with answering. 
EXPECTED BENEFITS 
This research will assist our understanding of how to build better privacy functionality 
into Social Networks.  
The research team would very much appreciate your participation in this research. This 
research may benefit general and future SNsusers to use a privacy friendly Social Networks. 
RISKS 
There are no risks beyond normal day-to-day living associated with your participation 
in this project. 
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
All comments and responses are anonymous and will be treated confidentially.  Your 
privacy will be maintained strictly. Each of the surveys returned will be given a numeric code 
for the analysis of the data. The data will be stored in a password-protected computer and 
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only the researcher will have access to the computer.  Any data collected as part of this project 
will be stored securely as per QUT’s Management of research data policy.  
The project is funded by NICTA/QUT Joint Post Graduate Award (JPA) however they 
will not have access to personally identifying information about you that may be obtained 
during the project. 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
Submitting the completed online survey is accepted as an indication of your consent to 
participate in this project. 
 
QUESTIONS / FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROJECT 
If have any questions or require any further information please contact one of the 
research team members below. 
Mohammad Badiul Islam Jason Watson 
PhD Student at QUT, Graduate Researcher at 
NICTA 
Institute Science and Engineering Faculty 
Senior Lecturer  
Institute Science and Engineering Faculty 
Phone   04 0267 3340 Phone   07 3138 1656 0402 254 670 
Email   mb.islam@qut.edu.au    Email   ja.watson@qut.edu.au   
  
Renato Iannella Shlomo Geva 
Adjuct Professor 
Institute Science and Engineering Faculty 
Associate Professor 
Institute Science and Engineering Faculty 
Phone   07 3023 8578 04 1313 2206 Phone   07 3138 1920 
Email   r.iannella@qut.edu.au  Email   s.geva@qut.edu.au  
 
CONCERNS / COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF THE PROJECT 
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QUT is committed to research integrity and the ethical conduct of research projects.  
However, if you do have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the project 
you may contact the QUT Research Ethics Unit on 07 3138 5123 or email 
ethicscontact@qut.edu.au. The QUT Research Ethics Unit is not connected with the research 
project and can facilitate a resolution to your concern in an impartial manner. 
Thank you for helping with this research project.  Please keep this sheet for your 
information. 
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A5. Survey – Participant information for qut research project  
PARTICIPATE IN 
RESEARCH 
Information for Prospective 
Participants 
The following research activity has been reviewed via QUT arrangements for the conduct of research involving human 
participation. 
If you choose to participate, you will be provided with more detailed participant information, including who you can contact 
if you have any concerns. 
SNsuser’s privacy requirements 
Research Team Contacts 
Principal 
Researcher: 
Mohammad Badiul Islam, PhD Student at QUT, Graduate 
Researcher at NICTA 
Associate 
Researchers: 
Jason Watson, Senior Lecturer, SEF, QUT 
Renato Iannella, Adjunct Professor, QUT, Lead Architect, 
Information & Policy Services, Nehta – National E-Health Transition 
Authority. 
A/Pro Shlomo Geva, Associate Professor, SEF, Electrical 
Engineering 
Please contact the researcher team members to have any questions answered or if you require further 
information about the project. 
What is the purpose of the research? 
The purpose of this research is to study SNsuser’s privacy requirements to assist in understanding the 
role of user’s information in Social Networks. 
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Are you looking for people like me? 
The research team is looking to recruit participants who are general users of Social Networks. They 
might use SN for various purposes such as general social networking or to publicize personal 
information. The participant may be a frequent SN user or may use SN rarely and have various 
concerns about their privacy. Any SNuser can participate in this survey and participants do not need to 
be experts in SNs(SN) or the privacy area. 
What will you ask me to do? 
You will be asked to complete a questionnaire which will not take more than 15 minutes. 
Are there any risks for me in taking part? 
The research team does not believe there are any risks beyond normal day-to-day living associated 
with your participation in this research. It should be noted that if you do agree to participate, you can 
withdraw from participation at any time during the project without penalty but before submitting your 
completed questionnaire. 
Are there any benefits for me in taking part? 
This research will assist our understanding as how to build privacy in Social Networks. As a 
user of SNsyour participation may benefit you and future SNsusers with better privacy 
control while using Social Networks 
Will I be compensated for my time? 
We would very much appreciate your participation in this research. As described above, this 
research may benefit you and future SNsusers to use a privacy friendly Social Networks. 
Who is funding this research?  
The project is funded by NICTA/QUT Joint Post Graduate Award (JPA). The funding body will not 
have access to personally identifying information about you that may be obtained during the project. 
Participants’ privacy will be maintained strictly. Each of the survey questionnaires returned by the 
participants will be given a numeric code for the analysis of the data. The data will be stored in a 
password-protected computer and only the researcher will have access to the computer. 
I am interested – what should I do next? 
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If you would like to participate in this study, please follow this link to the survey 
http://survey.qut.edu.au/f/174008/16fc/. 
You will be provided with further information to ensure that your decision and consent to 
participate is fully informed. 
Thank You!  QUT Ethics Approval 
Number:  1200000178 
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Figure A. 4: Online survey tool- Page 1 
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Figure A. 5: Online survey tool- Page 2 
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Figure A. 6: Online survey tool- Page 3 
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Figure A. 7: Online survey tool- Page 4 
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Figure A. 8: Online survey tool- Page 5 
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Figure A. 9: Online survey tool- Page 6 
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Figure A. 10: Online survey tool- Page 7 
 
 292 APPENDICES 
 
Figure A. 11: Online survey tool- Page 8 
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Table A. 1: Primary privacy requirements generated through expert judges 
Group No. Primary privacy 
requirements 
theme 
SN user privacy requirements 
Group 1 
(3 
members) 
Worry that 
information may 
be disclosed to 
others and 
misused 
Mobile SNuser may not want to participate in dynamic 
interaction for their presence and location 
SN users may expect that provider will not able to collect, 
analyze or delete any or all the profiles and activities of their 
users. 
SN users may expect that their information should not be used 
to identify physical location such as home location. 
User may want that information cannot be leaked through direct 
attacking techniques. 
User may want that their information will not be displayed 
unexpectedly to someone (for example,a stranger, parents, 
relatives, teacher, boss, ‘ex’ and government) which may cause 
inconvenience issues for them. 
Users may not want to be stalked by internal or external parties. 
Users may want that identity issue such as fake names and 
impersonation or identity theft which can be caused by profiling 
and data mining. 
Users may want that other users will not able to tag them in 
offensive photos, post and real life activities and those will not 
be displayed in an unflattering approach. 
Users may want that the SNprovider will not share information 
with external parties such as criminals, commercial websites, 
marketing, HR or government agencies. 
Users may want that their information will not be exposed 
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through a chain of FOAF (Friend of a friend). 
Users may want that their location information will not be 
disclosed and used for tracking. 
Users may want that their publicly available information will 
not be collected and misused by external parties such as 
marketing, HR or government agencies. 
Users may want that their uploaded digital contribution will not 
be disclosed unexpectedly abused by a group of contacts and 
criminals. 
Users may want that third parties will not gain unauthorized 
access to user information through deceitful conduct or other 
users without infringing ‘by default’. 
Users may expect that trusted contacts will not be involved in 
unsolicited privacy breaches and issues. 
Users may not want to disclose private information such as 
location information which can be revealed through real time 
uploaded picture publishes. 
Users desire for 
the ability to 
control their 
information 
SN information may want their corporate or individual 
information will not easily viewable to a third party which may 
create privacy instances. 
Users may not want their profile publicly available by default. 
Users may want functionalities thus they can optionally provide 
full name and contact in SN. 
Users may want simplified and user friendly data deletion 
process. 
Users may want that other users will not able to influence the 
content on or related to their profile such as relational 
information. 
Users may want that privacy issue will not rise through 
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interaction between mobile SNand traditional social network. 
Users may want that their location granularity cannot be 
associated with photos which can create privacy and location 
disclosure issues. 
Users may want that their unwanted or unforeseeable 
information and uploaded content will not be publicly disclosed. 
Users may want to be able to delete their accounts permanently. 
Users may want to be able to delete their digital contributions 
permanently. 
Users may want to delete data such as friend requests, posts, 
status update, messages, and pokes on a per item basis. 
Users may want to deny, ascertain or determine unwanted 
information accessibility by contacts which may be copied and 
reposted bypassing privacy settings. 
Users may want to exercise more control over their addition to 
various groups or networks. 
Worry about 
how the platform 
will use their 
information 
Various advertisement should not create disturbance by using 
SN user location without notification. 
SN users may not want their SNad-click data kept indefinitely. 
SN user may expect SN provider’s constructive assistance when 
they add an Third Party Application. 
Users experienced may want that SNprovider will not retains 
their deleted information for the next couple of years or 
indefinitely. 
Users may not want to experience unlimited use of information 
by other parties such as marketing, HR or government agencies. 
Users may want simplified and user friendly privacy policies. 
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Users may want that service provider will not grant license for 
further use of users information and content by Term of Use. 
Users may want that third party application providers will 
specify the extent of the gather and harvest user information 
through the application from their network. 
Users may want to know how they are targeted by advertisers 
and they may want transparent view about their information 
uses. 
Users may want to know retention policies of deleted 
information. 
Users may want to understand the privacy and data use policy 
such as how their personal information during and subsequent to 
registration will be used. 
User may want that their information, activities, identity and 
interests should not be collected and stored indefinitely. 
Group 2 
(2 
members) 
Third Party 
Applications - 
SNInteraction 
Users may want that the SNprovider will not share information 
with external parties such as criminals, commercial websites, 
marketing, HR or government agencies. 
SN user may expect SN provider’s constructive assistance when 
they add an Third Party Application. 
SN users may expect that their information should not be used 
to identify physical location such as home location. 
Various advertisement should not create disturbance by using 
SN user location without notification. 
Mobile SNuser may not want to participate in dynamic 
interaction for their presence and location 
Users may want to know how they are targeted by advertisers 
and they may want transparent view about their information 
uses. 
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Users may want that their location information will not be 
disclosed and used for tracking. 
Users may want that third party application providers will 
specify the extent of the gather and harvest user information 
through the application from their network. 
Users may not want to be stalked by internal or external parties. 
Data Control by 
User 
Users may want to be able to delete their accounts permanently. 
Users may want to know retention policies of deleted 
information. 
Users experienced may want that SNprovider will not retains 
their deleted information for the next couple of years or 
indefinitely. 
User may want that their information, activities, identity and 
interests should not be collected and stored indefinitely. 
SN users may expect that provider will not able to collect, 
analyze or delete any or all the profiles and activities of their 
users. 
Various advertisement should not create disturbance by using 
SN user location without notification. 
Mobile SNuser may not want to participate in dynamic 
interaction for their presence and location 
Users may want to delete data such as friend requests, posts, 
status update, messages, and pokes on a per item basis. 
Users may want simplified and user friendly data deletion 
process. 
Users may want to be able to delete their digital contributions 
permanently. 
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SN users may not want their SNad-click data kept indefinitely. 
Users may want to deny, ascertain or determine unwanted 
information accessibility by contacts which may be copied and 
reposted bypassing privacy settings. 
Users may want that third party application providers will 
specify the extent of the gather and harvest user information 
through the application from their network. 
Users may not want to experience unlimited use of information 
by other parties such as marketing, HR or government agencies. 
Users may want that other users will not able to tag them in 
offensive photos, post and real life activities and those will not 
be displayed in an unflattering approach. 
Users may want that their information will not be exposed 
through a chain of FOAF (Friend of a friend). 
Users may want that their location granularity cannot be 
associated with photos which can create privacy and location 
disclosure issues. 
Users may not want to disclose private information such as 
location information which can be revealed through real time 
uploaded picture publishes. 
SNPolicy Users may want simplified and user friendly privacy policies.  
Users may want to understand the privacy and data use policy 
such as how their personal information during and subsequent to 
registration will be used. 
Users may want to know how they are targeted by advertisers 
and they may want transparent view about their information 
uses. 
SN information may want their corporate or individual 
information will not easily viewable to a third party which may 
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create privacy instances. 
Users may want that their location information will not be 
disclosed and used for tracking. 
Users may not want to experience unlimited use of information 
by other parties such as marketing, HR or government agencies. 
Users may want that service provider will not grant license for 
further use of users information and content by Term of Use. 
Users may want that their unwanted or unforeseeable 
information and uploaded content will not be publicly disclosed. 
Users may expect that trusted contacts will not be involved in 
unsolicited privacy breaches and issues. 
Data Security User may want that information cannot be leaked through direct 
attacking techniques. 
User may want that their information will not be displayed 
unexpectedly to someone (for example,a stranger, parents, 
relatives, teacher, boss, ‘ex’ and government) which may cause 
inconvenience issues for them. 
Users may want that their uploaded digital contribution will not 
be disclosed unexpectedly abused by a group of contacts and 
criminals. 
Users may want that third parties will not gain unauthorized 
access to user information through deceitful conduct or other 
users without infringing ‘by default’. 
Users may want that other users will not able to influence the 
content on or related to their profile such as relational 
information. 
Users may want that identity issue such as fake names and 
impersonation or identity theft which can be caused by profiling 
and data mining. 
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Users may not want to be stalked by internal or external parties. 
Public Visibility Users may not want their profile publicly available by default. 
Users may not want to receive unwanted communication from 
restricted or unwanted contacts inside or outside the networks. 
Could not define Users may want to exercise more control over their addition to 
various groups or networks. 
Users may want functionalities thus they can optionally provide 
full name and contact in SN. 
Users may want that their publicly available information will 
not be collected and misused by external parties such as 
marketing, HR or government agencies. 
Users may want that privacy issue will not rise through 
interaction between mobile SNand traditional social network. 
Group 3 
(3 
members) 
System 
requirement 
Users may want that the SNprovider will not share information 
with external parties such as criminals, commercial websites, 
marketing, HR or government agencies. 
Users may want simplified and user friendly privacy policies. 
SN user may expect SN provider’s constructive assistance when 
they add an Third Party Application. 
Users may want to understand the privacy and data use policy 
such as how their personal information during and subsequent to 
registration will be used. 
Users may want functionalities thus they can optionally provide 
full name and contact in SN. 
Users may not want to receive unwanted communication from 
restricted or unwanted contacts inside or outside the networks. 
Users may want that third party application providers will 
specify the extent of the gather and harvest user information 
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through the application from their network. 
Users may want that service provider will not grant license for 
further use of users information and content by Term of Use. 
Users may want that privacy issue will not rise through 
interaction between mobile SNand traditional social network. 
Other privacy or 
security threat  
Users may not want to be stalked by internal or external parties. 
Users may want that identity issue such as fake names and 
impersonation or identity theft which can be caused by profiling 
and data mining. 
Users may want that their publicly available information will 
not be collected and misused by external parties such as 
marketing, HR or government agencies. 
Users may want that other users will not able to tag them in 
offensive photos, post and real life activities and those will not 
be displayed in an unflattering approach. 
Users may want that their location granularity cannot be 
associated with photos which can create privacy and location 
disclosure issues. 
Data storage 
requirement  
Users may want to be able to delete their accounts permanently. 
Users may want to know retention policies of deleted 
information. 
Users experienced may want that SNprovider will not retains 
their deleted information for the next couple of years or 
indefinitely. 
Users may want simplified and user friendly data deletion 
process. 
Users may want to be able to delete their digital contributions 
permanently. 
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Information 
control 
requirement  
Users may want to exercise more control over their addition to 
various groups or networks. 
User may want that their information, activities, identity and 
interests should not be collected and stored indefinitely. 
SN users may expect that provider will not able to collect, 
analyze or delete any or all the profiles and activities of their 
users. 
Users may want to delete data such as friend requests, posts, 
status update, messages, and pokes on a per item basis. 
Users may want to deny, ascertain or determine unwanted 
information accessibility by contacts which may be copied and 
reposted bypassing privacy settings. 
Users may want that their location information will not be 
disclosed and used for tracking. 
Users may want that other users will not able to influence the 
content on or related to their profile such as relational 
information. 
Users may not want to disclose private information such as 
location information which can be revealed through real time 
uploaded picture publishes. 
Information 
Leakage issues  
User may want that information cannot be leaked through direct 
attacking techniques. 
SN users may expect that their information should not be used 
to identify physical location such as home location. 
Various advertisement should not create disturbance by using 
SN user location without notification. 
Mobile SNuser may not want to participate in dynamic 
interaction for their presence and location 
Users may want to know how they are targeted by advertisers 
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and they may want transparent view about their information 
uses. 
SN users may not want their SNad-click data kept indefinitely. 
Users may not want their profile publicly available by default. 
SN information may want their corporate or individual 
information will not easily viewable to a third party which may 
create privacy instances. 
Users may want that third parties will not gain unauthorized 
access to user information through deceitful conduct or other 
users without infringing ‘by default’. 
Users may not want to experience unlimited use of information 
by other parties such as marketing, HR or government agencies. 
Users may want that their uploaded digital contribution will not 
be disclosed unexpectedly abused by a group of contacts and 
criminals. 
User may want that their information will not be displayed 
unexpectedly to someone (for example,a stranger, parents, 
relatives, teacher, boss, ‘ex’ and government) which may cause 
inconvenience issues for them. 
Users may want that their unwanted or unforeseeable 
information and uploaded content will not be publicly disclosed. 
Users may want that their information will not be exposed 
through a chain of FOAF (Friend of a friend). 
A6. Pilot survey detail analysis 
The analysis of a pilot study should focus primarily on descriptive analysis ((Poustie et 
al., 2006),(Bauhofer et al., 2001), (Lancaster et al., 2004)). No formal power calculations 
should not be conducted and results should be treated as preliminary results. This research 
has conducted a descriptive analysis with the inputs from 19-privacy expert opinions to 
develop the final survey instrument. 
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1. You are a  
This question had the three options of Male/Female/Other for gender analysis. ‘Other’ 
was included since other genders might have a various perspective about privacy. 
Respondents might have similar views since only one participant commented that ‘Is ‘other’ 
really required?’ and another respondents commented that ‘I Think, you could delete ‘Other’’ 
which is only 10.52% of respondents. Therefore, the question was kept for the final survey of 
gender analysis. 
2. Age 
The question was included as an open text box. However, five respondents (26%) 
commented that the question should provide options like: 25-30, 30-35. The experts also 
commented that collecting exact ages might initiate the privacy issue. Therefore, the question 
provided age ranges. Respondents were able to select their age range instead of exact stating 
an age in the final survey. 
3. Which is your main Social Network? 
The question included the  four options of Facebook/ Twitter/ LinkedIn/ Other which 
are the top ranked Social networking sites91 and asked participants to choose one. Six 
respondents (31.58%) asked to select multiple SNssince they use various SNsfor various 
purposes. Based on the feedback, the question was changed to allow multiple entries to 
‘Which Social Network(s) do you use most?’ and a new question was added ‘Which Social 
Network(s) concern(s) you most in terms of privacy?’ to check for any correlation between 
the SNuses and privacy issues, as it might be useful for further analysis. 
4. What is the issue that concern you most about your privacy when you use SNssuch as 
Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn? 
The question was changed to plural to collect multiple privacy issues in the final 
survey.  
5. I should be able to control how my information is added, collected, deleted, used and 
shared. 
There was no comment to change the question however, one respondent commented 
that the final survey should collect the expecting ‘level of control’ for further analysis since 
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the vast majority of respondents may naturally tick 7. A new question was added to collect 
ranking for the control. 
The level of control I expect is (rank out of 7, 1 means no control and 7 means full 
control)? 
6. I should be able to delete my information permanently on a per item basis. 
The respondents had no suggestions to change the question. However,  the word 
‘permanently’ was removed from the question since it may be confusing for respondents if 
they do not know that SN sites may keep their deleted information.  
7. I expect simple and user-friendly data deletion processes. 
The respondents had no suggestions to change the question. However, this question was 
combined with ‘I expect simple and user friendly privacy policies’ and converted to ‘I expect 
simple and user friendly privacy policies to control my information’ Since ‘control’ covers 
other option such as add, collect, use and share with delete. 
8. I expect simple and user-friendly privacy policies. 
9. My privacy should not be controlled or minimized by others for any reason. 
Five experts commented that the question was not clear. The question needed better 
wording for respondents to determine whether the level of privacy should not be altered or 
reduced. Therefore, the question changed to ‘My level of privacy should not be altered or 
reduced for any reason’. 
10. Service providers should offer a verification function when I add a new application 
developed by a third party. 
Two respondents were unsure ‘what is a verification function’ and commented that 
respondents may not know what this function means. So, ‘an authorization dialog box for 
permission’ changed and the question changed to ‘Service providers should show an 
authorization dialog box for permission to access my information when I add a new 
application developed by a third party’. 
11. I should be able to control my information use by advertisers. 
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There was an error in the wording of this question. Therefore, the question changed to 
‘I should be able to control how my info is used by advertisers’. 
12. Privacy and data use policies should clearly explain how my information would be 
used. 
There were no suggestions to change this question and was kept as is.  
13. My information can be collected and stored without my authorisation. 
The question was changed for greater clarification to ‘My information can be collected 
and stored at anytime because I provided my authorisation when I registered’ . 
14. Service providers should not able to analyse or delete any of my information without 
my authorisation. 
Seven respondents (36.84%) asked for further clarification and two of these suggested 
to change to two separate questions since the respondents might not agree with analyse part 
and delete. Therefore, the question was changed to ‘Service providers should not be able to 
analyse any of my information without my authorisation eg the service providers might want 
to target advertising based on age, location or other demographic information.’ 
15. It is reasonable if I do not know the retention policies of deleted information. 
Two commented that respondents might not have any idea about retention policies and 
asked for further clarification of this question. Therefore, the question was changed to ‘I do 
not need to know the disposal policies of deleted information’. 
16. It is reasonable if service providers keep my deleted information. 
The question was simplified further in the final survey to ‘SNsshould not keep my 
deleted information by storing it out of my sight in their system’. 
17. My information should be well protected so it cannot be leaked through direct 
attacking techniques. 
‘Through direct attacking techniques’ was removed from the question to be better  
understood since they might not have any idea about this technique. The question was 
changed to ‘My information should be well protected so it cannot be leaked.’  
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18. It is reasonable if I cannot determine information accessibility by others, which may 
be copied and reposted when privacy settings are bypassed. 
8 Respondents (42.11%) commented that the question that the question needed to be 
changed to ‘I am not worried that my copied information can be reposted by others.’ 
19. I should be well protected so I will not receive unwanted communication. 
Three respondents asked for further clarification of the word ‘unwanted’. Therefore, the 
question was changed to ‘My account should be well protected from receiving undesirable 
communication.’ 
20. My location information should not be disclosed or used for tracking. 
Four respondents asked for further clarification and one expert suggested be split the 
question into two. Therefore, the question was changed to ‘My location information should 
not be disclosed unless I post it myself’ and another question ‘I should not be tracked even 
when I am not on the Social Network. For example, you would not like to have your web 
browsing behaviour be tracked when even you are not logged in’ was added. 
21. Third parties should not have unauthorized access to my information. 
 There were no suggestions to change this question and was kept as is.  
22. Third party application providers should specify the extent of information collection 
through their application. 
Two respondents asked for further clarification which was simplified for the final 
survey, as ‘I should be informed about the information a third party collects about me.’ 
23. I should not face identity issues such as fake names and impersonation or identity 
theft. 
Three experts asked for further clarification for this question and one respondent 
commented that ‘fake names is perfectly fine’ but asking for verification procedures for real 
names should be in place to avoid identity theft. Therefore, the question was changed to 
‘Verification procedures for genuine names should be in place to avoid identity theft’. 
24. My trusted contacts cannot be involved in unsolicited privacy issues. 
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Five respondents asked for further clarification and as it was a general question, it was 
removed. 
25. Information leakage should not occur using mobile or hand held devices. 
There were no suggestions to change this question and was kept as is.  
26. My information should not be used by service providers for any purpose unless it has 
been authorised by me. 
There were no suggestions to change this question but four respondents commented 
that this question could merge with question 28 and so was removed to avoid redundancy.  
27. My publicly available information should not be collected or misused by others 
without my authorisation. 
Four experts asked for further clarification and one expert commented that misuse 
could not occur if there is authorisation. Therefore, the question was changed to ‘My publicly 
available information should be used without my authorisation’. 
28. When I provide information for one reason, it should not be used for other purposes. 
The question was modified to ‘When I provide information for one reason it should not 
be used for other purposes without my authorisation’ since it is more appropriate.  
29. It is reasonable to be tracked to identify my exact location such as my home or 
workplace. 
There was no recommendation to change the question but it was simplified to ‘I am 
happy to have my exact location identified such as my home or workplace’ to make it more 
understandable by general respondents’. 
30. Pop up application should not use my location information without my authorisation. 
The question was changed to ‘Location based applications should not use my location 
information without my authorisation’ since three of the experts commented that they were 
unsure about ‘Pop up application’ and that general users might not know this term. 
31. I must not be forced to participate in dynamic interactions with third parties for any 
reason. 
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The word was changed from ‘dynamic’ to ‘implicit’ to make it more understandable for 
general users and changed the question to ‘I should not be forced to participate in implicit 
interactions with third parties for any reason’. 
32. My information should not be overexposed to users that I know and do not know. 
The question was changed to ‘My information should not be over disclosed or 
undesirable disclosed to users I know and do not know’ since experts were unsure about what 
‘Over exposed’ means and general respondents might be confused. 
33. My information should not be publicly disclosed without my authorisation. 
 There were no suggestions to change this question and was kept as is.  
34. I should not be tagged by others in offensive and unflattering photos, post and real life 
activities without my authorisation. 
The question was further simplified to ‘I should be allowed to block offensive and 
unflattering content about me’. Furthermore, three experts commented that allowed to untag 
is a privacy control, which general respondents should be asked. So, a new question was 
added, as ‘I should be able to fix a privacy issue eg tagging or putting content about me, 
spreading my information even if I am not a member of that Social Network’. 
35. My location information should not be disclosed through real time uploaded photos. 
There were no suggestions to change this question and was kept as is.  
36. Do you have any other comments/concerns for SNsprivacy? 
The question modified the grammatical mistake and updated to ‘Do you have any other 
comments/concerns about SNsprivacy?’ 
A7. Users privacy requirements and survey questions with analysis code 
Table A. 2: Users privacy requirements and survey questions with analysis code 
 Question 
Analysis Code 
Questions 
Demographics instruments 
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 UI1 You are a  
 UI2 Age  
 UI3 Which Social Network(s) do you use most?  
 UI4 Which Social Network(s) concern(s) you most in terms of privacy?  
For collecting new users privacy requirements 
 UI5 What are the issues that concern you most about your privacy when you use the 
SNssuch as Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn?  
Measuring privacy requirements instruments 
Information Control 
 IC1 I should be able to control how my information is added, collected, deleted, used 
and shared. 
 IC2 The level of control I expect is (rank out of 7, 1 means no control and 7 means 
full control)? 
 IC3 I should be able to delete my information on a per item basis. 
 IC4 I expect simple and user-friendly privacy policies to control my information. 
 IC5 My level of privacy should not be altered or reduced for any reason. 
 IC6 Service providers should show an authorization dialog box for permission to 
access my information when I add a new application developed by a third party. 
 IC7 I should be able to control how advertisers use my information. 
 IC8 I should be able to fix a privacy issue eg tagging or putting content about me, 
spreading my information even if I am not a member of that Social Network. 
 IC9 Do you have any other concerns about controlling your information?  
Information collection and storage 
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 CS1 Privacy and data use policies should clearly explain how my information would 
be collected and stored.  
 CSR2 My information can be collected and stored at anytime because I provided my 
authorisation when I registered. (Reverse) 
 CS3 Service providers should not be able to analyse any of my information without 
my authorisation eg the service providers might want to target advertising based 
on age, location or other demographic information.  
 CS4 I should be informed about the information a third party collects about me. 
 CSR5 I do not need to know the disposal policies of deleted information. (Reverse) 
 CS6 SNsshould not keep my deleted information by storing it out of my sight in their 
system.  
 CS7 Do you have any other concerns about collecting and storing your information? 
Information access 
 IA1 My information should be well protected so it cannot be leaked.  
 IAR2 I am not worried that others can repost my copied information. (Reverse) 
 IA3 My account should be well protected from receiving undesirable communication. 
 IA4 Third parties should not have unauthorized access to my information.  
 IA5 Verification procedures for genuine names should be in place to avoid identity 
theft.  
 IA6 Information leakage should not occur using mobile or hand held devices.  
 IA7 I should not be tracked even when I am not on the Social Network. For example, 
you would not like to have your web browsing behaviour be tracked when even 
you are not logged in. 
 IA8 Do you have any other concerns about leaking your information? 
Unauthorized secondary use (Internal & External) 
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 UUR1 My publicly available information should be used without my authorisation. 
(Reverse) 
 UU2 When I provide information for one reason, it should not be used for other 
purposes without my authorisation. 
 UUR3 I am happy to have my exact location identified such as my home or workplace. 
(Reverse) 
 UU4 Location based applications should not use my location information without my 
authorisation.  
 UU5 I should not be forced to participate in implicit interactions with third parties for 
any reason. 
 UU6 Do you have any other concerns about unauthorized secondary use of your 
information?  
Undesirable activities 
 UA1 My information should not be over disclosed or undesirable disclosed to users I 
know and do not know. 
 UA2 My information should not be publicly disclosed without my authorisation. 
 UA3 I should be allowed to block offensive and unflattering content about me. 
 UA4 My location information should not be disclosed unless I post it myself. 
 UA5 My location information should not be disclosed through real time uploaded 
photos. 
 UAR6 I believe that some disclosure is necessary in SNsand therefore privacy cannot be 
completely guaranteed. (Reverse) 
 UA7 Do you have any other concerns about over disclosing or undesirable disclosing 
of your information? 
 UI6 Do you have any other comments/concerns about SNsprivacy? 
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A8. Survey Details 
Survey title: SNuser privacy requirements 
RESEARCH PROJECT: PARTICIPATION REQUEST 
The purpose of this research is to study SNuser privacy requirements. The research 
team would like to survey general users of SNs(SN) who are not experts in SN or the privacy 
area. You may use SN for various purposes such as general social networking or to publicize 
personal information. You may also be a frequent SN user or may use SN rarely and have 
various issues about privacy. Any SNuser can participate in this survey. 
This project is being undertaken as part of a PhD for Mohammad Badiul Islam.  
PARTICIPATION 
Participation in this project is entirely voluntary. The survey will take ≈15 minutes. 
You do not need to be an expert in SNsor the privacy area; however, you do need to be a 
general user of at least one SNto response the questions.  
If you agree to participate, you can withdraw from the project at any time before 
submitting your complete survey without penalty. Any information obtained will be analysed 
and used in developing a Privacy Framework for Social Networks. Your decision to 
participate or not participate will have no impact on your current or future relationship with 
QUT. Participation will involve completing a survey with a 7 point Likert scale (1= strongly 
disagree; 2= mostly disagree; 3= somewhat disagree; 4= neutral or unsure; 5= somewhat 
agree; 6= mostly agree; 7= strongly agree). Questions will include an open-ended question 
such as ‘What  are the issues that concern you most about your privacy when you use 
SNssuch as Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn’. The responses from the question will assist our 
understanding of general user privacy requirements. 
EXPECTED BENEFITS 
This research will identify how to build better privacy functionality into SNsand may 
benefit general and future SNusers to use  privacy friendly Social Networks. 
The research team appreciates your participation in this research. 
RISKS 
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There are no risks associated with your participation in this project. 
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
All comments and responses are anonymous and will be treated confidentially.  Your 
privacy will be strictly maintained. Each of the completed surveys will be given a numeric 
code for data analysis. The data will be stored in a password-protected computer and only the 
researcher will have access to the computer.  Any data collected as part of this project will be 
stored securely as per QUT’s Management of research data policy.  
The project is funded by NICTA/QUT however they will not have access to information 
obtained during the project. 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
Submitting the completed online survey is accepted as an indication of your consent to 
participate in this project. 
QUESTIONS / FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROJECT 
If you have any questions or require any further information please contact one of the 
research team members below.  
Mohammad Badiul Islam  
PhD Student at QUT, Graduate Researcher at NICTA  
QUT Science and Engineering Faculty  
Phone:   04 0267 3340  
Email: mb.islam@qut.edu.au 
Dr Jason Watson  
Senior Lecturer  
QUT Science and Engineering Faculty  
Phone:  07 3138 1656   
Email: ja.watson@qut.edu.au 
Adpro Renato Iannella  
Adjunct Professor  
QUT Science and Engineering Faculty  
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Phone:  04 1313 2206 
Email: r.iannella@qut.edu.au 
Aspro Shlomo Geva  
Associate Professor 
QUT Science and Engineering Faculty  
Phone:  07 3138 1920  
Email: s.geva@qut.edu.au  
CONCERNS / COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF THE PROJECT 
QUT is committed to research integrity and the ethical conduct of research projects.  
However, if you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of this project you may contact 
the QUT Research Ethics Unit on 07 3138 5123 or email ethicscontact@qut.edu.au. 
PART 1: INFORMATION ABOUT YOU AS A SNUSER 
Please tick the appropriate response or provide information in the space provided. Please 
answer the questions, which ask about your views and expectations of Social Networks.  
1. You are a  
Male/Female/Other 
2. Age  
Less than 13/13-20/21-25/26-30/31-35/36-40/41-45/46-50/51-55/56-60/61-65/66-70/71-
75/76-80/81-85/86-90/91-95/96-100/101+ 
3. Which Social Network(s) do you use most?  
 
Facebook/Twitter/LinkedIn/Other 
 
4. Which Social Network(s) concern(s) you most in terms of privacy?  
 
Facebook/Twitter/LinkedIn/Other  
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5. What are the issues that concern you most about your privacy when you use the SNssuch 
as Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn?  
 
PART 2: YOUR PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS 
For each of the remaining questions, please choose one response from the seven options.  
Please choose 
1= strongly disagree 
2= mostly disagree 
3= somewhat disagree 
4= neutral or unsure 
5= somewhat agree 
6= mostly agree 
7= strongly agree 
Questions 
Questions (6-14) measure your concerns about controlling your information. 
6. I should be able to control how my information is added, collected, deleted, used and 
shared. 
7. The level of control I expect is (rank out of 7, 1 means no control and 7 means full 
control)? 
1-7 
8. I should be able to delete my information on a per item basis. 
9. I expect simple and user-friendly privacy policies to control my information. 
10. My level of privacy should not be altered or reduced for any reason. 
11. Service providers should show an authorization dialog box for permission to access my 
information when I add a new application developed by a third party. 
12. I should be able to control how my information is used by advertisers. 
13. I should be able to fix a privacy issue eg tagging or putting content about me, spreading 
my information even if I am not a member of that Social Network. 
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14. Do you have any other concerns about controlling your information?  
Questions (15-21) measure your concerns about collecting and storing your information.  
15. Privacy and data use policies should clearly explain how my information would be used.  
16. My information can be collected and stored at anytime because I provided my 
authorisation when I registered. (Reverse) 
17. Service providers should not be able to analyse any of my information without my 
authorisation eg the service providers might want to target advertising based on age, 
location or other demographic information.  
18. I should be informed about the information a third party collects about me. 
19. I do not need to know the disposal policies of deleted information. (Reverse) 
20. SNsshould not keep my deleted information by storing it out of my sight in their system.  
21. Do you have any other concerns about collecting and storing your information? 
Questions (22-29) measure your concerns about leaking your information. 
22. My information should be well protected so it cannot be leaked.  
23. I am not worried that my copied information can be reposted by others. (Reverse) 
24. My account should be well protected from receiving undesirable communication. 
25. Third parties should not have unauthorized access to my information.  
26. Verification procedures for genuine names should be in place to avoid identity theft.  
27. Information leakage should not occur using mobile or hand held devices.  
28. I should not be tracked even when I am not on the Social Network. For example, you 
would not like to have your web browsing behaviour be tracked when even you are not 
logged in. 
29. Do you have any other concerns about leaking your information? 
Questions (30-35) measure your concerns about unauthorized secondary use of your 
information. 
30. My publicly available information should be used without my authorisation. (Reverse) 
31. When I provide information for one reason, it should not be used for other purposes 
without my authorisation. 
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32. I am happy to have my exact location identified such as my home or workplace. 
(Reverse) 
33. Location based applications should not use my location information without my 
authorisation.  
34. I should not be forced to participate in implicit interactions with third parties for any 
reason. 
35. Do you have any other concerns about unauthorized secondary use of your information?  
Questions (36-42) measure your concerns about over disclosing or undesirable disclosing of 
your information. 
36. My information should not be over disclosed or undesirable disclosed to users I know and 
do not know. 
37. My information should not be publicly disclosed without my authorisation. 
38. I should be allowed to block offensive and unflattering content about me. 
39. My location information should not be disclosed unless I post it myself. 
40. My location information should not be disclosed through real time uploaded photos. 
41. I believe that some disclosure is necessary in SNsand therefore privacy cannot be 
completely guaranteed. (Reverse) 
42. Do you have any other concerns about over disclosing or undesirable disclosing of your 
information? 
Do you have any other comments/concerns about SNsprivacy? 
 
A9. Survey– Qualitative data table 
The comments from the survey respondents have been analysed using thematic method 
and are summarised into categories. show the comments made by the respondents. 
Table A. 3: Data from qualitative analysis 
Theme Comments 
Concern most about About privacy of my family pictures. 
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SNsprivacy Access to my information beyond my friends and contacts. 
Adding to various groups without consent and posting embarrassing words or 
images on the wall by other users  
Authorization of storing and disclosing personal info should be made more 
explicit instead of just one ticking box of agreement to overall TOC.  
Automatic data mining and profiling without my knowledge or consent. 
Automatic tools such as auto tag, detection of location, and people 
recommendation is undesirable 
Avoiding stalker. I don't like to be traced by stranger. 
Because i have facebook and linkedin account. Most of the time i am in online, 
Being hacked 
Being swamped by unwanted messages or promotions 
Changes to security and privacy rules without notice (Facebook in particular). 
Complicated multi-faceted privacy settings that are impossible to understand. 
Poor security on servers leading to loss of account details to hackers (the reason 
I deleted my linkedin account). Commercialisation of the service by selling my 
personal data (Facebook, Instagram, linkedin). 
Changing policies, you just never know when they are going to change 
something that may somehow let them release private information. Inability to 
efficiently separate friends from work colleagues 
Commercial use of personal communications between friends.  Discrepancy 
between user expectation of an essentially social space and value of this 
information to unknown 3rd parties.  Online bullying especially among young 
users 
Companies building a profile of my interests in order to target advertising. 
Complex Security confuse more.......... 
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Concentrate on the  expression of common access control policies for the users 
in online social networks, based on two criteria, expressions of wide ranges of 
authorization conditions and full privacy support, such as authentication, 
identification, etc. 
Contacts can be viewed by all, some photos can also be viewed by my friends 
contacts and for skype random people ask to be my friend and I don't know 
them!! 
Control accessibility to everything on my SNpage, such as what information 
will be visible to the public, contacts, and certain groups in my contact list. 
Currently, the users need to put complete trust on OSN service providers, to 
protect their sensitive information because  of  centralized  access  control  at  
the  providers.  Taking  advantage  of  this  infrastructure,  OSN  service  
providers  can  expose their  subscribers’  personal  information  for  targeted  
advertisements,  or  anything  that  is  mentioned  in  the  terms  of  the  privacy.   
Agreement, including to change the terms. 
Data deletion, Data sharing, Display of unwanted ads, Profiling my behavior. 
Data mining for both. Linking of information and contacts to other networks and 
appliances eg: all my facebook contacts are automatically on my i=phone when 
I use the i cloud and Apple make it impossible to delete facebook contacts from 
i-phone. 
Data mining. Amount of personal information that is collected and possible 
abuse by corporate entities or fraudulent groups obtaining the data from either 
publicly available information by the site or privately maintained by the site. 
Data mining. Amount of personal information that is collected and possible 
abuse by corporate entities or fraudulent  
Data storage in the cloud, personal data being sold or given to third parties 
without my knowledge or consent 
Difficult to control who sees what comments 
Downloading pictures  Accessing my status or pictures by peoples  who are not 
in friend list       
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Education 
Employer or future employers might think I am a dick.  Girlfriends family might 
realise I am a dick.  I give away something that is private to me that is 
embarrassing to someone a few years older than my current self.  My future is 
compromised by my current indiscretions. 
Employer screening my facebook profile 
Enforced changes to privacy settings. Complexity of settings. Unintended 
consequences.  
Everyone can see my profile in facebook and linkedin. 
Facebook is not coming clean on ITS use of the data & keeps on changing the 
rules of the game; linkedin is worse because it is even less transparent 
Facebook seems to continually change its privacy rules, meaning that I am 
uncertain that current settings remain valid. At least with Twitter you know that 
the information is public, whereas with Facebook I often feel unsure. 
Facebook:  1) My friends posting personal info about me that may be read by 
other people unknown to me  2) The fact that all my info is public domain. Their 
‘privacy settings’ is an illusion! All my info is already exposed on hashed 
URL's; so if someone guesses the hash, they have my info 
Friends or acquaintances of friends are able to see my posts once my friends 
make comments on or like  them. 
Friends who do not mark their Facebook as private and everyone can go and 
look into it. 
Hacking 
Hacking of account, Access to the messages by outsiders 
Hacking on my account and abuse my account 
Hacking, and reporting to the authority(for example,Facebook authority) by 
others intentionally with a clear objective to preventing opponent's voice.   
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Hacking, unwanted people seeing posts and pictures. 
I am worried that SNproviders can access all of my information . 
I am fairly flexible in terms of privacy to friends. However, if I share a photo 
that contains someone other than me, I want to preserve her/his privacy! 
I am not sure how much privacy I have. I don't want to go into Facebook 
settings all the time and check for changes. 
I direct message my personal posts - and if I have something I'd prefer to remain 
private, I don't post it online.  
I don’t believe the settings are strong enough to protect someones privacy. The 
new element on facebook the scroll menu on the side can make users access 
pictures which their friends like of non-friends on their friends list  this new 
feature i believe limits the privacy of the user.  
I don't like that advertisers can find out information about me. 
I have no concern about my privacy. As long as my phone number, email and 
physical address is not public, I am good. 
I sometimes feel people do not consider how public the information they post on 
SNsis. However I also believe individuals should ultimately be in control of 
their information, and thus can choose to make it public or private as they wish. 
I try to avoid posting anything too personal, I mostly use Twitter for work 
purposes. There is info related to my political views which could be used 
against me but I don't see how to share it and make it private at the same time! 
I want to see how other people (e.g., in my network, in a list) see a particular 
content 
Identity theft  Invasion of privacy  Leakage of personal information 
Identity theft, being tagged in photos without permission 
Identity theft.  
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Impersonation  
In facebook anyone can download anyones photo, given that privacy allows 
them to view at that time. That is a problem. We dont know who has our picture, 
which can be misused later. 
In Facebook, the original posting in timeline that was edited/deleted could still 
be seen in Newsfeed 
In general, I fear to lose control about private, personal data (as opposed to 
merely contact data and a general job history).  First of all, I'd like to control 
individually, with whom I share which information.  Second, I'd like to see the 
service provider taking access control serious (secure Authentication and 
Encryption as opposed to pseudo-protection solely by guessable urls).  Finally, 
I'd like being able to withdraw previously shared information (without leaving 
traces in the SN system). 
In my opinion, privacy should be taken as serious as sharing information under 
a non-disclosure agreement because I regard my private information a valuable 
asset and a reckless abuse can isolate me and thus effectively destroy my life.    
When thinking about statement 41, I concluded on the following definition for 
privacy: ‘Privacy is limiting the information disclosure to a reasonable 
minimum for a specific purpose’.  The purpose of a SN is a) to centralise my 
contact list (address book) for me and b) to aid me in efficiently distributing 
information (about me) to my contacts.  This service can be in line with privacy, 
which means in this context to not disclose any information to anyone I do not 
intend to share this information.    There is certainly a tension between 
efficiency in sharing information and the prevention of unintended disclosure.  
Who would not have unintentionally sent an e-mail to a whole mailing list / 
group of recipients instead of only the sender?  However, current SN platforms 
are server-based.  Thus, it should even be possible to withdraw accidentally 
shared information as opposed to e-mails, where messages are distributed before 
they get read.  At least, a service provider should work hard to prevent leakage 
to any third parties.  Furthermore, efficiency in information sharing includes 
reasonable default settings -- and confirmation dialogs before a presumably 
unintended action is performed. 
Info going public due to changes in privacy by facebook  
Information can be stored/collected only by the authorized Service providers.  
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Issues about my personal data such as photos being visible to friends' friends 
who i do not know.  
It is very helpful for net users. 
Its a tough challenge to implement privacy measures because there are still 
hackers around and no matter how hard everyone tries to alter the settings it can 
still be accessed. Th only way one can keep their privacy is not to share 
unwanted photos, view, locations etc on the networking if you really wanna 
protect yourself. You should be careful what you post and say as well.  
Knowledge of empty houses through check in system 
Lack of awareness about privacy in social network 
Lack of control of who sees what information 
Lack of control over your own data (it's there forever, even if you delete it) 
Lack of security (linkedin hack), default options for SNsis quite open 
(especially for underage and not concerned with security) 
Making our posts public without our consent (such as likes and comments in the 
facebook), making tweets searchable in Google and other search engines, Third 
party apps that use our information without our consent, privacy setting 
changing constantly and becoming default and you have to set it up again 
Making unwanted issues with pictures 
Must have the option to delete everything if i want. Facebook currently is not 
giving this option! 
My birthday date 
My friends can download my pictures. All people are not real freind, they may 
miss use the pictures. 
My information being seen by people I dont know/dont what seeing my 
information. 
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My personal details may be released to other users, being tagged and checked in 
without my knowledge or permision. Without the correct setting my information 
can be simply Googled.  
My personal information, my pictures, information that I am not willing to 
disclose before others except my close friends 
My personal social face among my friends. 
My photos being viewed and/or used by a stranger 
My Twitter account was hacked into, so I have lost confidence in using it.  In 
terms of facebook, I don't add a lot of material (photos, posts). 
Not to share personal photos or any kind of personal information 
Not too much concerns really, I don't post too much personal information. 
Facebook is a concern because you have asked for an option. Maybe offer a 
‘Not a concern’ option as well. 
Opt-out instead of opt-in principle for privacy policies, i.e. The standard stuff is 
everybody can see everything, also in public search machines; levity and 
ignorance of users about what such networks can and do really gather; 
automatic cross-linking between profiles even when no links existed before; 
most people compare or even consider SNfriends as real (for example,Many of 
people get angry if you do not accept their invitation to be linked etc.) 
Other people accessing my family Facebook page 
Other people downloading photos I have uploaded.     
Other people that I don't know very well (friend's friend) can read my status.  
People I don't know accessing my personal details, images etc 
People invite me to play network game, some times people also send me 
advertisng material 
People seeing information (for example,Pictures etc.) Others have posted about 
me 
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People sharing photos of me without my consent. You can untag on Facebook 
but still need to ask someone to remove the actual photo. Also some people 
share photos and do not set there privacy settings to the same level as I do so I 
cannot control what they do with my information.   On all social networking 
sites I am concerned with what information is collected by Facebook/Twitter 
itself but also other outside companies through data mining.  
People's privacy should be respected and protected even before today's police, 
Govs. and courts. Governments, Meddling stupid services, etc. Should not be 
able to force the company to pass our information to them without our 
permission. There should be mechanisms to control corruption and crimes but 
not by easy violation of human rights/ respect. 
Personal details, like date of birth (which is often used as a security question) 
Personal information and hacking my account.    
Personal information 
Personal information  
Personal information  personal comments   
Personal information including my name and location 
Personal opinion that may hurt some people 
Photo privacy. Fake accounts with fake informations. Nonsense sharing of 
staffs!  
Photos - who can view them  private messages - are they really private or public  
who can view my info  apps - how much of my personal detail they can access 
Photos can be seen even when someone isan't your friend.   
Pictures 
Pictures 
Potential hacking to accounts  
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Privacy 
Privacy and security of personal data (i.e. Email address, location, birthday, 
etc... NOT anything I have posted or shared).  
Privacy for the pictures 
Privacy is important issue. However, I think, often we (both users and 
researchers) utterly misuse it. In real life (non-digital life!) We cannot avoid 
sharing information if we want to interact an live in a social life. While we 
present ourselves in front of a reception counter, immediately we share a lot of 
information (i.e., 'front' in social science). Similar thing is expected to happen in 
digital world. We cannot or should not try to avoid our digital foot print while 
being online. I think, users also do not mind, unless we scare them deliberately, 
unfortunately! 
Privacy settings changes often, making it hard to track whether who can see 
what I posted or status I am tagged in by friends. 
Proytection of personal information. 
Religion 
Restiction to my private things 
Risk for abuse of the information.  
Risk of misuse of my family photos,  my current location (office or on holiday) 
Sale of personal details to third party companies 
Say something and not happy with it in future  
Scared of others to get my personal info which I don't intend to share with all 
Selling data, leaking data through Aps, constantly changing data and privacy 
policy and rules, constantly changing my privacy settings for me 
Sending or receiving message 
Since we cannot avoid SNsnow, I think education and awareness training about 
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them should take place early in life, for example,In schools 
SNprovider shoud give well protection for the user, when user logged of his/her 
the social due to ran out of the electrical or other accidents. 
SNsare an excellent tool for increasing work productivity. The level of available 
information of individuals enables clear concise and appropriate discussions. 
SNsmay be making people less social. 
Social networks, having got seemingly most of the planet signed up now 
naturally want to make money. While it is great to be able to catch up with 
people you might otherwise lose touch with, it seems even our casual 
conversations with friends are now public property. I do not believe there is any 
more justification for making this information publicly available than the 
contents of a conversation between friends or colleagues over coffee. Perhaps 
there should be an option to pay a small fee for the convenience of using the site 
with a guarantee of no passing on of information while others content to share 
everything can get all the advertising material they can handle. 
Some of the questions leave openings. Eg: Q 23. My copied information? Is that 
information that someone can copy and paste from my publicly available 
profile? 
Some of these services store information about me that I never provided to 
them. For example, Facebook has information about me even though I do not 
have a Facebook account. They do this by tricking their users into giving up 
their e-mail account login details, logging into those accounts, and scouring the 
address book. 
Someone hacking into my profile 
Sometimes, bad persons/users create duplicate profile with same name and 
password,(I have no idea how?)To see-all messages/photos i.e to see all 
personal communications in facebook. ‘personal messages should not be seen 
by any unauthorized persons’. It is very difficult to detect-log in users or friends 
,because, the  same name i.e user ID with same password. 
Spamming 
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Spamming of commercial products from friends (some of them not quite close), 
tagging my photo without permission, I don't mind to publish status, but I don't 
like my comments to other status appears in my wall.  
Spred of private information and Tagging  
Stalking and inappropriate use of personal information by malicious individuals 
That Facebook owns all information we post on our page. 
That others can view the content on my page (images, status updates etc.) 
That the wrong people see the wrong information -- especially that people from 
my professional life see information meant solely for friends. 
The ability to replicate my identity for the purpose of fradulent activity 
The company's dishonesty 
The correlation of my data from the SNwith other databases - being ‘looked up’.  
CVS a pharmacy chain here in the US just did a deal with Facebook to correlate 
all the data from their loyalty card with Facebook's user base.  
The data that are being shared with friends in Facebook, would remain personal 
or not as facebook itself still has power to go through that.    Even if one have 
access to view his friend's profile, Facebook should have enhanced the security 
issues so that he can't download/save the picture and thumbnails!     There are 
many issues, I can't drop in due to free time constraint! :)       
The fact that the networks seem to own whatever they own, regardless of who 
produced them, and is in control of who can or cannot access it. 
The organisation's inability to stop hackers from getting our passwords. 
Essentially handing over our rights to our own intellectual property once posted 
to these sites.  
The requirement to always update privacy settings 
The security structure of Facebook is not strong and it does not work properly. 
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The trustworthiness of SNsis highly doubtful. Facebook's continuous change of 
settings (always to the detriment of my privacy) is something I abhor. I suffer 
using it only because I cannot persuade my friends to dump it and take measures 
to limit the possible disclosure of truly private information. 
There little protection over users from being abused or threatening. Perhaps 
when an IP receives multiple abusing reports the social media should the owner 
of the IP blocked from the social media.  The social media should have a strong 
connection with police or ‘even having a professional section as as police to 
protect their users’. There has been many news about how the users have been 
the victim  of the acts done by online criminals who have attacked the 
personality of the people by sending pics and other documents to the friend of 
the person. Even asking for money or other things. Unfortunately social media 
have been very weak in dealing with these increasing problem. 
There should be a good security for social networking. At least, there is a 
notification to our email or mobile phone when we update status from unusual 
location/access. I have some friends whose accounts were hacked (Thanks God, 
it's not me!); It is embarrassing when the hacker updates inappropriate status, as 
it will affect how public will appraise our character.  
There's a bunch of stuff on usenet under my name that I didn't post, because 
newsgroup postings take a ‘From’ address with no password required, and 
variously old flatmates using my computer, or college friends playing pranks, 
would cause things to get posted under my name that have since been archived 
into Google Groups -- searchable under my name -- without my permission. 
They know everything??? Where you live??? What you like to eat??? 
Everything??? 
This app is a perfect example and way to make it clear to people that your 
privacy and safety could be  an issue with social networks. Its awesome. Its not 
spam or a virus    http://www.takethislollipop.com/  
This is very concerning issues 
To hide my comments from someone 
Unable to delete content or manage who has access to my info 
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Unannounced changes to the way the site works 
Unauthorised disclosure of personal info to third party both intentionally and 
unintentionally 
Unauthorized use of my personal photos, creation of fake accounts with them. 
Unintended exposure of private information. Particularly information becoming 
searchable and possibly available to employers.  
Unknown use of my information; using the camera (possibly in the future) to 
observe me without my knowing in order to target advertising 
User friendly privacy 
Users should take care not to post any material that may have effect on their 
privacy in the first instance. That I think is the main impediment for social 
networks. Privacy measures should not negatively influence the users' capability 
to engage in networking activities. 
Various apps which require to access personal information and spam link.  
Want some kind of authorization before adding me to a random groups on 
facebook! 
What Facebook is doing with personal information ie. Selling rights to photos. 
When I see my children using Facebook and how little guidelines and 
understanding they have re: privacy. 
Whether privacy setting is doing what it supposed to do..!!!! 
Which one is suitable for public, which one is consumable for friends only, and 
which one is only for self.  Things that have been deleted according to some 
friends, they are not really deleted from the storage. 
Information Control Access of others and my friends to my friend lists and my activities. 
Advertisers using my information is a good thing. I infd the directed advetising 
to me as useful. If I was limited, I wouldn't have benefitted from some of the 
 332 APPENDICES 
advertising I have seen. 
Default should be maximum privacy rights with an opt out clause rather than 
maximum openness with the onus on the user to add privacy constraints. 
Easy to use general privacy policies are needed, but advanced or concerned 
users should be able to control everything in detail 
Ensure that other people (hacker) cannot access my information 
I should be able to delete all of my account information, and should be notified 
by providers if I’m forgotten about my sporadic registration in the past 
I should be asked before any changes are made. 
I understand that with free services I will not have total control over information 
I choose to share but I would like more control over what other people share 
about me. 
I'm a security freak. Probably not the best user case. 
Misuse or misinterpretation of photos or information 
My information should not be displayed without my permission. 
My information's should not be got by anyone 
No selling/ giving of information to third parties, governments, etc. 
Should be able to use password if anyone wants to access my private 
information. 
Spamming 
Standards used by many SNS - each is various 
Targeted advertising is sometimes a little invasive 
The management should easy and user-friendly, e.g., by easy-to-use and 
meaningful grouping 
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To protect  from unwanted/unauthorized users 
Yes,no idea what is going on. 
Information 
collection and storage 
Deleted must mean physically deleted for good! 
It's not the analysis but how the use it that can be of concern 
I don't mind for example,Personalized search by Google, since it is often useful 
(e.g., location-based preference in search results) 
I have  DATA collecting and storing 
I should be able to find out which third parties are able to access my information 
If i decide to shut an account, they should send me a dump of my data.. Then 
close acct.. Then if i decide to rejoin.. I can put data back.. 
My concern is that my information may not be completely erased from the 
servers of social networking sites even after i delete it 
No information without my authorisation 
No third party should be enabled to collect any information about me unless I 
explicitly consent to it. 
Social provider had better gives little database to users 
Storing deleted information and my inability to control it is a serious concern 
The item 21 is very important 
They should not be storing any deleted information! 
User should have control how much data can be accessed by third parties. 
Users should be informed when any type of linking information or content about 
them is given or linked by others without prior submission by default 
Where is my data is stored ? 
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Well, I think they can keep deleted data for a period of say, one month. Because, 
often, general user are frustrated if they cannot retrieve deleted data! 
Yes, that is why I don't add very much. 
Information access Contacts being made from third party to my friends. 
Do not like the advertisements which occur around my browser just because I 
browsed a certain webpage before. 
I think, there should be a mechanism to show the user about last login 
time/history etc. 
I think it's important to understand the difference between personally 
identifiable information and generic user based information not able to be tied to 
me.  There is a big difference. 
I'm much more concerned about usage of my name in a professional setting than 
in a private one (linkedin vs. Facebook. 27. It's hard to assess what 3rd-party 
apps do with information obtained through mobiles 
Information should be well protected 
It should be possible to claim one's identity if it's be clearly stolen 
Knowing where my information is and who has it. 
Service providers provide my personal information for security agency or do not 
provide adequate measures to prevent that 
Storing private information on mobile device poses a risk to our data. I am 
concern about my information being stolen and forged. 
Stuff like the like button should be forbidden, it allows to track users anywhere 
in the net and nobody knows about! 
Web browsing history should not be made available to 3rd parties or used to 
rank results or to target advertising. 
What do verification policies for real names have to do with leaking data? 
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Would not like to have your web browsing behaviour be tracked when even you 
are not logged in. 
Yes, someone I do not know use my photo as the profile picture 
Unauthorized 
secondary use 
Authorisation is necessary 
Availability of Public Info should only be used if I have clearly authorised it to 
be used 
Cover photos should not be public. 
Exact location is one thing, identifying it as workplace or home is another. 
I do not know what implicit interactions means 
I do not want my location being used for various advertisement purposes 
Yes, I do not like it, and once again, that is why I don't add very much content, 
and try not to let my location known but friends sometimes tag me at places. 
Over or undesirable 
information 
disclosing 
Anything that identifies me personally I am opposed to without my permission, 
however browser based, unidentifiable information such as browsing history, 
cookies, aggregated data is fine. 
I expect aq good support and follow up on the cases that I report as abuse 
If the offensive content (i.e., not a bad picture, but something I did ) is factual 
and the publisher can prove it, then I shouldn't be able to have it forcibly 
removed (this to avoid censorship abuses); re 40: I should be able to select 
which metadata should and should not be included with published photos and 
other content on a case-by-case basis 
It should be forbidden that other users can post that they have seen another one 
anywhere, for example,As feasible by facebook places 
My where about should not be available to my friends unless I choose to 
disclose it 
Privacy should be what you choose and guaranteed based on your choice. 
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Really hate the idea of employers/potential employers looking up people's 
facebook profiles etc. 
SNshave little benefit to me, unless I actually share some information 
Well, I think this problem is unsolvable. However, we may come into an 
agreement- such as social translucence can be an alternative 
With my authorisation, disclosure is OK, but undesirable information, there is a 
question mark, why? 
You just can never be certain if there is something out there about you that 
shouldn’t be there. How can you ensure its all ok 
Table A. 4: Architectural principles based on PbD principles (Cavoukian, 2009)  
Name PbD principles 
Reference Principle 1: Proactive not Reactive; Preventative not Remedial 
Principle 2: Privacy as the Default 
Principle 3: Privacy Embedded into Design 
Principle 4: Full Functionality: Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum 
Principle 5: End-to-End Security: Full Lifecycle Protection 
Principle 6: Visibility and Transparency: Keep it open 
Principle 7: Respect for User Privacy 
Statement These principles of information management apply to SN  
Rationale The way SN can provide a consistent and measurable level of privacy if the SN 
decision-makers/service providers abide by the principles. SN privacy 
functionality should be proactive not reactive, preventative not remedial. Privacy 
functionalities should available by default and embedded into the design. 
However, the SN should not trade off with functionality; the SN should provide 
full functionality and make the system visible and transparent. But the system 
should deal with end to end security and always respect for its user privacy. 
Implications Without these principles, exclusions, favouritism, and inconsistency would 
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rapidly undermine the management of information in SN. However, information 
management initiatives should not begin until they are examined for compliance 
with the principles. A conflict with a specific framework principle can be 
resolved by changing the framework of the initiative. 
Principle 1: Proactive not Reactive; Preventative not Remedial 
1. Affirm commitment to a strong, proactive privacy. 
2. Ensure to concrete actions, not just policies, reflect a commitment to 
privacy. Monitor through a system of regularly reviewed metrics. 
3. Develop systematic methods to assess privacy & security risks and to 
correct any negative impacts, well before they occur. 
4. Encourage privacy practices demonstrably shared  by diverse user 
communities and stakeholders, in a culture of continuous improvement. 
Principle 2: Privacy as the Default 
1.  Limited data collection as possible for specific a purpose(s) -begin with no 
collection of PII  
2.  Minimize the collection of data at the outset to only what is strictly necessary. 
3. Limit the use of personal information to the specific purposes for which it was 
collected. 
4. Create technological, policy and procedural barriers to data linkages with PII. 
Principle 3: Privacy Embedded into Design 
1. Make a Privacy Risk Assessment an integral part  of the design stage of 
any initiative, for example,when designing the technical architecture of a 
system, pay particular attention to potential unintended uses of the 
personal information. 
2. Base identity metasystems on the ‘Laws of Identity,’  intended to codify 
a set of fundamental principles to which universally adopted, sustainable 
identity architecture must conform.  
3. Consider privacy in system development lifecycles and organizational 
engineering processes. System designers should be encouraged to 
practice responsible innovation in the field of advanced analytics. 
4. Embed privacy into regulatory approaches that may take the form of 
self-regulation, sectoral privacy laws, omnibus privacy legislation and 
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more general legislative frameworks, calling for an approach guided by 
‘flexibility, common sense and pragmatism.’ 
Principle 4: Full Functionality: Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum 
1. Acknowledge that multiple, legitimate business interests must coexist. 
2. Understand, engage and partner – Practice the 3Cs – communication, 
consultation and collaboration, to better understand multiple and, at 
times, divergent interests. 
3. Pursue innovative solutions and options to achieve multiple 
functionalities.  
Principle 5: End-to-End Security: Full Lifecycle Protection 
1. Employ encryption by default to mitigate the security issues associated 
with the loss, theft or disposal of electronic devices such as laptops, 
tablets, smartphones, USB memory keys and other external media. The 
default state of data, if breached, must be ‘unreadable.’ 
2. Deploy encryption correctly and carefully integrate it into devices and 
workflows in an automatic and seamless manner. 
3. Ensure the secure destruction and disposal of personal information at the 
end of its lifecycle. 
Principle 6: Visibility and Transparency: Keep it open 
1. Make the identity and contact information of the individual(s) 
responsible for privacy and security available to the public and well 
known within the organization. 
2. Implement a policy that requires all ‘public facing’ documents to be 
written in ‘plain language’ that is easily understood by the individuals 
whose information is the subject of the policies and procedures.  
3. Make information about the policies, procedures and controls relating to 
the management of Personal Information readily available to all 
individuals. 
4. Consider publishing summaries of various audit result such as Privacy 
Impact Assessment and third party audit results. 
5. Make available a list of data holdings of Personal Information 
maintained by your organization. 
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6. Make audit tools available so that users can easily determine how their 
data is stored, protected and used. 
7. Users should also be able to determine whether the policies are being 
properly enforced. 
Principle 7: Respect for User Privacy  
1. Offer strong privacy defaults. 
2. Provide appropriate notice. 
3. Consider user-friendly options: 
4. Make user preferences persistent and effective. 
5. Provide users with access to data about themselves. 
6. Provide access to the information management practices of the 
organization. 
 
Table A. 5: Stakeholders analysis and users requirements 
Stakeholder Analysis 
Users requirements 
  Mean Std. Deviation Required 
Understanding/ 
Commitment/ 
Support 
All stakeholders 
IC1 6.5612 1.16168 High 
IC2 6.4964 1.06577 High 
IC3 6.4388 1.25753 High 
IC4 6.5108 1.22396 High 
IC5 6.4173 1.30717 High 
IA1 6.7770 .89316 High 
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IA3 6.2518 1.16776 High 
IA5 5.6835 1.79789 High 
IA6 6.5755 .97042 High 
UUR1 3.7266 2.26762 High 
UU2 6.3813 1.35879 High 
OD3 6.2950 1.34839 High 
OD2 6.6331 1.12381 High 
ODR6 4.4388 2.01485 Medium 
Users 
IAR2 3.3094 2.14965 High 
OD1 6.3597 1.26266 High 
Service Providers 
IC8 6.2518 1.37310 High 
CS1 6.5324 1.11187 High 
CSR2 3.7914 2.15176 High 
CS3 5.7482 1.73244 High 
CSR5 3.1223 2.16514 High 
IA7 6.4820 1.22387 High 
Third parties  
(Inside the network) 
IC6 6.5540 1.07793 High 
CS4 6.5755 1.07662 High 
IA4 6.7194 .80783 High 
UUR3 2.9712 2.14659 High 
UU4 6.2446 1.49803 High 
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External parties  
(Outside the 
network) 
IC7 6.4748 1.11856 High 
 
Table A. 6: Mapping Privacy requirements and SN functionalities (in tabular format) 
   SN 
Functionalities  
 
Privacy 
Requirements  
Identity 
management
Expert 
search 
Context 
awareness 
Contact 
Management
Exchange Network 
awareness 
Information Control  
      
Information collection 
and storage    
    
Information access  
     
 
Unauthorized 
secondary use (Internal 
& External ) 
 
 
 
   
SN Practice  
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Table A. 7: Mapping between privacy requirements and PbD Principles 
           
             PbD           
               
principles 
 
Privacy 
Requirements  
Proactive not 
Reactive; 
Preventative 
not Remedial 
Privacy 
as the 
Default
Privacy 
Embedded into 
Design 
Full 
Functionalit
y – Positive-
Sum, not 
Zero-Sum 
End-to-End 
Security- 
Full 
Lifecycle 
Protection 
Visibility 
and 
Transpar
ency- 
Keep it 
open 
Respect 
for User 
Privacy 
Information 
Control  
Users will be 
facilitated SN 
functionalitie
s ensuring 
privacy 
requirements 
from the 
beginning of 
the Social 
Networks. 
These sub-
principles will 
ensure designing 
of privacy 
friendly 
architecture and 
framework for 
Social Network.  
According 
to this 
principle, it 
is possible 
to have SN 
functionaliti
es to 
disclose 
information 
as well as 
facilitate 
privacy, 
which is 
core of this 
privacy 
architecture 
and 
framework. 
Propose 
encryption 
However, 
encryption 
may not be 
the right 
solution. 
There may 
other 
privacy 
model 
available for 
providing 
end to end 
protection 
for SN users
  
Information 
collection and 
storage  
 
Information access 
  
Unauthorized 
secondary use 
(Internal & 
External  
 
SN Practice  
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Figure A. 12: SN Privacy architecture formation 
Table A. 8: Diagram legend117 
Legend Description 
 
Business event: A business event triggers a business process or is generated by a business 
process. 
 
Entity application component: An entity component is frequently derived from business 
entities, and is responsible for managing the access to the entity, and its integrity. 
 
Function: Describes one function of the organization. 
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Goal: This is a goal or objective of the enterprise. 
 
Business service: Represents a service provided by the business, which may then be realized 
by one or more IS services. 
 
Table A. 9: Information types and data entities 
Information types and Data entities 
Private information Protected information Public information 
Social security number 
Legal investigations conducted by the 
government Name 
Medical record number Information related to offense Work experience 
Health plan number Criminal conviction 
Financial data on public 
sponsored project 
Account number Classified information 
Employment or educational 
verification 
Personal profile 
information Public profile 
Home address 
E-mail address 
Consumer purchase 
history 
Physical characteristic 
Online activity 
Geo-location place 
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Racial origin 
Ethnic origin 
Political opinion 
Religious belief   
Philosophical belief   
Trade-union membership   
Sexual preference   
Genetic Information    
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Table A. 10: Alice’s settings for political group using privacy model 
  Stakeholders 
  
Users  
Political group 
    
Data 
types 
SN User privacy requirements: IC: Information Control, CS: Information collection and storage, IA: Information access, UU: Unauthorized 
secondary use (Internal & External), SP: SN Practice 
          HP(High Privacy)   BP (Balanced Privacy)   LP (Low Privacy)     
IC1 IC2 IC3 IC4 IC5 IC6 IC7 CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 IA1 IA2 IA3 IA4 IA5 IA6 UU1 UU2 UU3 SP1 SP2 SP3 SP4 SP5 
SD1                                                   
SD2                                                   
SD3                                                   
SD4                                                   
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DD1                                                   
DD2                                                   
DD3                                                   
DD4                                                   
DD5                                                   
DD6                                                   
DD7                                                   
DD8                                                   
DD9                                                   
DD10                                                   
DD11                                                   
DD12                                                   
DD13                                                   
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DD14                                                   
DD15                                                   
ED1                                                   
ED2                                                   
ED3                                                   
ED4                                                   
ED5                                                   
ED6                                                   
ED7                                                   
ED8                                                   
ID1                                                   
ID2                                                   
ID3                                                   
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ID4                                                   
ID5                                                   
ID6                                                   
ID7                                                   
ID8                                                   
ID9                                                   
BD1                                                   
BD2                                                   
BD3                                                   
BD4                                                   
BD5                                                   
BD6                                                   
DR1                                                   
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Table A. 11: Alice’s settings for others using privacy model 
  Stakeholders 
  
Users Service provider Third parties External parties 
 Other friends or groups  
Data 
types 
SN User privacy requirements: IC: Information Control, CS: Information collection and storage, IA: Information access, UU: Unauthorized 
secondary use (Internal & External), SP: SN Practice 
          HP(High Privacy)   BP (Balanced Privacy)   LP (Low Privacy)     
IC1 IC2 IC3 IC4 IC5 IC6 IC7 CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 IA1 IA2 IA3 IA4 IA5 IA6 UU1 UU2 UU3 SP1 SP2 SP3 SP4 SP5 
SD1                                                   
SD2                                                   
SD3                                                   
SD4                                                   
DD1                                                   
DD2                                                   
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DD3                                                   
DD4                                                   
DD5                                                   
DD6                                                   
DD7                                                   
DD8                                                   
DD9                                                   
DD10                                                   
DD11                                                   
DD12                                                   
DD13                                                   
DD14                                                   
DD15                                                   
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ED1                                                   
ED2                                                   
ED3                                                   
ED4                                                   
ED5                                                   
ED6                                                   
ED7                                                   
ED8                                                   
ID1                                                   
ID2                                                   
ID3                                                   
ID4                                                   
ID5                                                   
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ID6                                                   
ID7                                                   
ID8                                                   
ID9                                                   
BD1                                                   
BD2                                                   
BD3                                                   
BD4                                                   
BD5                                                   
BD6                                                   
DR1                                                   
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